Select Classics.—Vol. I.

CICERO

ON THE

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

OR

QUAESTIONUM TUSCULANARUM

LIBER I.

WITH NOTES AND AN APPENDIX.

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PREFACE.

The occasion and design of publishing the little volumes entitled *Select Classics*, may be stated in a few words. It is customary with me, always to recommend to my pupils in sacred philology, the daily reading of some portion of a good Latin or Greek classical writer. This I do, in order that they may increase their knowledge of the ancient languages, and be able to judge of the difference between classical idioms and those of the Scriptures. But this is not my only motive. Believing that the study of the best Latin and Greek authors is very important to the cultivation of an improved taste in literature, and to the acquisition of tact and ability in criticism and in writing, I feel it to be a matter of serious consequence, that every theological student should devote some portion of his time to this employment.

But what shall he read? Merely to repeat the reading of college books, would be unattractive to most students. And if they are to extend it beyond these limits, what shall be selected? A question of more difficulty to the young student, (whose circle of acquaintance with the classics is generally somewhat narrow), than every one will be apt to imagine. And even after he has made his choice, how shall he obtain the pieces which he desires? They appear, more usually, only in the large collections; which he cannot afford to purchase. Or if separately printed, they are not published, perhaps, in our country; or if they are, most of them are merely copies of European editions, which (the school-books excepted) are principally characterized by notes on the various readings of the text; in which he, who studies for profit and pleasure, can feel but little if any interest. Grammarians and critical editors alone can profit much by these. But the

great mass of readers belong to neither of these classes. Consequently, they need an *exegetical* commentary. They are, and ought to be, much more interested to know what the text in general *means*, than to know how a solitary word or phrase, which now and then occurs, is to be read.

The Select Classics which I now publish, are intended wholly for this latter class of readers. In particular are they designed for young readers in our country, who need to be allured and guided and encouraged, with respect to classical study.

The plan which I have adopted, supersedes the necessity of printing a continuous translation. Every passage, in which I have supposed that there could be any difficulty, the student will find translated or explained in the notes; and some perhaps will even wonder, that I have done so much in this way, rather than so little. None, I would hope, will have reason to complain, that the meaning of the author is not made sufficiently evident; so far, at least, as I am able to understand and explain it. That I have always understood it rightly, I would not venture to assert. I can only say, that I have devoted to the study of it, as much time as I could possibly spare from my other duties and studies; and that I indulge the hope, that I shall not often mislead the student.

If it should be asked, why I have been so liberal in my biographical and historical notes and explanations; my answer is, that I have adopted this course for several reasons. Most readers have not the sources at hand, from which I have drawn more or less of them. Many of these sources are in languages, which the students in general of our country do not understand. And even in cases where the reader may have access to these sources, and be able to draw from them, it is not often the case, when he sits down to spend a few leisure moments in reading a classic, that he feels inclined to load his table with biographical, geographical, chronological, and historical works, (not to mention many other helps), in order that he may proceed with a due understanding of his author.

It falls, moreover, within the *special* design of the

present publication, to render classical reading easy, and attractive, and profitable. Whatever may be said as to the expediency of this, with reference to students who are pursuing classical studies as a daily business, and whose strength may sometimes be put to the trial by the reading of text without note or comment; such a principle is not applicable to the present case. I publish these volumes for the aid of those, who wish to renew their acquaintance with the classics, or to increase their knowledge of them, with as little expense of time and money as possible. To purchase all the helps, which I have made use of for their benefit, would be expensive; to study them, would require time and pains which many will hardly deem themselves able to spare.

It has been my endeavour, in the notes and appendix to this work, to point out in what manner we should read the Greek and Roman writers in order truly to profit by them. If I have succeeded in the attempt, it may encourage others to rise up as editors among us, in the like way.

In the *text* of the present volume, I have not implicitly followed any one edition. I have had before me the editions of Ernesti, of Rath, of Nobbe, and of Carey; all recent editors; the three last, I believe, still living. In doubtful cases I have selected that which seemed to me the most probable reading; and in this, I have sometimes agreed with one, and sometimes another, of these editors. As we have no manuscripts in this country from which a new edition of the text could be formed, I have done all in respect to it, that the nature of the case seemed to admit. From none of these editions have I derived any *exegetical* aid, which is worthy of being mentioned. Rath's book is a large one, and filled with notes; but almost all of them are occupied with speculations concerning the state of the text.

The punctuation, I may say, is wholly my own. I found none with which I was satisfied. Carey's I regard as the best; and Nobbe's stands next; while that of Ernesti often and almost of necessity obscures the meaning of the text; at least it does so for me. By careful and diligent attention to the punctuation, I

would hope that I have made the sense more evident to the reader, in many passages, than it is in the common editions.

I was induced to engage in the present work, by the express wish of my pupils, during the past year. My earnest hope and desire are, that they, and others associated with them, may be profited by the study of it; as it is specially designed for theological students. I would indulge the hope, also, that others who pursue classical study, may take an interest in it; for I can scarcely conceive of a topic more interesting, in a moral and religious point of view, than the knowledge of what the highest efforts of human reason could without revelation and of themselves do, in developing the doctrine of the soul's immortality.

My present design is, to publish a second volume in connexion with this, which is to consist of Plato's *Phaedo*, i. e. his treatise on the immortality of the soul. The present volume is a specimen of the manner which I mean to pursue, in respect to commentary, and to the critical examination of the author's arguments.

In the present volume, I have adapted the sections (marked §) to the purpose of discriminating the larger transitions of the author's discourse. I found these so discrepant from each other in my different editions, and oftentimes so much at variance with what seemed to me the most desirable division of the text, that, after consideration, I was induced to abandon the plan of following any one of them, and to mark the sections anew. Another object obtained by marking them, is, *to facilitate references to the text*, in the notes and elsewhere.

I have also introduced breaks or paragraphs in many places of the text, where most editions make none. Ernesti has printed an almost unbroken text; by which the reader is often perplexed, and always fatigued.

I have also ventured to go a step further than any of the editions which I have seen, viz., to print the colloquy *in the manner of a dialogue*. Every reader will, I trust, spontaneously give his assent to this.

In those cases where I have supposed there could be any doubt, in the mind of the reader, with regard to the Ablative case of the first declension, as distinguish-

ed from the Nominative, I have marked the Ablative in the usual way. Carey marks it always; the German editors, never. It is unnecessary to mark it for the practised reader; but it is convenient for the unpractised one to have it marked in doubtful cases. I have marked such cases; but I have come, in the course of printing, and when it was too late to retrace my steps, to the entire conviction, that the method of Carey is the best.

Here and there I have printed a whole sentence in *capitals*. My object is, to render conspicuous to the eye, and easy to be found, such sentences as are extraordinary for the sentiment which they contain, or as will serve for significant mottos in writing, or maxims in conversation.

I could never be induced, placed in such circumstances as I am at present, to give my time and attention to the exegesis of any heathen author, were I not convinced that the study of such authors is important to the interpreter of the sacred writings. It is because of the bearing which such study has on the interpretation of the Scriptures, and because of the deeply interesting nature of the subjects discussed in the selection which I have made, that I feel myself to be within the proper sphere of my duty, while engaged in this work.

My reason for publishing my notes and strictures in English, is the same which induces almost all the lexicographers of Greek and Latin, at the present day, to publish their explanations in their own vernacular language. He who expects to aid the young reader, must make it not only possible for him to understand his explanations, but a matter of course that they should be understood without much effort or study. Where is to be the end of interpretation, if each writer who attempts to explain, is as difficult to be understood, as the *original* on which he comments? My object would be entirely defeated, by pursuing such a course.

Should this work meet with a favourable reception, I would hope to see some other individual proceed farther in the execution of the plan now commenced. With the little volume from Plato, should my life be spared to finish it, I must bid adieu to this kind of labour.

My present duties and station call for all my attention in another way; and the guardians and friends of the Seminary with which I am connected, expect, and have a right to expect, that I should obey the call. Most cheerfully shall I do it, if it may please a kind Providence to give me ability. Thus far, all the attention I have bestowed on the little volumes of Select Classics, has been of direct and immediate advantage to my exegetical studies. I cannot, therefore, but think the time well spent; and especially so, if the undertaking should meet the public approbation so as to excite some of the scholars in our country to publish such editions of the classics, as may be the real means of literary and moral improvement. We have been, long enough, shut up to the European method. More pieces which are *entire*, (only such should be published for the purposes of reading), from Plato, Xenophon, and other Greek writers, of a moral and highly interesting nature; and also like pieces from the Latin ones; might easily be selected. To all these I could wish to see added, *Selections from the Latin and Greek Christian Fathers;* writers now unknown, except by name, to most of our students; but deserving of more attention than our country has yet given them. How can a system of education be truly Christian and *liberal*, which entirely excludes them?

How soon the volume containing the Phaedo will follow, I cannot definitely state at present. I find the editing of it to be a serious business indeed, as it renders a knowledge of the Platonic system absolutely necessary, in order to give the requisite explanations. No one of all Plato's writings, partakes more of his *ideal* philosophy than this.

The public will not therefore expect that this volume should be hastily published, when they consider what an undertaking it is, and also that I can give but a very small portion of my time to the work, as my other duties must not in any wise be neglected. Still, I have advanced nearly through the commentary on the Phaedo, and would hope to conclude the work, during the winter or in the spring.

MOSES STUART.

Andover, Jan. 1833.

M. TULLII CICERONIS

TUSCULANARUM QUAESTIONUM

AD M. BRUTUM

LIBER PRIMUS.

DE CONTEMNENDA MORTE.

§ 1.

Cum defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus, aut omnino, aut magna ex parte, essem aliquando liberatus, retuli me, Brute, te hortante maxime, ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa revocavi. Et cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae *philosophia* dicitur, contineretur; hoc mihi Latinis litteris illustrandum putavi. Non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset: sed meum semper judicium fuit, omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos; aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae quidem digna statuissent in quibus elaborarent. Nam mores et instituta vitae, resque domesticas ac familiares, nos profecto et melius tuemur et lautius; rem vero publicam nostri majores certe melioribus temperaverunt et institutis et legibus. Quid loquar de re militari? in qua cum virtute nostri mul tum valuerunt, tum plus etiam disciplinâ. Jam illa quae naturâ non litteris assecuti sunt, neque cum Graecia neque ulla cum gente sunt conferenda. Quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas, fides,

quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum majoribus nostris comparanda?

§ 2.

Doctrinâ Graecia nos et omni litterarum genere superabat; in quo erat facile vincere non repugnantes. Nam cum apud Graecos antiquissimum sit e doctis genus poëtarum, siquidem Homerus fuit et Hesiodus ante Romam conditam, Archilochus regnante Romulo; serius poëticam nos accepimus. Annis enim fere DX post Romam conditam, Livius fabulam dedit (C. Claudio Caeci filio, M. Tuditano, consulibus) anno ante natum Ennium, qui fuit major natu quam Plautus; et Naevius.

Sero igitur a nostris poëtae vel cogniti vel recepti. Quamquam est in Originibus, solitos esse in epulis canere convivas ad tibicinem de clarorum hominum virtutibus, honorem tamen huic generi non fuisse, declarat oratio Catonis, in qua objecit ut probrum M. Nobiliori, quod is in provinciam poëtas duxisset; duxerat autem consul ille in Aetoliam, ut scimus, Ennium. Quo minus igitur honoris erat poëtis, eo minora studia fuerunt; nec tamen sic qui magnis ingeniis in eo genere exstiterunt, non satis Graecorum gloriae responderunt.

An censemus, si Fabio nobilissimo homini laudi datum esset quod pingeret, non multos etiam apud nos futuros Polycletos et Parrhasios fuisse? HONOS ALIT ARTES, OMNESQUE INCENDUNTUR AD STUDIA GLORIA; JACENTQUE EA SEMPER, QUAE APUD QUOSQUE IMPROBANTUR.

§ 3.

Summam eruditionem Graeci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus. Igitur et Epaminondas (princeps, meo judicio, Graeciae) fidibus praeclare cecinisse dicitur. Themistoclesque, aliquot ante annos cum in epulis recusasset lyram, habitus est indoctior. Ergo in Graecia musici floruerunt, discebantque id omnes; nec qui nesciebat satis excultus doctrinâ putabatur.

In summo apud illos honore geometria fuit; itaque nihil mathematicis illustrius. At nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate hujus artis terminavimus modum. At contra, oratorem celeriter complexi sumus; nec eum primo eruditum, aptum tamen ad dicendum; post autem eruditum. Nam Galbam, Africanum, Laelium, doctos fuisse traditum est; studiosum autem eum, qui iis aetate anteibat, Catonem; post vero, Lepidum, Carbonem, Gracchos; deinde ita magnos, nostram ad aetatem, ut non multum aut nihil omnino Graecis cederetur.

§ 4.

Philosophia jacuit usque ad hanc aetatem, nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum; quae illustranda, et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi. In quo eo magis nobis est elaborandum, quod multi jam esse Latini libri dicuntur scripti inconsiderate, ab optimis illis quidem viris, sed non satis eruditis.

FIERI AUTEM POTEST, UT RECTE QUIS SENTIAT, ET ID QUOD SENTIT POLITE ELOQUI NON POSSIT;

sed mandare quemquam litteris cogitationes suas, qui eas nec disponere nec illustrare possit, nec delectatione aliqua allicere lectorem, hominis est intemperanter abutentis et otio et litteris. Itaque suos libros ipsi legunt cum suis ; nec quisquam attingit, praeter eos qui eandem licentiam scribendi sibi permitti volunt. Quare si aliquid oratoriae laudi nostrâ attulimus industriâ, multo studiosius philosophiae fontes aperiemus, e quibus etiam illa manabant.

§ 5.

Sed ut Aristoteles, vir summo ingenio, scientiae copiâ, cum motus esset Isocratis rhetoris gloriâ, docere etiam coepit adolescentes dicere, et prudentiam cum eloquentia jungere ; sic nobis placet, nec pristinum dicendi studium deponere, et in hac majore et uberiore arte versari. HANC ENIM PERFECTAM PHILOSOPHIAM SEMPER JUDICAVI, QUAE DE MAXIMIS QUAESTIONIBUS COPIOSE POSSET ORNATEQUE DICERE ; in quam exercitationem ita nos studiose operam dedimus, ut jam etiam *scholas*, Graecorum more, habere auderemus ; ut nuper, tuum post discessum, in Tusculano, cum essent plures mecum familiares, tentavi quid in eo genere possem. Ut enim antea declamitabam causas, quod nemo me diutius fecit ; sic haec nunc mihi senilis est declamatio.

Ponere jubebam de quo quis audire vellet ; ad id, aut sedens aut ambulans, disputabam. Itaque dierum quinque *scholas*, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. Fiebat autem ita, ut cum is qui audire vellet dixisset quid sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. Haec est enim,

ut scis, vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi ; nam ita facillime, quid verisimillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Ergo ita nascetur exordium.

§ 6.

A. Malum mihi videtur esse mors.

M. Iisne qui mortui sunt, an iis quibus moriendum est ?

A. Utrisque.

M. Est miserum, igitur, quoniam malum.

A. Certe.

M. Ergo et ii quibus evenit jam ut morerentur, et ii quibus eventurum est, miseri.

A. Mihi ita videtur.

M. Nemo ergo non miser.

A. Prorsus nemo.

M. Et quidem, si tibi constare vis, omnes quicunque nati sunt eruntve, non solum miseri, sed etiam semper miseri. Nam si solos eos diceres miseros quibus moriendum esset, neminem tu quidem eorum qui viverent, exciperes ; moriendum est enim omnibus : esset tamen miseriae finis in morte. Quoniam autem etiam mortui miseri sunt, in miseriam nascimur sempiternam. Necesse est enim miseros esse eos, qui centum millibus annorum ante occiderunt, vel potius omnes quicumque nati sunt.

A. Ita prorsus existimo.

M. Dic, quaeso, num te illa terrent, triceps apud inferos Cerberus, Cocyti fremitus, trans-

vectio Acherontis, mento summam aquam attingens siti enectus Tantalus? Num illud, quod

. . . . . Sisyphus versat
Saxum sudans nitendo, neque proficit hilum?

Fortasse etiam inexorabiles judices, Minos et Rhadamanthus? Apud quos nec te L. Crassus defendet, nec M. Antonius; nec, quoniam apud Graecos judices res agetur, poteris adhibere Demosthenem; tibi ipsi pro te erit maximâ coronâ causa dicenda. Haec fortasse metuis, et idcirco mortem censes esse sempiternum malum.

A. Adeone me delirare censes, ut ista esse credam?

M. An tu haec non credis?

A. Minime vero.

M. Male hercule narras.

A. Cur? quaeso.

M. Quia disertus esse possem, si contra ista dicerem.

A. Quis enim non in ejusmodi causa? Aut quid negotii est, haec poëtarum et pictorum portenta convincere?

M. Atqui pleni sunt libri contra ista ipsa philosophorum disserentium.

A. Inepte sane; quis est enim tam excors, quem ista moveant?

M. Si ergo apud inferos miseri non sunt, ne sunt quidem apud inferos ulli.

A. Ita prorsus existimo.

M. Ubi ergo sunt ii quos miseros dicis, aut quem locum incolunt? Si enim sunt, nusquam esse non possunt.

A. Ego vero nusquam esse illos puto.

M. Igitur ne esse quidem.

A. Prorsus isto modo; et tamen miseros ob id ipsum quidem, quia nulli sunt.

M. Jam mallem Cerberum metueres, quam ista tam inconsiderate diceres.

A. Quid tandem?

M. Quem esse negas, eundem esse dicis; ubi est acumen tuum? Cum enim *miserum* esse dicis, tum eum qui non sit dicis esse.

A. Non sum ita hebes, ut istuc dicam.

M. Quid dicis igitur?

A. Miserum esse (verbi causâ) Marc. Crassum, qui illas fortunas morte dimiserit; miserum Cn. Pompeium, qui tanta gloria sit orbatus; omnes denique miseros, qui hac luce careant.

M. Revolveris eodem; sint enim oportet, si miseri sunt; tu autem modo negabas eos esse, qui mortui essent. Si igitur non sunt, nihil possunt esse; ita ne miseri quidem sunt.

A. Non dico fortasse etiam quod sentio; nam istuc ipsum, non esse cum fueris, miserrimum puto.

M. Quid? miserius quam omnino numquam fuisse? Ita qui nondum nati sunt, miseri jam sunt quia non sunt; et nos ipsi, si post mortem miseri futuri sumus, miseri fuimus antequam nati. Ego autem non commemini, antequam sum natus me miserum. Tu, si meliore memoria es, velim scire ecquid de te recordere.

A. Ita jocaris quasi ego dicam, eos miseros qui nati non sunt, et non eos qui mortui sunt.

M. Esse ergo eos dicis.

A. Immo, quia non sunt cum fuerint, eo miseros esse.

M. Pugnantia te loqui non vides? Quid enim tam pugnat, quam non modo miserum, sed omnino quidquam esse, qui non sit? An tu, egressus portâ Capena, cum Calatini, Scipionum, Serviliorum, Metellorum, sepulcra vides, miseros putas illos?

A. Quoniam me verbo premis, posthac non ita dicam *miseros esse*, sed tantum *miseros*, ob id ipsum quia non sunt.

M. Non dicis, igitur, *miser est M. Crassus;* sed tantum, *miser M. Crassus.*

A. Ita plane.

M. Quasi non necesse sit, quidquid isto modo pronunties, id aut esse, aut non esse. An tu dialecticis ne imbutus quidem es? In primis enim hoc traditur: Omne pronuntiatum, (sic enim mihi in praesentia occurrit ut appellarem ἀξίωμα, utar post alio si invenero melius), id ergo est pronuntiatum, quod est verum aut falsum. Cum dicis igitur, *miser M. Crassus*, aut hoc dicis, *miser est M. Crassus*, ut possit judicari verum id falsumne sit; aut nihil dicis omnino.

A. Age, jam concedo non esse miseros qui mortui sunt; quoniam extorsisti ut faterer, qui omnino non essent, eos ne miseros quidem esse posse. Quid? Qui vivimus, cum moriendum sit, nonne miseri sumus? Quae enim potest in vita esse jucunditas, cum dies et noctes cogitandum sit, jam jamque esse moriendum?

M. Ecqui ergo intelligis, quantum mali de humana conditione dejeceris?

A. Quonam modo?

M. Quia, si mori etiam mortuis miserum esset, infinitum quoddam et sempiternum malum

haberemus in vita. Nunc video calcem; ad quam cum sit decursum, nihil sit praeterea extimescendum. Sed tu mihi videris Ephicharmi, acuti nec insulsi hominis, ut Siculi, sententiam sequi.

A. Quam? non enim novi.

M. Dicam, si potero, Latine; scis enim me Graece loqui in Latino sermone non plus solere, quam in Graeco Latine.

A. Et recte quidem; sed quae tandem est Epicharmi ista sententia?

M. Emori nolo; sed me esse mortuum nihil aestimo.

A. Jam agnosco Graecum; et quoniam coëgisti ut concederem, qui mortui essent eos miseros non esse, perfice, si potes, ut ne moriendum quidem esse, miserum putem.

M. Jam istuc quidem nihil negotii est; sed etiam majora molior.

A. Quo modo hoc nihil negotii est? Aut quae sunt tandem ista majora?

M. Quia, quoniam si post mortem nihil est mali, ne mors quidem est malum; cui proximum tempus est post mortem, in quo mali nihil esse concedis. Ita ne moriendum quidem esse, malum est; id est enim, perveniundum esse ad id, quod non esse malum confitemur.

A. Uberius ista, quaeso; haec enim spinosiora prius (ut confitear) me cogunt, quam ut assentiar. Sed quae sunt ea, quae dicis te majora moliri?

M. Ut doceam, si possim, non modo malum non esse, sed *bonum* etiam esse mortem.

A. Non postulo id quidem; aveo tamen audire; ut enim non efficias quod vis, tamen, mors

ut malum non sit, efficies. Sed nihil te interpellabo ; continentem orationem audire malo.

M. Quid ? si te rogavero aliquid, nonne respondebis ?

A. Superbum id quidem esset ; sed, nisi quid necesse erit, malo ne roges.

M. Geram tibi morem ; et ea quae vis, ut potero, explicabo ; nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint et fixa quae dixero ; sed ut homunculus unus e multis, probabilia conjecturâ sequens. Ultra enim quo progrediar, quam ut veri videam similia, non habeo. Certa dicent ii, qui et percipi ea posse dicunt, et se sapientes esse profitentur.

A. Tu, ut videtur ; nos ad audiendum parati sumus.

§ 7.

M. Mors igitur ipsa, quae videtur notissima res esse, quid sit, primum est videndum. Sunt enim qui discessum animi a corpore putent esse mortem ; sunt qui nullum censeant fieri discessum, sed animum et corpus occidere, animumque cum corpore exstingui. Qui discedere animum censent, alii statim dissipari, alii diu permanere, alii semper. Quid sit porro ipse animus, aut ubi, aut unde, magna dissensio est. Aliis cor ipsum, animus videtur ; ex quo *ex-cordes*, *ve-cordes*, *con-cordesque* dicuntur ; et Nasica ille prudens, bis consul, *Corculum* ; et, *Egregie cordatus homo, catus Aelius Sextus.*

Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem ; aliis, pars quaedam cerebri visa est animi principatum tenere ; aliis, nec cor

ipsum placet, nec cerebri quandam partem, esse animum: sed alii *in* corde, alii *in* cerebro, dixerunt animi esse sedem et locum. Animum autem alii *animam;* ut fere nostri. Declarat nomen; nam et *agere animam* et *efflare* dicimus; [et *animosos*, et *bene animatos*, et *ex animi sententia*]; ipse autem animus ab *anima* dictus est. Zenoni Stoico animus, ignis videtur.

§ 8.

Sed haec quidem quae dixi, cor, cerebrum, animam, ignem, vulgo; reliqua fere singuli. Ut multi ante veteres, proxime autem Aristoxenus, musicus idemque philosophus, ipsius corporis intentionem quandam; velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur, sic ex corporis totius natura et figura, varios motus cieri, tamquam in cantu sonos. Hic ab artificio suo non recessit; et tamen dixit aliquid quod ipsum, quale esset, erat multo ante et dictum et explanatum a Platone. Xenocrates animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse; verum *numerum* dixit esse, cujus vis, (ut jam antea Pythagorae visum erat), in natura maxima esset. Ejus doctor, Plato, triplicem finxit animam: cujus principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit; et duas partes parere voluit, iram et cupiditatem, quas locis suis, iram in pectore, cupiditatem subter praecordia, locavit.

Dicaearchus autem, in eo sermone (quem Corinthi habitum tribus libris exponit) doctorum hominum disputantium, primo libro multos loquentes facit; duobus, Pherecratem quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum,

disserentem inducit, nihil esse omnino animum, et hoc esse nomen totum inane, frustraque *animalia* et *animantes* appellari; neque in homine inesse animum vel animam, nec in bestia; vimque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis aequabiliter esse fusam, nec separabilem a corpore esse; quippe quae nulla sit, nec sit quidquam nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita figuratum ut temperatione naturae vigeat et sentiat.

Aristoteles longe omnibus (Platonem semper excipio) praestans et ingenio et diligentia, cum quatuor illa genera principiorum esset complexus e quibus omnia orirentur, quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens; cogitare enim, et providere, et discere, et docere, et invenire aliquid, et tam multa alia, meminisse, amare, odisse, cupere, timere, angi, laetari— haec, et similia eorum, in horum quatuor generum nullo inesse putat. Quintum genus adhibet, vacans nomine; et sic ipsum animum *ἐνδελέχειαν* appellat, novo nomine, quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem.

§ 9.

Nisi quae me forte fugiunt, hae sunt fere de animo sententiae. Democritum enim, magnum quidem illum virum, sed levibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum concursu quodam fortuito, omittamus; nihil est enim apud istos, quod non atomorum turba conficiat. Harum sententiarum quae vera sit, deus aliquis viderit; quae verisimillima, magna quaestio est. Utrum

igitur inter has sententias dijudicare malumus, an ad propositum redire?

A. Cuperem equidem utrumque, si posset; sed est difficile confundere. Quare si, ut ista non disserantur, liberari mortis metu possumus, id agamus; sin id non potest, nisi hac quaestione animorum explicata, nunc, si videtur, hoc; illud, alias.

M. Quod malle te intelligo, id puto esse commodius; efficiet enim ratio, ut quaecumque vera sit earum sententiarum quas exposui, mors aut malum non sit, aut sit bonum potius. Nam si cor, aut sanguis, aut cerebrum est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore. Si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur; si ignis, exstinguetur; si est Aristoxeni harmonia, dissolvetur. Quid de Dicaearcho dicam, qui nihil omnino animum dicat esse? His sententiis omnibus, nihil post mortem pertinere ad quemquam potest; pariter enim cum vitâ sensus amittitur. Non sentientis autem, nihil est ullam in partem quod intersit.

Reliquorum sententiae spem afferunt, si te forte hoc delectat, posse animos, cum e corporibus excesserint, in coelum quasi in domicilium suum pervenire.

A. Me vero delectat: idque primum ita esse velim; deinde, etiam si non sit, mihi tamen persuaderi velim.

M. Quid tibi ergo opera nostra opus est? Num eloquentia Platonem superare possumus? Evolve diligenter ejus eum librum, qui est de animo; amplius quod desideres, nihil erit.

A. Feci mehercule, et quidem saepius; SED,

NESCIO QUO MODO, DUM LEGO, ASSENTIOR; CUM POSUI LIBRUM, ET MECUM IPSE DE IMMORTALITATE ANIMORUM COEPI COGITARE, ASSENSIO OMNIS ILLA ELABITUR.

M. Quid hoc? Dasne, aut manere animos post mortem, aut morte ipsa interire?

A. Do vero.

M. Quid, si maneant?

A. Beatos esse concedo.

M. Si intereant?

A. Non esse miseros; quoniam ne sint quidem. Jam istuc, coacti a te, paullo ante concessimus.

M. Quo modo igitur, aut cur, mortem malum tibi videri dicis; quae aut beatos nos efficiet, animis manentibus; aut non miseros, sensu carentes.

§ 10.

A. Expone igitur, nisi molestum est, primum, si potes, animos remanere post mortem; tum si minus id obtinebis (est enim arduum), docebis, carere omni malo mortem. Ego enim istuc ipsum vereor, ne malum sit, non dico carere sensu, sed carendum esse.

M. Auctoribus quidem ad istam sententiam, quam vis obtineri, uti optimis possumus; quod in omnibus causis et debet et solet valere plurimum; et primum quidem omni antiquitate; quae quo propius aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse, quae erant vera, cernebat.

Itaque unum illud erat insitum priscis illis, quos *Cascos* appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum, neque excessu vitae sic deleri hominem ut

funditus interiret. Idque cum multis aliis rebus, tum e pontificio jure et caeremoniis sepulcrorum, intelligi licet; quas maximis ingeniis praediti nec tanta cura coluissent, nec violatas tam inexpiabili religione sanxissent, nisi haesisset in eorum mentibus, mortem non interitum esse omnia tollentem atque delentem, sed quandam quasi migrationem commutationemque vitae, quae in claris viris et faeminis dux in caelum soleret esse; in ceteris humi retineretur, et permaneret tamen. Ex hoc, et nostrorum opinione, *Romulus in caelo cum diis agit aevum*, ut famae assentiens dixit Ennius; et apud Graecos, indeque perlapsus ad nos et usque ad Oceanum Hercules, tantus et tam praesens habetur deus. Hinc Liber, Semelâ natus; eademque famae celebritate Tyndaridae fratres, qui non modo adjutores in proeliis victoriae populi Romani, sed etiam nuntii fuisse perhibentur. Quid? Ino, Cadmi filia, nonne Leucothea nominata a Graecis, Matuta habetur a nostris? Quid? totum prope caelum, ne plures persequar, nonne humano genere completum est? Si vero scrutari vetera, et ex his ea, quae scriptores Graeci prodiderunt, eruere coner; ipsi illi, majorum gentium Dii qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecti in caelum reperientur. Quaere, quorum demonstrantur sepulcra in Graecia; reminiscere, quoniam es initiatus, quae traduntur mysteriis; tum denique, quam hoc late pateat, intelliges.

Sed qui nondum ea (quae multis post annis tractari coepissent) *physica* didicissent, tantum sibi persuaserant, quantum natura admonente

cognoverant. Rationes et causas rerum non tenebant. Visis quibusdam saepe movebantur, hisque maxime nocturnis, ut viderentur ii, qui vitâ excesserant, vivere.

§ 11.

Ut porro firmissimum afferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio. Multi de diis prava sentiunt; id enim vitioso more effici solet; omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur. Nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus effecit; non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus. Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium *lex naturae* putanda est. Quis est, igitur, qui suorum mortem primum non eo lugeat, quod eos orbatos vitae commodis arbitretur? Tolle hanc opinionem, luctum sustuleris. Nemo enim maeret suo incommodo. Dolent fortasse et anguntur; sed illa lugubris lamentatio fletusque maerens ex eo est, quod eum quem diximus vitae commodis privatum arbitramur, idque sentire. Atque haec ita sentimus naturâ duce, nulla ratione, nullaque doctrinâ.

Maximum vero argumentum est, naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus curae sunt, et maxime quidem, quae post mortem futura sint. *Serit arbores, quae alteri saeculo prosint*, ut ait Statius in Synephebis; quid spectans, nisi etiam postera secula ad se pertinere? Ergo arbores seret diligens agricola, quarum adspiciet baccam ipse nunquam; vir magnus leges, instituta, rempub-

licam non seret?* Quid procreatio liberorum, quid propagatio nominis, quid adoptiones filiorum, quid testamentorum diligentia, quid ipsa sepulcrorum monumenta, quid elogia significant, nisi nos futura etiam cogitare? Quid? illud num dubitas, quin specimen naturae capi debeat ex optima quaque natura? Quae est, igitur, melior in hominum genere natura, quam eorum qui se natos ad homines juvandos, tutandos, conservandos arbitrantur? Abiit ad deos Hercules; num- 10
quam abiisset, nisi, cum inter homines esset, eam sibi viam munivisset. Vetera jam ista, et religione omnium consecrata.

§ 12.

Quid in hac republica tot tantosque viros, ob rempublicam interfectos, cogitasse arbitramur? Iisdemne ut finibus nomen suum, quibus vita, terminaretur? Nemo umquam, sine magna spe immortalitis, se pro patria offerret ad mortem. Licuit esse otioso Themistocli; licuit Epaminondae; licuit, ne et vetera et externa quaeram, 20
mihi. Sed, nescio quomodo, INHAERET IN MENTIBUS QUASI SAECULORUM QUODDAM AUGURIUM FUTURORUM; idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis et existit maxime, et apparet facillime. Quo quidem demto, quis tam esset amens, qui semper in laboribus et periculis viveret? Loquor de principibus.

Quid poëtae? Nonne post mortem nobilitari volunt? Unde ergo illud:

> Adspicite o cives senis Ennii imaginis formam, 30
> Hic vestrum pinxit maxima facta patrum.

Mercedem gloriae flagitat ab iis, quorum patres affecerat gloriâ. Idemque:

Nemo me lacrymis decoret, nec funera fletu
Faxit. Cur? Volito vivu' per ora virum.

Sed quid poëtas? Opifices post mortem nobilitari volunt. Quid enim Phidias sui similem speciem inclusit in clypeo Minervae, cum inscribere non liceret? Quid nostri philosophi? Nonne in his ipsis libris, quos scribunt de contemnenda gloria, sua nomina inscribunt?

Quod si omnium consensus naturae vox est; omnesque, qui ubique sunt, consentiunt esse aliquid quod ad eos pertineat qui vitâ cesserint; nobis quoque idem existimandum est. Et si, quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur (quia naturâ optimâ sunt) cernere naturae vim maxime; verisimile est, cum optimus quisque maxime posteritati serviat, esse aliquid cujus is post mortem sensum sit habiturus.

§ 13.

Sed ut deos *esse*, natura opinamur; *qualesque* sint, ratione cognoscimus: sic *permanere animos*, arbitramur consensu nationum omnium; *qua in sede maneant qualesque sint*, ratione discendum est. Cujus ignoratio finxit Inferos, easque formidines quas tu contemnere non sine causa videbare. In terram enim cadentibus corporibus, hisque *humo* tectis (e quo dictum est *humari*), sub terra censebant reliquam vitam agi mortuorum. Quam eorum opinionem magni errores consecuti sunt: quos auxerunt poëtae. Frequens enim consessus theatri, in quo sunt mulierculae et pueri, movetur audiens tam grande carmen:

Adsum, atque advenio Acheronte, vix, via alta atque ardua;
Per speluncas saxis structas asperis, pendentibus,
Maximis; ubi rigida constat crassa caligo Inferum;

Tantumque valuit error (qui mihi quidem jam sublatus videtur), ut corpora cremata cum scirent, tamen ea fieri apud Inferos fingerent, quae sine corporibus nec fieri possent nec intelligi. Animos enim per se ipsos viventes, non poterant mente complecti; formam aliquam figuramque quaerebant. Inde Homeri tota νεκυία; inde ea quae meus amicus Appius νεκρομαντεῖα faciebat; inde in vicinia nostra Averni lacus,

> Unde animae excitantur, obscura umbra opertae, ostio
> Alti Acherontis, falso sanguine, imagines mortuorum.

Has tamen imagines loqui volunt; quod fieri nec sine lingua, nec sine palato, nec sine faucium laterumve et pulmonum vi et figura potest. Nihil enim animo videre poterant; ad oculos omnia referebant. Magni autem est ingenii sevocare mentem a sensibus, et cogitationem a consuetudine abducere. Itaque (credo equidem etiam alios tot saeculis, sed) quod litteris exstet, Pherecydes Syrius primum dixit, animos hominum esse sempiternos. Antiquus sane, fuit enim meo regnante gentili. Hanc opinionem discipulus ejus Pythagoras maxime confirmavit: qui, cum Superbo regnante in Italiam venisset, tenuit Magnam illam Graeciam cum honore disciplinae tum etiam auctoritate: multaque saecula postea sic viguit Pythagoreorum nomen, ut nulli alii docti viderentur.

§ 14.

Sed redeo ad antiquos. Rationem illi sententiae suae non fere reddebant, nisi quid erat numeris aut descriptionibus explicandum. Platonem ferunt, ut Pythagoreos cognosceret, in Ita-

liam venisse, et didicisse Pythagorea omnia; primumque de animorum aeternitate non solum sensisse idem quod Pythagoram, sed rationem etiam attulisse; quam (nisi quid dicis) praetermittamus, et hanc totam spem immortalitatis relinquamus.

A. An tu, cum me in summam exspectationem adduxeris, deseris? ERRARE, MEHERCULE, MALO CUM PLATONE, (quem tu quanti facias scio, et quem ex tuo ore admiror), QUAM CUM ISTIS VERA SENTIRE.

M. Macte virtute; ego enim ipse cum eodem ipso non invitus erraverim. Num igitur dubitamus, sicut pleraque, sic et hoc? Quamquam hoc quidem minime; persuadent enim mathematici, terram in medio mundo sitam, ad universi caeli complexum quasi puncti instar obtinere, quod κέντρον illi vocant; eam porro naturam esse quatuor omnia gignentium corporum, ut quasi partita habeant inter se et divisa momenta. Terrena et humida, suopte nutu et suo pondere, ad pares angulos in terram et in mare ferantur; reliquae duae partes, una ignea altera animalis, ut illae superiores in medium locum mundi gravitate ferantur et pondere, sic hae rursum rectis lineis in caelestem locum subvolent, sive ipsa naturâ superiora appetente, sive quod a gravioribus leviorâ naturâ repellantur.

Quae cum constent, perspicuum debet esse, animos, cum e corpore excesserint, sive illi sint *animales* (id est, spirabiles), sive *ignei*, in sublime ferri. Si vero aut *numerus* quidam sit animus, quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide dicitur; aut *quinta illa* non nominata magis quam

non intellecta natura ; multo etiam integriora ac puriora sunt, ut a terra longissime se efferant. Horum igitur aliquid animus est, nec tam vegeta mens aut in corde cerebrove, aut in Empedocleo sanguine demersa jaceat.

§ 15.

Dicaearchum vero, cum Aristoxeno aequali et condiscipulo suo, doctos sane homines, omittamus ; quorum alter ne condoluisse quidem unquam videtur, qui animum se habere non sentiat ; alter ita delectatur suis cantibus, ut eos etiam ad haec transferre conetur. Harmoniam autem ex intervallis sonorum nosse possumus, quorum varia compositio etiam harmonias efficit plures ; membrorum vero situs et figura corporis, vacans animo, quam possit harmoniam efficere non video. Sed hic quidem, quamvis eruditus sit (sicut est), haec magistro concedat Aristoteli ; canere ipse doceat : bene enim illo proverbio Graecorum praecipitur,

Quam quisque norit artem, in hac se exerceat.

Illam vero funditus ejiciamus individuorum corporum levium et rotundorum concursionem fortuitam ; quam tamen Democritus concalefactam et spirabilem, id est, animalem esse voluit. Is autem animus, qui, si est horum quatuor generum ex quibus omnia constare dicuntur, ex inflammata anima constat, (ut potissimum videri video Panaetio), superiora capessat necesse est ; nihil enim habent haec duo genera proni, et supera semper petunt. Ita, sive dissipantur, procul a terris id evenit ; sive perma-

nent et conservant habitum suum, hoc etiam magis necesse est ferantur ad caelum, et ab his perrumpatur et dividatur crassus hic et concretus aer qui est terrae proximus: calidior est enim, vel potius ardentior animus, quam est hic aer, quem modo dixi crassum atque concretum; quod ex eo sciri potest, quia corpora nostra, terreno principiorum genere confecta, ardore animi concalescunt.

§ 16.

Accedit, ut eo facilius animus evadat ex hoc aëre, quem saepe jam appello, eumque perrumpat, quod nihil est animo velocius; nulla est celeritas, quae possit cum animi celeritate contendere: qui si permanet incorruptus suique similis, necesse est ita feratur, ut penetret et dividat omne caelum hoc, in quo nubes, imbres, ventique coguntur, quod et humidum et caliginosum est propter exhalationes terrae. Quam regionem cum superavit animus, naturamque sui similem contigit et agnovit, junctis ex animâ tenui et ex ardore solis temperato ignibus insistit, et finem altius se efferendi facit. Cum enim sui similem et levitatem et calorem adeptus, tamquam paribus examinatus ponderibus, nullam in partem movetur; eaque ei demum naturalis est sedes, cum ad sui similem penetravit, in quo nulla re egens aletur, et sustentabitur iisdem rebus quibus astra sustentantur et aluntur.

Cumque corporis facibus inflammari soleamus ad omnes fere cupiditates; eoque magis incendi, quod iis aemulemur qui ea habeant quae nos

habere cupiamus; profecto beati erimus, cum, corporibus relictis, et cupiditatum et aemulationum erimus expertes. Quodque nunc facimus, cum laxati curis sumus, ut spectare aliquid velimus et visere; id multo tum faciemus liberius, totosque nos in contemplandis rebus perspiciendisque ponemus, propterea quod et naturâ inest mentibus nostris insatiabilis quaedam cupiditas veri videndi: et orae ipsae locorum illorum quo pervenerimus, quo faciliorem nobis cognitionem rerum caelestium, eo majorem cognoscendi cupiditatem dabunt.

Haec enim pulchritudo, etiam in terris, patriam illam et avitam (ut ait Theophrastus) philosophiam, cognitionis cupiditate incensam, excitavit. Praecipue vero fruentur eâ, qui tum etiam, cum has terras incolentes circumfusi erant caligine, tamen acie mentis dispicere cupiebant. Etenim si nunc aliquid assequi se putant, qui ostium Ponti viderunt, et eas angustias, per quas penetravit ea quae est nominata,

> Argo, quia *Argivi* in ea, delecti viri,
> Vecti, petebant pellem inauratam arietis;

aut ii, qui Oceani freta illa viderunt,

> Europam, Libyamque rapax ubi dividit unda;

quod tandem spectaculum fore putamus, cum totam terram contueri licebit, ejusque cum situm, formam, circumscriptionem, tum et habitabiles regiones, et rursum omni cultu propter vim frigoris aut caloris vacantes?

Nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea, quae videmus; neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore; sed, (ut non solum physici docent,

verum etiam medici qui ista aperta et patefacta viderunt), viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares, a sede animi perforatae. Itaque saepe aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris et oculis et auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus; ut facile intelligi possit, *animum* et videre et audire, non eas partes quae quasi fenestrae sunt animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat et adsit.

Quid? quod eadem mente res dissimillimas comprehendimus, ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, sonum? quae numquam quinque nuntiis animus cognosceret, nisi ad eum omnia referrentur, et is omnium judex solus esset. Atque ea profecto tum multo puriora et dilucidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, liber animus pervenerit. Nam nunc quidem, quamquam foramina illa quae patent ad animum a corpore, callidissimo artificio natura fabricata est, tamen terrenis concretisque corporibus sunt intersepta quodammodo. Cum autem nihil erit praeter animum, nulla res objecta impediet, quo minus percipiat quale quidque sit.

§ 17.

Quamvis copiose haec diceremus, si res postularet, quam multa, quam varia, quanta spectacula animus in locis caelestibus esset habiturus. Quae quidem cogitans, soleo saepe mirari nonnullorum insolentiam philosophorum, qui naturae cognitionem admirantur, ejusque inventori et principi gratias exultantes agunt, eumque venerantur ut deum; liberatos enim se per eum

dicunt gravissimis dominis, terrore sempiterno, et diurno ac nocturno metu. Quo terrore? Quo metu? Quae est anus tam delira, quae timeat ista, quae vos videlicet, si physica non didicissetis, timeretis?

Acherusia templa, alta Orci . . . .
Palatia Leti, obnubila tenebris loca!

Non pudet philosophum in eo gloriari, quod haec non timeat, et quod falsa esse cognoverit? ex quo intelligi potest, quam acuti natura sint, qui haec sine doctrina crediturí fuerint.

Praeclarum autem nescio quid adepti sunt, quod didicerunt, se, cum tempus mortis venisset, totos esse perituros. Quod ut ita sit (nihil enim pugno), quid habet ista res aut laetabile, aut gloriosum? Nec tamen mihi sane quidquam occurrit, cur non Pythagorae sit et Platonis vera sententia; ut enim rationem Plato nullam afferret, (vide quid homini tribuam), ipsa auctoritate me frangeret. Tot autem rationes attulit, ut velle ceteris, sibi certe persuasisse videatur.

§ 18.

Sed plurimi contra nituntur, animosque quasi capite damnatos morte multant. Neque aliud est quidquam, cur incredibilis his animorum videatur aeternitas, nisi quod nequeunt, qualis animus sit vacans corpore, intelligere et cogitatione comprehendere. Quasi vero intelligant, qualis sit in ipso corpore, quae conformatio, quae magnitudo, qui locus; ut, si jam possent in homine vivo cerni omnia quae nunc tecta sunt, casurusne in conspectum videatur animus; an tanta sit ejus tenuitas, ut fugiat aciem.

Haec reputent isti, qui negant animum sine corpore se intelligere posse. Videbunt, quem in ipso corpore intelligant. Mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio multoque obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit, tamquam alienae domi ; quam qualis cum exierit et in liberum caelum, quasi domum, venerit. Nisi enim, quod numquam vidimus, id quale sit intelligere non possumus ; certe et Deum ipsum, et divinum animum corpore liberatum, cogitatione complecti possumus.

Dicaearchus quidem et Aristoxenus, quia difficilis erat animi quid aut qualis esset intelligentia, nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt. Est illud quidem vel maximum, animo ipso animum videre ; et nimirum hanc habet vim praeceptum Apollinis, quo monet ut se quisque noscat. Non enim, credo, id praecipit, ut membra nostra aut staturam figuramve noscamus. Neque nos *corpora* sumus ; neque ego, tibi dicens hoc, *corpori* tuo dico. Cum igitur NOSCE TE dicit, hoc dicit : NOSCE ANIMUM TUUM. Nam corpus quidem quasi vas est, aut aliquod animi receptaculum. Ab animo tuo quidquid agitur, id agitur a te. Hunc igitur nosse, nisi divinum esset, non esset hoc acrioris cujusdam animi praeceptum, sic, ut tributum deo sit, [hoc est, se ipsum posse cognoscere.]

§ 19.

Sed si *qualis* sit animus, ipse animus nesciet ; dic, quaeso, ne *esse* quidem se sciet ? ne moveri quidem se ? Ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis, quae a Socrate est in Phaedro explicata, a me

autem posita est in sexto libro de Republica: "Quod semper movetur, aeternum est; quod autem motum affert alicui, quodque ipsum agitatur aliunde, quando finem habet motûs, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. Solum igitur quod se ipsum movet, quia numquam deseritur a se, numquam ne moveri quidem desinit; quinetiam ceteris quae moventur, hic fons, hoc principium est movendi. Principii autem nulla est origo. Nam e principio oriuntur omnia; ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest; nec enim esset principium, quod gigneretur aliunde. Quod si numquam oritur, ne occidit quidem umquam; nam principium exstinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur, nec a se aliud creabit, siquidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. Ita fit, ut motûs principium ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur. Id autem nec nasci potest, nec mori; vel concidat omne caelum omnisque terra, consistat necesse est, nec vim ullam nanciscatur qua primo impulsa moveatur. Cum pateat igitur, aeternum id esse quod se ipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? Inanimum est enim omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur interiore et suo. Nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis; quae, si est una ex omnibus quae se ipsa semper moveat, neque nata certe est, et aeterna est."

Licet concurrant plebeii omnes philosophi, (sic enim ii qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia dissident, appellandi videntur), non modo nihil umquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter conclusum

sit, intelligent. Sentit igitur animus se moveri ; quod cum sentit, illud una sentit, se vi sua non alienâ moveri; nec accidere posse ut ipse umquam a se deseratur. Ex quo efficitur aeternitas ; nisi quid habes ad haec.

A. Ego vero facile sum passus, ne in mentem quidem mihi aliquid contra venire ; ita isti faveo sententiae.

§ 20.

M. Quid illa tandem ? Num leviora censes, quae declarant inesse in animis hominum divina quaedam ? quae si cernerem quemadmodum nasci possent, etiam quemadmodum interirent viderem. Nam sanguinem, bilem, pituitam, ossa, nervos, venas, omnem denique memborum, et totius corporis figuram, videor posse dicere unde concreta, et quo modo facta sint; animum ipsum, si nihil esset in eo nisi id, ut per eum viveremus, tam natura putarem hominis vitam sustentari, quam vitis, quam arboris ; haec enim etiam dicimus *vivere.* Item si nihil haberet animus hominis, nisi ut appeteret aut refugeret, id quoque esset ei commune cum bestiis.

Habet primum memoriam, et eam infinitam, rerum innumerabilium. Quam quidem Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitae ; nam in illo libro, qui inscribitur Menon, pusionem quendam Socrates interrogat quaedam geometrica de dimensione quadrati. Ad ea sic ille respondet, ut puer ; et tamen, ita faciles interrogationes sunt, ut gradatim respondens eodem perveniat quo si geometrica didicisset. Ex quo effici vult Socrates, ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi

recordari. Quem locum multo etiam accuratius explicat in eo sermone, quem habuit eo ipso die quo excessit e vita; docet enim, quemvis, qui omnium rerum rudis esse videatur, bene interroganti respondentem, declarare se non tum illa discere, sed reminiscendo recognoscere; nec vero fieri ullo modo posse, ut, a pueris, tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones (quas ἐννοίας vocant) haberemus, nisi animus, antequam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset. Cumque nihil esset, ut omnibus locis a Platone disseritur, (nihil enim ille putat *esse* quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum *esse* quod semper tale sit qualem ἰδέαν appellat ille, nos *speciem*), non potuit animus haec in corpore inclusus agnoscere; cognita attulit. Ex quo tam multarum rerum cognitionis admiratio tollitur. Neque ea plane videt animus, cum tam repente in insolitum tamque perturbatum domicilium immigravit; sed cum se collegit atque recreavit, tum agnoscit illa reminiscendo. Ita nihil aliud est discere, nisi recordari.

Ego autem, majore etiam quodam modo, memoriam admiror. Quid est enim illud, quo meminimus? Aut quam habet vim; aut unde natam? Non quaero, quanta memoria Simonides fuisse dicatur; quanta Theodectes; quanta is, qui a Pyrrho legatus ad senatum est missus, Cyneas; quanta nuper Charmadas; quanta, qui modo fuit, Scepsius Metrodorus; quanta noster Hortensius. De communi hominum memoria loquor, et eorum maxime qui in aliquo majore studio et arte versantur; quorum quanta mens

sit, difficile est existimare; ita multa memine-runt.

§ 21.

Quorsum igitur haec spectat oratio? Quae sit illa vis, et unde, intelligendum puto. Non est certe nec cordis, nec sanguinis, nec cerebri, nec atomorum. Anima sit animus, ignisve, nescio; nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire quod nesciam. Illud, si ulla alia de re obscura affirmare possem, (sive anima sive ignis sit animus), eum jurarem esse *divinum*. Quid enim, obsecro te; terrâne tibi, aut hoc nebuloso et caliginoso coelo, aut sata aut concreta videtur tanta vis memoriae? Si *quid* sit hoc non vides, at *quale* sit vides; si ne id quidem, et *quantum* sit profecto vides.

Quid igitur? Utrum capacitatem aliquam in animo putamus esse, quo, tamquam in aliquod vas, ea quae meminimus infundantur? Absurdum id quidem; qui enim fundus, aut quae talis animi figura, intelligi potest. Aut quae tanta omnino capacitas? An imprimi quasi ceram animum putamus, et memoriam esse signatarum rerum in mente vestigia? Quae possunt verborum, quae rerum ipsarum, esse vestigia? Quae porro tam immensa magnitudo, quae illa tam multa possit effingere? Quid? Illa vis, quae tandem est quae investigat occulta, quae inventio atque excogitatio dicitur? Ex hacne tibi terrena, mortalique natura et caduca, concreta ea videtur? Aut qui primus, quod summae sapientiae Pythagorae visum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina? Aut qui dissipa-

tos homines congregavit, et ad societatem vitae convocavit? Aut qui sonos vocis, qui infiniti videbantur, paucis litterarum notis terminavit? Aut qui errantium stellarum cursus, regressiones, institiones notavit? Omnes magni; etiam superiores, qui fruges, qui vestitum, qui tecta, qui cultum vitae, qui praesidia contra feras, invenerunt; a quibus mansuefacti et exculti, a necessariis artificiis ad elegantiora defluximus. Nam et auribus oblectatio magna parta est, inventa et temperata varietate et natura sonorum.

Et astra suspeximus, tum ea quae sunt infixa certis locis, tum illa non re sed vocabulo errantia; quorum conversiones omnesque motus qui animo vidit, is docuit similem animum suum ejus esse, qui ea fabricatus esset in caelo. Nam cum Archimedes lunae, solis, quinque errantium, motus in sphaeram illigavit; effecit idem quod ille, qui in Timaeo mundum aedificavit, Platonis deus, ut tarditate et celeritate dissimillimos motus una regeret conversio. Quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitari.

§ 22.

Mihi vero ne haec quidem notiora et illustriora carere vi divina videntur, ut ego aut poëtam grave plenumque carmen sine caelesti aliquo mentis instinctu putem fundere; aut eloquentiam sine quadam vi majore fluere, abundantem sonantibus verbis uberibusque sententiis. Philosophia vero, omnium mater artium, quid est aliud, nisi (ut Plato ait) *donum*, (ut ego), *inventum*

deorum? Haec nos primum ad illorum cultum ; deinde ad jus hominum, quod situm est in generis humani societate ; tum ad modestiam magnitudinemque animi, erudivit : eademque ab animo, tamquam ab oculis, caliginem dispulit, ut omnia supera, infera, prima, ultima, media videremus. Prorsus haec *divina* mihi videtur vis, quae tot res efficiat et tantas. Quid est enim memoria rerum et verborum ? Quid porro in-
10 ventio ? Profecto id, quo nec in deo quidquam majus intelligi potest. Non enim ambrosiâ deos, aut nectare, aut Juventate pocula ministrante, laetari arbitror ; nec Homerum audio, qui Ganymedem a diis raptum ait propter formam, ut Jovi bibere ministraret. Non justa causa, cur Laomedonti tanta fieret injuria. Fingebat haec Homerus, et humana ad deos transferebat ; divina mallem ad nos. Quae autem divina ? Vigere, sapere, invenire, memin-
29 isse. Ergo animus (ut ego dico) *divinus* est ; ut Euripides audet dicere, *deus* : et quidem si deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. Nam ut illa natura caelestis et terra vacat et humore ; sic utriusque harum rerum humanus animus est expers. Sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta ; primum haec et deorum est et animorum.

§ 23.

Hanc nos sententiam secuti, his ipsis verbis in Consolatione haec expressimus : " Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest ; nihil
30 enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse vi-

deatur; nihil ne aut humidum quidem, aut flabile, aut igneum. His enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriae, mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod et praeterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit praesentia; quae sola divina sunt. Nec invenietur umquam, unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi a deo. Singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi, se juncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. Ita quidquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, caeleste et divinum est; ob eamque rem, aeternum sit necesse est. Nec vero deus ipse, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omniaque sentiens et movens, ipsaque praedita motu sempiterno." Hoc e genere, atque eadem e natura, est humana mens.

§ 24.

Ubi igitur, aut qualis est ista mens? Ubi tua, aut qualis? Potesne dicere? An, si omnia ad intelligendum non habeo quae habere vellem, ne iis quidem quae habeo mihi per te uti licebit? Non valet tantum animus ut se ipse videat; at, ut oculus, sic animus se non videns alia cernit. Non videt autem (quod minimum est) formam suam. Fortasse; quamquam id quoque; sed relinquamus. Vim certe, sagacitatem, memoriam, motum, celeritatem videt. Haec magna, haec divina, haec sempiterna sunt. Quae facie quidem sit, aut ubi habitet, ne quaerendum quidem est. Ut cum videmus speciem primum candoremque caeli; deinde

conversionis celeritatem tantam, quantam cogitare non possumus; tum vicissitudines dierum atque noctium, commutationesque temporum quadripartitas, ad maturitatem frugum et ad temperationem corporum aptas; eorumque omnium moderatorem et ducem solem; lunamque accretione et diminutione luminis, quasi fastorum notis signantem dies; tum in eodem orbe in duodecim partes distributo, quinque stellas ferri eosdem cursus constantissime servantes, disparibus inter se motibus; nocturnamque caeli formam undique sideribus ornatam: tum globum terrae eminentem e mari fixum in medio mundi universi loco, duabus oris distantibus habitabilem et cultum; quarum altera, quam nos incolimus,

> Sub axe posita ad stellas septem, unde horrifer
> Aquilonis stridor gelidas molitur nives;

altera australis, ignota nobis, quam vocant Graeci ἀντίχθονα; ceteras partes incultas, quod aut frigore rigeant aut urantur calore; hîc autem, ubi habitamus, non intermittit suo tempore,

> Caelum nitescere, arbores frondescere,
> Vites laetificae pampinis pubescere,
> Rami baccarum uberitate incurvescere,
> Segetes largiri fruges, florere omnia,
> Fontes scatere, herbis prata convestirier;

tum multitudinem pecudum, partim ad vescendum, partim ad cultas agrorum, partim ad vehendum, partim ad corpora vestienda; hominemque ipsum quasi contemplatorem caeli ac deorum, ipsorumque cultorem; atque hominis utilitati agros omnes et maria parentia—haec igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his praesit aliquis vel Effector,

si haec nata sunt (ut Platoni videtur), vel si semper fuerint (ut Aristoteli placet), Moderator tanti operis et muneris? Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, (ut deum non vides), tamen, UT DEUM AGNOSCIS EX OPERIBUS EJUS, SIC EX MEMORIA RERUM, ET INVENTIONE, ET CELERITATE MOTUS, OMNIQUE PULCHRITUDINE VIRTUTIS, VIM DIVINAM MENTIS AGNOSCITO.

§ 25.

In quo igitur loco est? Credo equidem in capite; et cur credam, afferre possum. Sed alias; nunc ubi sit animus, certe quidem in te est. Quae est ei natura? Propria, puto, et sua. Sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem; nihil ad id de quo agimus. Illud modo videto, ut deum noris, etsi ignores et locum et faciem; sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiam si ejus ignores et locum et formam. In animi autem cognitione, dubitare non possumus, nisi plane in physicis plumbei sumus, quin nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni, nec dividi, nec discerpi, nec distrahi potest; nec interire igitur. Est enim interitus quasi discessus et secretio ac diremptus earum partium, quae ante interitum junctione aliqua tenebantur.

His et talibus rationibus adductus, Socrates nec patronum quaesivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit; adhibuitque liberam contumaciam, a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia. Et supremo vitae die, de hoc ipso multa disseruit, et paucis ante diebus, cum facile

posset educi e custodia, noluit; et cum paene in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in caelum videretur ascendere.

Ita enim censebat itaque disseruit: 'Duas esse vias duplicesque cursus animorum a corpore excedentium. Nam qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent, et se totos libidinibus dedidissent, quibus caecati; vel domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinavissent; vel republica violanda fraudes inexpiabiles concepissent; iis devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum a concilio deorum. Qui autem se integros castosque servavissent; quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio, seseque ab his semper sevocassent; essentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum; his ad illos a quibus essent profecti, reditum facilem patere.' Itaque commemorat, ut cygni (qui non sine causa Apollini dicati sint, sed quod ab eo divinationem habere videantur quâ providentes quid in morte boni sit), cum cantu et voluptate moriantur; sic omnibus et bonis et doctis esse faciendum. Nec vero de hoc quisquam dubitare posset; nisi idem nobis accideret, diligenter de animo cogitantibus, quod iis saepe usu venit, qui cum acriter oculis deficientem solem intuerentur, ut adspectum omnino amitterent: sic mentis acies, seipsa intuens, nonnumquam hebescit, ob eamque causam contemplandi diligentiam amittimus. Itaque dubitans, circumspectans, haesitans, multa adversa reverens, tamquam ratis in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio.

Sed haec et vetera, et a Graecis. Cato au-

tem sic abiit e vita, ut causam moriendi nactum se esse gauderet. VETAT ENIM DOMINANS ILLE IN NOBIS DEUS, INJUSSU HINC NOS SUO DEMIGRARE. Cum vero causam justam deus ipse dederit, ut tunc Socrati, nunc Catoni, saepe multis; nae ille, medius fidius, vir sapiens, laetus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit; nec tamen illa vincula carceris ruperit, leges enim vetant. Sed tamquam a magistratu, aut ab aliqua potestate legitima, sic a deo evocatus atque emissus, exierit. Tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem, commentatio mortis est.

§ 26.

Nam quid aliud agimus, cum a voluptate, id est a corpore; cum a re familiari, quae est ministra et famula corporis; cum a republica; cum a negotio omni, sevocamus animum? Quid, inquam, tum agimus, nisi animum ad seipsum advocamus, secum esse cogimus, maximeque a corpore abducimus? Secernere autem a corpore animum, nec quidquam aliud est, quam emori discere. Quare hoc commentemur, mihi crede, disjungamusque nos a corporibus, id est, consuescamus mori. Hoc et, dum erimus in terris, erit illi caelesti vitae simile; et cum illuc ex his vinculis emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum. Nam qui in compedibus corporis semper fuerunt, etiam cum soluti sunt, tardius ingrediuntur; ut ii, qui ferro vincti multos annos fuerunt. Quo cum venerimus, tum denique vivemus. Nam haec quidem vita mors est; quam lamentari possem, si liberet.

A. Satis quidem tu in Consolatione es lamen-

tatus; quam cum lego, nihil malo quam has res relinquere; his vero modo auditis, multo magis.

M. Veniet tempus, et quidem celeriter, et sive retractabis sive properabis; volat enim aetas. Tantum autem abest [ab eo] ut malum mors sit, quod tibi dudum videbatur, ut verear ne homini nihil sit, non malum aliud certe, sed nihil bonum aliud potius: siquidem vel dii ipsi, vel cum diis futuri sumus.

§ 27.

A. Quid refert? Adsunt, enim, qui haec non probent.

M. Ego autem numquam ita te in hoc sermone dimittam, ulla uti ratione mors tibi videri malum possit.

A. Quî potes; cum ista cognoverim?

M. Quî possit, rogas? Catervae veniunt contra dicentium, non solum Epicureorum (quos equidem non despicio), sed nescio quo modo doctissimus quisque contemnit; acerrime autem deliciae meae, Dicaearchus, contra hanc immortalitatem disseruit. Is enim tres libros scripsit, (qui *Lesbiaci* vocantur, quod Mytilenis sermo habetur), in quibus vult efficere animos esse mortales. Stoici autem usuram nobis largiuntur, tamquam cornicibus: *diu* mansuros aiunt animos; *semper*, negant.

Num vis igitur audire, cur, etiam si ita sit, mors tamen non sit in malis?

A. Ut videtur; sed me nemo de immortalitate depellet.

M. Laudo id quidem; etsi nihil nimis oportet confidere. Movemur enim saepe aliquo acute

concluso ; labamus, mutamusque sententiam, clarioribus etiam in rebus ; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas. Id igitur si acciderit, simus armati.

A. Sane quidem ; sed ne accidat, providebo.

M. Num quid igitur est causae, quin amicos nostros Stoicos dimittamus ? eos dico qui aiunt animos manere e corpore cum excesserint, sed non semper.

A. Istos vero ; qui quod tota in hac causa difficillimum est suscipiant, posse animum manere corpore vacantem ; illud autem, quod non modo facile ad credendum est, sed (eo concesso quod volunt) consequens—id certe non dant, ut cum diu permanserit ne intereat.

M. Bene reprehendis ; ut se isto modo res habet. Credamus igitur Panaetio, a Platone suo disentienti ? quem enim omnibus locis divinum, quem sapientissimum, quem sanctissimum, quem Homerum philosophorum, appellat, hujus hanc unam sententiam de immortalitate animorum non probat. Vult enim, quod nemo negat, quidquid natum sit, interire ; nasci autem animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo qui procreantur ; quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus, appareat.

Alteram autem affert rationem ; nihil esse quod doleat, quin id aegrum esse quoque possit ; quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum : dolere autem animos ; ergo etiam interire.

§ 28.

Haec refelli possunt ; sunt enim ignorantis, cum de aeternitate animorum dicatur, de mente

dici quae omni turbido motu semper vacet ; non de partibus iis in quibus aegritudines, irae, libidinesque versentur : quas is, contra quem haec dicuntur, semotas a mente et disclusas putat. Jam similitudo magis apparet in bestiis, quarum animi sunt rationis expertes ; hominum autem similitudo, in corporum figura magis exstat. Et ipsi animi, magni refert quali in corpore locati sint ; multa enim e corpore existunt, quae acuant mentem ; multa, quae obtundant.

Aristoteles quidem ait, omnes ingeniosos melancholicos esse ; ut ego me tardiorem esse non moleste feram. Enumerat multos ; idque quasi constet, rationem cur ita fiat affert. Quod si tanta vis est ad habitum mentis in iis, quae gignuntur in corpore, (ea sunt autem, quaecumque sunt, quae similitudinem faciant) ; nihil necessitatis affert cur nascatur animi similitudo. Omitto dissimilitudines.

Vellem adesse posset Panaetius. Vixit cum Africano. Quaererem ex eo, cujus suorum similis fuisset Africani fratris nepos ; facie vel patris, vitâ omnium perditorum, ita similis, ut esset facile deterrimus. Cujus etiam similis P. Crassi, et sapientis et eloquentis et primi hominis, nepos ; multorumque aliorum virorum clarorum, quos nihil attinet nominare, nepotes et filii ?

§ 29.

Sed quid agimus ? Oblitine sumus hoc nunc nobis esse propositum, cum satis de aeternitate dixissemus, ne si interirent quidem animi, quidquam mali esse in morte ?

A. Ego vero memineram ; sed te de aeterni-

tate dicentem aberrare a proposito facile patiebar.

M. Video te alte spectare, et velle in caelum migrare.

A. Spero fore, ut contingat id nobis ; sed fac, ut isti volunt, animos non remanere post mortem ; video nos, si ita sit, privari spe beatioris vitae.

M. Mali vero quid affert ista sententia ? Fac enim sic animum interire ut corpus ; num igitur aliquis dolor, aut omnino post mortem sensus, in corpore est ? Nemo id quidem dicit ; etsi Democritum insimulat Epicurus. Democritici negant. Ne in animo quidem igitur sensus remanet ; ipsę enim nusquam est. Ubi igitur malum est, quoniam nihil tertium est ? An quoniam ipse animi discessus a corpore non sit sine dolore ? Ut credam ita esse, quam est id exiguum ! Et falsum esse arbitror ; et fit plerumque sine sensu ; nonnumquam etiam cum voluptate. Totumque hoc leve est, qualecumque est ; fit enim ad punctum temporis. Illud angit vel potius excruciat, discessus ab omnibus iis quae sunt *bona* in vita. Vide ne a *malis* dici verius possit.

Quid ego nunc lugeam vitam hominum ? vere et jure possum. Sed quid necesse est, cum id agam, ne post mortem miseros nos putemus fore, etiam vitam efficere deplorando miseriorem ? Fecimus hoc in eo libro, in quo nosmetipsos quantum potuimus consolati sumus. A *malis* igitur mors abducit, non a bonis, verum si quaerimus.

Hoc quidem a Cyrenaico Hegesia sic copiose disputatur, ut is a rege Ptolemaeo prohibitus es-

se dicatur illa in scholis dicere; quod multi, his auditis, mortem sibi ipsi consciscerent. Callimachi quidem epigramma in Ambraciotam Cleombrotum est; quem ait, cum nihil ei accidisset adversi, e muro se in mare abjecisse, lecto Platonis libro. Ejus autem (quem dixi) Hegesiae liber est, Ἀποκαρτερῶν, quod a vita quidam, per inediam discedens, revocatur ab amicis; quibus respondens, vitae humanae enumerat incommoda. Possem id facere, etsi minus quam ille qui omnino vivere expedire nemini putat. Mitto alios; etiamne nobis expedit? qui et domesticis et forensibus solatiis ornamentisque privati, certe, si ante occidissemus, mors nos a malis, non a bonis abstraxisset.

§ 30.

Sit igitur aliquis, qui nihil mali habeat, nullum a fortuna vulnus acceperit. Metellus ille honoratis quatuor filiis; at quinquaginta Priamus; e quibus septem et decem justa uxore natis. In utroque eandem habuit fortuna potestatem; sed usa in altero est. Metellum enim multi filii, filiae, nepotes, neptes, in rogum imposuerunt; Priamum tanta progenie orbatum, cum in aram confugisset, hostilis manus interemit. Hic, si vivis filiis, incolumi regno, occidisset,

Astante ope barbarica,
Tectis caelatis, laqueatis,

utrum tandem a bonis an a malis discessisset? Tum profecto videretur a bonis. At certe ei melius evenisset; nec tam flebiliter illa canerentur,

Haec omnia vidi inflammari,
Priamo vi vitam evitari,
Jovis aram sanguine turpari.

Quasi vero istâ vel quidquam tum potuerit ei melius accidere. Quod si ante occidisset, tum eventum omnino amisisset; hoc autem tempore, sensum malorum amisit.

Pompeio nostro familiari, cum graviter aegrotasset Neapoli, melius est factum. Coronati Neapolitani fuerunt; nimirum etiam Puteolani vulgo ex oppidis publice gratulabantur. Ineptum sane negotium, et Graeculum; sed tamen fortunatum. Utrum igitur, si tum esset exstinctus, a bonis rebus an a malis discessisset? Certe a miseris; non enim cum socero bellum gessisset; non imparatus arma sumsisset; non domum reliquisset; non ex Italia fugisset; non, exercitu amisso, nudus in servorum ferrum et manus incidisset; non liberi defleti; non fortunae omnes a victoribus possiderentur; qui, si mortem tum obisset, in amplissimis fortunis occidisset. Is, propagatione vitae, quot, quantas, quam incredibiles hausit calamitates? Haec morte effugiuntur; etiam si non evenerint, tamen quia possunt evenire. Sed homines ea sibi accidere posse non cogitant. Metelli sperat sibi quisque fortunam; perinde quasi aut plures fortunati sint quam infelices; aut certi quidquam sit in rebus humanis; aut sperare sit prudentius quam timere.

§ 31.

Sed hoc ipsum concedatur, bonis rebus homines morte privari; ergo etiam *carere* mortuos vitae commodis, idque esse *miserum?* Certe,

ita dicant, necesse est. An potest is, qui non est, re ulla *carere?* Triste enim est nomen ipsum *carendi*, quia subjicitur haec vis: 'Habuit, non habet; desiderat, requirit, indiget;' haec, opinor, incommoda sunt carentis. Caret oculis, odiosa caecitas; liberis, orbitas. Valet hoc in vivis; mortuorum autem, non modo vitae commodis, sed ne vitâ quidem ipsâ, quisquam caret. De mortuis loquor, qui nulli sunt. Nos qui sumus, num, aut si cornibus caremus, aut pennis, sit qui id dixerit? Certe nemo. Quid ita? Quia cum id non habeas, quod tibi nec usu nec naturâ sit aptum, non *careas*, etiam si sentias te non habere. Hoc premendum etiam atque etiam est argumentum, confirmato illo, de quo (si mortales animi sunt) dubitare non possumus, quin tantus interitus in morte sit, ut ne minima quidem suspicio sensûs relinquatur. Hoc igitur probe stabilito et fixo, illud excutiendum est, ut sciatur quid sit *carere;* ne relinquatur aliquid erroris in verbo. *Carere*, igitur, hoc significat: *Egere eo quod habere velis.* Inest enim *velle* in carendo; nisi cum sic, tamquam in febri, dicitur, alia quadam notione verbi. Dicitur enim alio modo etiam *carere*, cum aliquid non habeas, et non habere te sentias, etiam si id facile patiare. Carere in morte non dicitur; nec enim esset dolendum. Dicitur illud, *bono carere;* quod est malum. Sed ne vivus quidem bono caret, si eo non indiget. Sed in vivo intelligi tamen potest, regno carere. Dici autem hoc in te satis subtiliter non potest; potuisset in Tarquinio, cum regno esset expulsus. At in mortuo ne intelligi quidem potest, carere enim *sentientis* est. Nec

sensus in mortuo ; ne *carere* quidem, igitur, in mortuo est. Quamquam quid opus est in hoc philosophari, cum rem non magnopere philosophia egere videamus ?

§ 32.

Quoties non modo ductores nostri, sed universi etiam exercitus, ad non dubiam mortem concurrerunt ? Quae quidem si timeretur, non L. Brutus, arcens eum reditu tyrannum quem ipse expulerat, in proelio concidisset. Non cum Latinis decertans pater Decius, cum Etruscis filius, cum Pyrrho nepos, se hostium telis objecissent. Non uno bello pro patria cadentes, Scipiones Hispania vidisset ; Paullum et Geminum, Cannae ; Venusia, Marcellum ; Latini, Albinum ; Lucani, Gracchum. Num quis horum miser hodie ? Ne tum quidem post spiritum extremum ; nec enim potest esse miser quisquam, sensu peremto.

'At id ipsum odiosum est, sine sensu esse.' Odiosum, si id esset carere. Cum vero perspicuum sit, nihil posse in eo esse qui ipse non sit ; quid potest esse in eo odiosum, qui nec careat nec sentiat ? Quamquam hoc quidem nimis saepe ; sed eo quod in hoc inest omnis animi contractio ex metu mortis. Qui enim satis viderit, id quod est luce clarius, animo et corpore consumpto, totoque animante deleto, et facto interitu universo, illud animal quod fuerit factum esse nihil ; is plane perspiciet, inter Hippocentaurum qui numquam fuerit, et regem Agamemnonem, nihil interesse : nec pluris nunc facere M. Camillum hoc civile bellum,

quam ego, illo vivo, fecerim Romam captam. Cur igitur et Camillus doleret, si haec post trecentos et quinquaginta fere annos eventura putaret; et ego doleam, si ad decem millia annorum gentem aliquam urbe nostra potituram putem? Quia TANTA CARITAS PATRIAE EST, UT EAM NON SENSU NOSTRO, SED SALUTE IPSIUS METIAMUR.

§ 33.

Itaque non deterret sapientem mors, quae propter incertos casus quotidie imminet, propter brevitatem vitae numquam longe potest abesse, quo minus in omne tempus reipublicae suisque consulat; et posteritatem ipsam, cujus sensum habiturus non sit, ad se putet pertinere. Quare licet etiam mortalem esse animum, judicantem aeterna moliri, non gloriae cupiditate quam sensurus non sis, sed virtutis, quam necessario gloria, etiam si tu id non agas, consequatur. Natura vero sic se habet, ut quo modo initium nobis rerum omnium ortus noster afferat, sic exitum mors; ut nihil pertinuit ad nos ante ortum, sic nihil post mortem pertinebit. In quo, quid potest esse mali? cum mors nec ad vivos pertineat, nec ad mortuos. Alteri nulli sunt; alteros non attingit. Quam qui leviorem faciunt, somni simillimam volunt esse; quasi vero quisquam ita nonaginta annos velit vivere, ut, cum sexaginta confecerit, reliquos dormiat. Ne sues quidem id velint, non modo ipse. Endymion vero, si fabulas audire volumus, nescio quando, in Latmo obdormivit qui est mons Cariae; nondum, opinor, est experrectus. Num igitur eum

curare censes, cum Luna laboret, a qua consopitus putatur ut eum dormientem oscularetur? Quid curet autem, qui ne sentit quidem? Habes somnum imaginem mortis, eamque quotidie induis. Et dubitas quin sensus in morte nullus sit, cum in ejus simulacro videas esse nullum sensum?

§ 34.

Pellantur ergo istae ineptiae paene aniles, ante tempus mori miserum esse. Quod tandem tempus? Naturaene? At ea quidem dedit usuram vitae, tamquam pecuniae, nulla praestituta die. Quid est igitur, quod querare, si repetit cum vult? ea enim conditione acceperas. Idem, si puer parvus occidit, aequo animo ferendum putant; si vero in cunis, ne querendum quidem. Atqui ab hoc acerbius exegit natura, quod dederat. Nondum gustaverat, inquiunt, vitae suavitatem; hic autem jam sperabat magna, quibus frui coeperat. At id quidem ipsum in ceteris rebus melius putatur, aliquam partem quam nullam attingere; cur in vita secus? Quamquam non male ait Callimachus, multo saepius lacrymasse Priamum quam Troilum. Eorum autem, qui exacta aetate moriuntur, fortuna laudatur. Cur? Nam reor nullis, si vita longior daretur, posset esse jucundior. Nihil est enim profecto homini prudentiâ dulcius; quam, ut cetera auferat, affert certe senectus. Quae vero aetas longa est? Aut quid omnino homini longum? Nonne

Modo pueros, modo adolescentes, in cursu, tergo insequens,
Nec opinantes assecuta est

senectus? Sed quia ultra nihil habemus, hoc longum ducimus. Omnia ista, perinde ut cuique data sunt pro rata parte, ita, longa aut brevia dicuntur.

Apud Hypanim fluvium, qui ab Europae parte in Pontum influit, Aristoteles ait bestiolas quasdam nasci, quae unum diem vivant. Ex his igitur, hora octava quae mortua est, provecta aetate mortua est; quae vero occidente sole, decrepita; eo magis, si etiam solstitiali die. Confer nostram longissimam aetatem cum aeternitate; in eadem propemodum brevitate, qua illae bestiolae, reperiemur.

§ 35.

Contemnamus igitur omnes ineptias, (quod enim levius huic levitati nomen imponam?) totamque vim bene vivendi in animi robore ac magnitudine, et in omnium rerum humanarum contemptione ac despicientia, et in omni virtute ponamus. Nam nunc quidem cogitationibus mollissimis effeminamur, ut, si ante mors adventet quam Chaldaeorum promissa consecuti sumus, spoliati magnis quibusdam bonis, illusi, destitutique videamur. Quod si exspectando et desiderando pendemus animis, cruciamur, angimur; pro dii immortales! quam iter illud jucundum esse debet, quo confecto, nulla reliqua cura, nulla sollicitudo futura sit!

Quam me delectat Theramenes; quam elato animo est! Etsi enim flemus, cum legimus, tamen non miserabiliter vir clarus emoritur; qui, cum conjectus in carcerem triginta jussu tyrannorum venenum ut sitiens obduxisset, re-

liquum sic e poculo ejecit ut id resonaret; quo sonitu reddito, arridens, *Propino*, inquit, *hoc pulchro Critiae*, qui in eum fuerat taeterrimus. Graeci enim in conviviis solent nominare, cui poculum traditurí sint. Lusit vir egregius extremo spiritu, cum jam praecordiis conceptam mortem contineret; vereque ei, cui venenum praebiberat, mortem est eam auguratus quae brevi consecuta est.

§ 36.

Quis hanc animi maximi aequitatem in ipsa morte laudaret, si mortem malum judicaret? Vadit in eundem carcerem, atque in eundem paucis post annis scyphum, Socrates; eodem scelere judicum, quo tyrannorum Theramenes. Quae est igitur ejus oratio, qua facit eum Plato usum apud judices, jam morte mulctatum? "Magna me," inquit, "spes tenet, Judices, bene mihi evenire, quod mittar ad mortem. Necesse est enim, sit alterum de duobus; ut aut sensus omnino omnes mors auferat, aut in alium quendam locum ex his locis morte migretur. Quamobrem, sive sensus exstinguitur, morsque ei somno similis est qui nonnumquam etiam sine visis somniorum placatissimam quietem affert; dii boni, quid lucri est mori! Aut quam multi dies reperiri possunt, qui tali nocti anteponantur? Cui si similis futura est perpetuitas omnis consequentis temporis, quis me beatior? Sin vera sunt quae dicuntur, migrationem esse mortem in eas oras, quas qui e vita excesserunt incolunt; id multo jam beatius est, te, cum ab iis qui se judicum numero haberi velint evaseris, ad eos

venire qui vere judices appellentur, Minoem, Rhadamanthum, Aeacum, Triptolemum, convenireque eos, qui juste et cum fide vixerint. Haec peregrinatio mediocris vobis videri potest? Ut vero colloqui cum Orpheo, Musaeo, Homero, Hesiodo liceat, quanti tandem aestimatis? Equidem saepe emori (si fieri posset) vellem, ut ea quae dico mihi liceret invenire. Quanta delectatione autem afficerer, cum Palamedem, cum Ajacem, cum alios judicio iniquo circumventos, convenirem? Tentarem etiam summi regis, qui maximas copias duxit ad Trojam, et Ulyssi, Sisyphique prudentiam; nec ob eam rem, cum haec exquirerem sicut hîc faciebam, capite damnarer. Ne vos quidem, Judices, ii qui me absolvistis, mortem timueritis. Nec enim cuiquam bono mali quidquam evenire potest, nec vivo, nec mortuo; nec umquam ejus res a diis immortalibus negligentur. Nec mihi ipsi hoc accidit fortuito; nec vero ego iis, a quibus accusatus sum, aut a quibus condemnatus, habeo quod succenseam, nisi quod mihi nocere se crediderunt."

Et haec quidem hoc modo; nihil autem melius extremo: "Sed tempus est," inquit, "jam hinc abire me, ut moriar; vos, ut vitam agatis; utrum autem sit melius, dii immortales sciunt; hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem."

§ 37.

Nae ego haud paullo hunc animum malim, quam eorum omnium fortunas qui de hoc judicaverunt. Etsi, quod praeter deos negat scire quemquam, id scit ipse, utrum melius sit; nam dixit ante. Sed suum illud, nihil ut affirmet, tenet ad extremum.

Nos autem teneamus, ut nihil censeamus esse malum, quod sit a natura datum omnibus ; intelligamusque, si mors malum sit, esse sempiternum malum. Nam vitae miserae mors finis esse videtur ; mors si est misera, finis esse nullus potest.

Sed quid ego Socratem, aut Theramenem, praestantes viros virtutis et sapientiae gloria, commemoro, cum Lacedaemonius quidam, cujus ne nomen quidem proditum est, mortem tanto pere contempserit, ut, cum ad eam duceretur, damnatus ab Ephoris, et esset vultu hilari atque laeto, dixissetqne ei quidam inimicus : Contemnisne leges Lycurgi? responderit : "Ego vero illi maximam gratiam habeo, qui me ea poena mulctaverit, quam sine mutuatione et sine versura possem dissolvere." O virum Spartâ dignum! ut mihi quidem, qui tam magno animo fuerit, innocens damnatus esse videatur.

Tales innumerabiles nostra civitas tulit. Sed quid duces et principes nominem, cum legiones scribat Cato saepe alacres in eum locum profectas, unde redituras se non arbitrarentur? Pari animo Lacedaemonii in Thermopylis occiderunt, in quos Simonides :

> Dic, hospes, Spartae, nos te hic vidisse jacentes,
> Dum sanctis patriae legibus obsequimur.

[Quid ille dux Leonidas dicit? *Pergite animo forti, Lacedaemonii ; hodie apud Inferos fortasse caenabimus.* Fuit haec gens fortis, dum Lycurgi leges vigebant] ; e quibus unus, cum Perses hostis in colloquio dixisset glorians : "Solem prae jaculorum multitudine et sagittarum non videbitis." In umbra, inquit, igitur pugnabimus.

Viros commemoro; qualis tandem Lacaena? quae cum filium in proelium misisset, et interfectum audisset, "Idcirco," inquit, "genueram, ut esset qui pro patria mortem non dubitaret occumbere."

Esto; fortes et duri Spartiatae; magnam habet vim reipublicae disciplina. Quid? Cyrenaeum Theodorum, philosophum non ignobilem, nonne miramur? cui cum Lysimachus rex crucem minaretur, "Istis quaeso," inquit, "ista horribilia minitare purpuratis tuis; Theodori quidem nihil interest, humine an sublime putrescat."

§ 38.

Cujus hoc dicto admoneor, ut aliquid etiam de humatione et sepultura dicendum existimem; rem non difficilem, iis praesertim cognitis quae (de nihil sentiendo) paullo ante dicta sunt. De qua Socrates quidem quid senserit, apparet in eo libro in quo moritur; de quo jam tam multa diximus. Cum enim de immortalitate animorum disputavisset, et jam moriendi tempus urgeret, rogatus a Critone quemadmodum sepeliri vellet, "Multam vero," inquit, "operam, amici, frustra consumpsi. Critoni enim nostro non persuasi me hinc avolaturum, neque quidquam mei relicturum. Verumtamen, Crito, si me assequi potueris, aut sicubi nactus eris, ut tibi videbitur, sepelito. Sed, mihi crede, nemo me vestrûm, cum hinc excessero, consequetur."

Praeclare id quidem, qui et amico permiserit, et se ostenderit de hoc toto genere nihil laborare. Durior Diogenes, et is idem sentiens, sed (ut Cynicus) asperius, projici se jussit inhuma-

tum. Tum amici : Volucribusne et feris ? Minime vero, inquit; sed bacillum propter me quo abigam, ponitote. Qûi poteris ? illi, non enim senties. Quid igitur mihi ferarum laniatus oberit, nihil sentienti ?

Praeclare Anaxagoras ; qui cum Lampsaci moreretur, quaerentibus amicis, velletne Clazomenas in patriam, si quid ei accidisset, afferri : Nihil necesse est, inquit ; undique enim ad Inferos tantundem viae est.

Totaque de ratione humationis unum tenendum est ; ad *corpus* illam pertinere, sive occiderit animus sive vigeat. In corpore autem perspicuum est, vel exstincto animo vel elapso, nullum residere sensum.

Sed plena errorum sunt omnia. Trahit Hectorem, ad currum religatum, Achilles. Lacerari eum et sentire, credo, putat. Ergo hic ulciscitur, ut quidem sibi videtur. At illa sicut acerbissimam rem maeret :

> Vidi, videre quod me passa aegerrime,
> Hectorem quadrijugo curru raptarier.

Quem Hectorem ? Aut quamdiu ille erit Hector ? Melius Accius, et aliquando sapiens Achilles :

> Immo enimvero corpus Priamo reddidi, Hectorem abstuli.

Non igitur Hectora traxisti, sed corpus quod fuerat Hectoris.

Ecce alius exoritur e terra, qui matrem dormire non sinat :

> Mater, te appello, tu quae curam somno suspensam levas,
> Neque te mei miseret ; surge, et sepeli natum.

Haec cum pressis et flebilibus modis, qui totis theatris maestitiam inferant, concinuntur ; diffi-

cile est, non eos qui inhumati sint miseros judicare.

——— Prius quam ferae, volucresque;

metuit, ne laceratis membris minus bene utatur : ne combustis, non extimescit.

Neu relliquias sic meas siris, denudatis ossibus,
Per terram sanie delibutas foede divexarier.

Non intelligo quid metuat, cum tam bonos septenarios fundat ad tibiam.

Tenendum est igitur, nihil curandum esse post mortem, cum multi inimicos etiam mortuos poeniantur. Execratur, luculentis sane versibus, apud Ennium Thyestes, primum ut naufragio pereat Atreus. Durum hoc sane ; talis enim interitus non est sine gravi sensu. Illa inania :

— Ipse summis saxis fixus asperis, evisceratus,
Latere pendens, saxa spargens tabo, sanie, et sanguine atro.

Non ipsa saxa magis sensu omni vacabant, quam ille *latere pendens*, cui se hic cruciatum censet optare. Quae essent dura, si sentiret, nulla sine sensu sunt. Illud vero perquam inane :

Neque sepulcrum, quo recipiatur, habeat, portum corporis,
Ubi, remissa humana vita, corpus requiescat a malis.

Vides quanto haec in errore versentur ; portum esse corporis, et requiescere in sepulcro putat mortuum : magna culpa Pelopis, qui non erudierit filium nec docuerit, quatenus esset quidque curandum.

§ 39.

Sed quid singulorum opiniones animadvertam, nationum varios errores perspicere cum liceat ? Condiunt Aegyptii mortuos, et eos

domi servant. Persae etiam cerâ circumlitos condunt, ut quam maxime permaneant diuturna corpora. Magorum mos est, non humare corpora suorum, nisi a feris sint ante laniata. In Hyrcania plebs publicos alit canes ; optimates, domesticos. Nobile autem genus canum illud scimus esse. Sed pro sua quisque facultate parat, a quibus lanietur ; eamque optimam illi esse censent sepulturam. Permulta alia colligit Chrysippus, ut est in omni historia curiosus ; sed ita taetra sunt quaedam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio. Totus igitur hic locus est contemnendus in nobis, non negligendus in nostris ; ita tamen, ut mortuorum corpora nihil sentire sentiamus. Quamtum autem consuetudini, famaeque dandum sit, id curent vivi ; sed ita ut intelligant nihil ad mortuos pertinere.

Sed profecto mors tum aequissimo animo oppetitur, cum suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest. Nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis perfectae perfecto functus est munere. Multa mihi ipsi ad mortem tempestiva fuerunt ; quam utinam potuissem obire. Nihil enim jam acquirebatur ; cumulata erant officia vitae, cum fortunâ bella restabant. Quare, si ipsa ratio minus perficiet ut mortem negligere possimus ; at vita acta perficiat, ut satis superque vixisse videamur. Quamquam enim sensus abierit, tamen summis et propriis bonis et laudis et gloriae, quamvis non sentiant, mortui non carent. Etsi enim nihil in se habeat gloria cur expetatur, tamen virtutem tamquam umbra sequitur. Verum multitudinis judicium de bonis, si quando est, magis laudandum est, quam illi ob eam rem beati.

§ 40.

Non possum autem dicere, quoquo modo hoc accipiatur, Lycurgum, Solonem, legum et publicae disciplinae carere gloriâ ; Themistoclem, Epaminondam, bellicae virtutis. Ante enim Salaminam ipsam Neptunus obruet, quam Salaminii tropaei memoriam ; priusque Boeotia Leuctra tollentur, quam pugnae Leuctricae gloria. Multo autem tardius fama deseret Curium, Fabricium, Calatinum, duo Scipiones, duo Africanos, Maximum, Marcellum, Paullum, Catonem, Laelium, innumerabiles alios ; quorum similitudinem aliquam qui arripuerit, non eam famâ populari sed vera bonorum laude metiens, fidenti animo (si ita res fert) gradietur ad mortem : in qua aut summum bonum, aut nullum malum esse cognovimus.

Secundis vero suis rebus volet etiam mori ; non enim tam cumulus bonorum jucundus esse potest, quam molesta decessio. Hanc sententiam significare videtur Laconis illa vox ; qui, cum Rhodius Diagoras, Olympionices nobilis, uno die duo filios victores Olympiae vidisset, accessit ad senem, et gratulatus, *Morere, Diagora*, inquit, *non enim in caelum adscensurus es.*

Magna haec et nimium fortasse Graeci putant, vel tum potius putabant ; isque, qui hoc Diagorae dixit, permagnum existimans tres Olympionicas una e domo prodire, cunctari illum diutius in vita, fortunae objectum, inutile putabat ipsi. Ego autem tibi quidem quod satis esset, paucis verbis (ut mihi videbar), responderam ; concesseras enim, nullo in malo mortuos esse. Sed ob eam causam contendi, ut plura dicerem,

quod in desiderio et luctu haec est consolatio maxima. Nostrum enim, et nostra causâ susceptum, dolorem, modice ferre debemus, ne nosmetipsos amare videamur. Illa suspicio intolerabili dolore cruciat, si opinamur eos quibus orbati sumus, esse cum aliquo sensu in iis malis quibus vulgo opinantur. Hanc excutere opinionem mihimet volui radicitus ; eoque fui fortasse longior.

A. Tu longior ? Non mihi quidem ; prior enim pars orationis tuae faciebat, ut mori cuperem ; posterior, ut modo non nollem, modo non laborarem. Omni autem oratione illud certe perfectum est, ut mortem non ducerem in malis.

§ 41.

M. Num igitur etiam rhetorum epilogum desideramus ? An jam hanc artem plane relinquimus ?

A. Tu vero istam ne reliqueris, quam semper ornasti ; et quidem jure ; illa enim te, verum si loqui volumus, ornaverat. Sed quinam est iste epilogus ? Aveo enim audire, quidquid est.

M. Deorum immortalium judicia solent in scholis proferre de morte, nec vero ea fingere ipsi, sed Herodoto auctore, aliisque pluribus. Primum, Argiae sacerdotis (Cleobis et Biton) filii praedicantur. Nota fabula est. Cum enim illam ad solemne et statum sacrificium curru vehi jus esset, satis longe ab oppido ad fanum, morarenturque jumenta ; tunc juvenes ii, quos modo nominavi, veste posita, corpora oleo perunxerunt, ad jugum accesserunt. Ita sacerdos advecta in fanum, cum currus esset ductus a

filiis, precata a deâ dicitur, ut illis praemium daret pro pietate quod maximum homini dari posset a deo. Post epulatos cum matre adolescentes, somno se dedisse ; mane inventos esse mortuos.

Simili precatione Trophonius et Agamedes usi dicuntur : qui, cum Apollini Delphis templum exaedificavissent, venerantes deum, petierunt mercedem non parvam quidem operis et laboris sui, nihil certi sed quod esset optimum homini. Quibus Apollo se id daturum ostendit, post ejus diei diem tertium ; qui, ut illuxit, mortui sunt reperti. Judicavisse deum dicunt ; et eum quidem deum, cui reliqui dii concessissent ut praeter ceteros divinaret.

Affertur etiam de Sileno fabella quaedam ; qui, cum a Mida captus esset, hoc ei muneris pro sua missione dedisse scribitur ; docuisse regem, *non nasci homini longe optimum esse ; proximum autem, quam primum mori.* Qua est sententia in Cresphonte usus Euripides :

> Nam nos decebat, coetus celebrantes, domum,
> Lugere ubi esset aliquis in lucem editus,
> Humanae vitae varia reputantes mala ;
> At, qui labores morte finisset graves,
> Hunc omni amicos laude et laetitia exequi.

Simile quiddam est in consolatione Crantoris ; ait enim, Terinaeum quendam Elisium, cum graviter filii mortem maereret, venisse in psychomantium, quaerentem quae fuisset tantae calamitatis causa. Huic in tabellis tris hujusmodi versiculos datos :

> Ignaris homines in vita mentibus errant :
> Euthynous potitur fatorum munere, letho.
> Sic fuit utilius finiri ipsique tibique.

His et talibus auctoribus usi, confirmant causam rebus a diis immortalibus judicatam. Alcidamus quidam, rhetor antiquus, in primis nobilis, scripsit etiam Laudationem Mortis; quae constat ex enumeratione humanorum malorum; cui rationes eæ quae exquisitius a philosophis colliguntur, defuerunt, ubertas orationis non defuit. Clarae vero mortes pro patria oppetitae, non solum gloriosae rhetoribus, sed etiam beatae videri solent. Repetunt ab Erechtheo, cujus etiam filiae cupide mortem expetiverunt pro vita civium; Codrum, qui se in medios immisit hostes veste famulari, ne posset agnosci si esset ornatu regio; quod oraculum erat datum, si rex interfectus esset, victrices Athenas fore. Menoeceus non praetermittitur; qui oraculo edito largitus est patriae suum sanguinem. Iphigenia Aulide duci se immolandam jubet, ut hostium sanguis eliciatur suo. Veniunt inde ad propiora. Harmodius in ore, et Aristogiton; Lacedaemonius Leonidas, Thebanus Epaminondas vigent. Nostros non norunt; quos enumerare longum est. Ita sunt multi, quibus videmus optabiles mortes fuisse cum gloria.

§ 42.

Quae cum ita sint, magna tamen eloquentia est utendum, atque ita velut superiore e loco concionandum, ut homines mortem vel optare incipiant, vel certe timere desistant. Nam si supremus ille dies non extinctionem, sed commutationem affert loci, quid optabilius? Sin autem perimit ac delet omnino, quid melius quam in mediis vitae laboribus obdormiscere, et ita con-

niventem somno consopiri sempiterno? Quod si fiat, melior Ennii quam Solonis oratio. Hic enim noster,

> Nemo me lacrymis decoret (inquit) nec funera fletu
> Faxit.

At vero sapiens ille,

> Mors mea ne careat lacrymis: linquamus amicis
> Maerorem, ut celebrent funera cum gemitu.

Nos vero, si quid tale acciderit (ut a deo denuntiatum videatur) ut exeamus e vita, laeti et agentes gratias pareamus; emittique nos e custodia et levari vinculis arbitremur, ut aut in aeternam et plane in nostram domum remigremus, aut omni sensu molestiâque careamus. Sin autem nihil denuntiabitur, eo tamen simus animo, ut horribilem illum diem aliis, nobis faustum putemus, nihilque in malis ducamus, quod sit vel a diis immortalibus vel a natura parente omnium constitutum. NON ENIM TEMERE NEC FORTUITO SATI ET CREATI SUMUS, SED PROFECTO FUIT QUAEDAM VIS, QUAE GENERI CONSULERET HUMANO; NEC ID GIGNERET AUT ALERET, QUOD, CUM EXANTLAVISSET OMNES LABORES, TUM INCIDERET IN MORTIS MALUM SEMPITERNUM. PORTUM POTIUS PARATUM NOBIS ET PERFUGIUM PUTEMUS. Quo utinam velis passis pervehi liceat! Sin reflantibus ventis rejiciemur, tamen eodem paullo tardius referamur necesse est. Quod autem omnibus necesse est, idne miserum esse uni potest?

Habes epilogum, nequid praetermissum aut relictum putes.

A. Ego vero; et quidem fecit etiam iste me epilogus firmiorem.

M. Optime, inquam; sed nunc quidem valitudini tribuamus aliquid. Cras autem, et quot dies erimus in Tusculano, agamus haec; et ea potissimum quae levationem habeant aegritudinum, formidinum, cupiditatum: qui omni e philosophia est fructus uberrimus.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

OF

CICERO.

MARCUS TULLUS CICERO was born at Arpinum (now Arpino), a town belonging to the Volsci, one of the tribes of Latium in the neighbourhood of Rome. His ancestors he traced back to Servius Tullius, the sixth king of the Romans, and of Sabine descent. His father was a Roman knight; and his mother's name was Helvia. He was born B. C. 105, and died at the age of 63 years. The poet Archias was his first teacher; and Apollonius Molo of Rhodes gave him his first instructions in eloquence. He was taught philosophy by Piso, and law by Mutius Scævola. In the Marsian war, he acquired, under Sylla, a knowledge of the military art, and a taste for it.

He was naturally of a feeble and delicate constitution. When the commotions at Rome were multiplied, under Sylla, he paid a visit to Greece, and there studied philosophy and oratory with the best masters at Athens.

On his return to Rome, he soon became distinguished as an orator, and was made Quæstor of Sicily; where he behaved with great justice and moderation. After this, he passed through the offices of Ædile and Prætor. In the year 62 B. C. he was raised to the office of Consul. In this

office he greatly distinguished himself by the suppression of Cataline's conspiracy; for which he was styled, by a grateful people, *Pater patriæ*. By the machinations of Clodius, whom Cicero had strongly opposed, the latter was proscribed. He retired to Greece; and not long after was recalled with great honour and applause. After this he was sent into Cilicia as Proconsul. There he obtained victory over the enemies of the Romans, and a triumph was decreed him on his return to Rome; which the factions of the city, however, prevented him from enjoying.

In the civil war between Pompey and Cæsar, which soon followed, Cicero espoused the cause of Pompey. After the victory won by Cæsar at the battle of Pharsalia, Cicero met the conqueror at Brundusium, and was reconciled to him. From this time Cicero retired from public affairs to his country seat, and seldom visited Rome. After the death of Cæsar, and when Antony came into power, Cicero withdrew once more to Athens; but he soon returned to his country. When the triumvirate was formed by Augustus, Antony, and Lepidus, each agreed to sacrifice his own personal enemies, in order to perpetuate their power. About 200 were doomed to death; and Cicero was among the number placed upon Antony's list of proscription. Popilius Lænas was commissioned by Antony to destroy Cicero; and the latter fled, in a litter, toward the sea at Caieta. He was, however, overtaken by the assassins; and when he put his head out of the litter, it was severed from his body by Herennius. This took place B. C. 43, when he was 63 years of age. The head and

right hand of the orator were carried to Rome; and there, by order of Antony, whom he had so often annoyed, they were hung up in the Forum. Fulvia, the wife of Antony, to shew her spite against Cicero, drew the tongue out of the mouth, and pierced it through with a bodkin.

Thus perished the greatest orator, rhetorician, and philosopher whom Rome had ever produced; and whom, in some respects, all subsequent ages have scarcely equalled. It has been finely said of Cicero, as an orator, that he had the strength of Demosthenes, the copiousness of Plato, and the polish of Isocrates. The first of these assertions, however, I cannot think to be true; the second is more than doubtful; the third may perhaps be conceded. His orations, which have come down to us, are fine examples of the *ornate* in speaking; and some of them are exceedingly powerful in invective, and cogent in argument. It is impossible to read them without perceiving, that there could have been but one feeling and sentiment in those who originally heard them, viz. that of approbation and delight.

His rhetorical letters and treatises will continue to be read and studied, with pleasure and profit, so long as rhetoric and oratory continue to be a study among men. His letters are a perfect model of ease, and grace, and playfulness, and zest, and learning, and affectionate feeling. Nothing of the kind, in all antiquity, can be fairly compared with them.

His *philosophical works*, however, are those with which we are now immediately concerned. These are numerous, and consist of the following treatises; viz. Academicæ Qæstiones; De Finibus

Bonorum et Malorum ; Quaestiones Tusculanæ; De Natura Deorum ; De Divinatione ; De Fato ; De Legibus ; De Officiis ; De Senectute ; De Amicitia ; Consolatio ; Paradoxa ; De Petitione Consulatûs ; Fragmenta. These constitute about one fourth part of his works which are still extant ; but all that we now have, are supposed by many to be but a small part (not one tenth) of what he actually wrote. His whole works that remain, have often been published collectively ; and most of them separately. The cheapest and most correctly printed edition which I have examined, is the small stereotype one of Tauchnitz at Leipsic.

Cicero lived at a period when the Roman power, splendour, and influence, had arrived at the highest point. Grecian arts and literature were very generally cultivated among the higher classes at Rome. Philosophy, also, had begun to find its admirers and devotees. But from the account given in the first part of the preceding Treatise, it is clear that no very great progress had been made in it by the countrymen of Cicero. It was not unnatural, therefore, when a man of so much ambition as he possessed, was driven by the stress of the times away from public employments and honours, that he should seek at once for occupation and honour, by cultivating a study which had brought so much glory to Plato, Aristotle, and many others of the Greeks. Early in life he had imbibed a taste for this study while at Athens. There he had learned to admire Plato ; and him he undertook to imitate, both in the matter and manner of many of his philosophical writings.

With all his admiration of Plato, however, one

can hardly reckon him as belonging to the Academy. He may rather be named an *Eclectic;* for he read and studied all the different systems of philosophy within his reach, and adopted or rejected what he thought proper, by exercising his own judgment and reasoning powers respecting them. He did not aim so much at going deeply into abstruse and difficult points, as he did at the popular exhibition of plainer and more practical principles. With him, tasteful representation, animated description, wit, and extensive reading, were not secondary but primary objects in philosophizing. "Hanc enim [says he] perfectam philosophiam semper judicavi, quæ de maximis quaestionibus *copiose posset ornateque dicere;*" Tusc. Quæst. I. 4. Here we see the *orator* coming in and claiming his undiminished prerogative, even over the empire of philosophy.

In his fundamental principles of speculative reasoning, Cicero appears to have agreed, for the most part, with the maxims of the New Academy. Probability, arising out of *subjective* conviction, seems to have been the *ultimatum* to which he expected to arrive, in any case of a speculative nature. Hence we find him, in the preceding treatise, (after having cited that part of the speech of Socrates before his judges which has reference to a future existence, and expressing his admiration of it), declaring that what Socrates last of all said, was not inferior in point of excellence to any thing in his whole address; and this was, that 'the gods only know whether it is better for a man to die than to live, for no man can know this.' 'In so saying,' adds Cicero, 'Socrates exhibits his own

peculiarity, i. e. to *affirm* nothing; which he preserved even to the last.' Supra § 36. In his mode of discussion Cicero imitated the Greek philosopher, even where his convictions appear to have been somewhat strong.

But it was only in the *speculative* parts of philosophy, that Cicero admitted and cherished this half skeptical spirit. In matters of duty and right, i. e. of morals, he came very near to the Stoics; who seem to have been the most rigid moralists and casuists among all the ancient sects of philosophers.

As Cicero had read and studied almost every thing then extant in the Greek and Latin languages, on the subject of philosophy and morals; and as he was exceedingly fond of imitating the dialogues of Plato, and of representing the different sides of almost all questions; so his works contain a great store house of materials for the history of ancient philosophy, and one without which there must have been many more chasms than there now are. The general accuracy of his representations are not called in question; and his fair-mindedness, for the most part, can not well be impeached. He even carries this, in one point of view, to excess. In his dialogues, he introduces contending parties; makes them speak their sentiments and views; and then quits the subject without any full and decisive *critique* upon what they have said. His apology would probably be, that his own mind was in doubt. "Cicero", says Tennemann very truly, "was like a physician who sees the disease, but being unable to discover the cause of it, he cannot apply the appropriate remedy." The distinguished

Roman philosopher did indeed well know, that speculation and doubt, according to the fashion of the day, were endless; but how to terminate many of the great disputes, was beyond his power to divine. Light from heaven was needed, to dispel darkness like that in which the heathen world was enveloped.

On no question agitated by philosophy, without the light of revelation to aid it, can a deeper interest be felt by the inquiring Christian moralist and theologian, than on the question, *Whether the soul is immortal?* The first book of the *Tusculan Questions* contains a compressed and concentrated representation of all Cicero's views and speculations, relative to this all-important subject. How is it possible, that any one who has the spirit of inquiry within him, should not be curious to know what the first writer and philosopher of the ancient Roman nation thought and said, in relation to such a subject? All that can be wanting to create an interest in such an inquiry, as I would fain believe, is, that the means of prosecuting it in an intelligible way, should be put within the power of discerning readers in general.

The remarks which I have to make on the weight of Cicero's arguments, and on the state of mind in which they seem to have left him; as also the comparison of his views with those which the Gospel discloses; I reserve to the closing part of the present volume.

In the mean time, it is proper to observe here, that the first book of the Tusculan Questions, contained in the preceding pages, is in itself a complete treatise, and not at all dependent on the

other four books which follow. This first book is entitled, *De Contemnenda Morte;* but this subject gives way very naturally, after a little discussion at the outset, to the consideration of the perpetual existence of the soul. This does indeed constitute, in the writer's view, and in fact, one of the most important of all reasons, why death may be disregarded, when we are prepared to die. But it is the discussion of the point itself, *in regard to the immortal nature of the soul*, which constitutes the great charm and interest of the whole treatise. When this is completed, the writer relapses again into the more common and ordinary Stoical reasons for disregarding death. He is very ingenious and striking in the production of these. But our chief interest lies in the particular topic just mentioned. It is impossible to read what Cicero has said upon this, without feeling the truth of the allegation, that every man has within him the best arguments for his own immortality; and that the image of God which is enstamped upon the soul, can never be so obscured, but that some bright spot will now and then gleam through all the darkness by which it is surrounded. Cicero did not attain to a perspicuous and explicit statement of this great fact; but he has shown, in many a passage of his treatise, that it was the ground of his feelings and convictions.

NOTES.

INTRODUCTION.

§§ 1—5.

The exordium to the Tusculan Questions is composed with great skill and address. Although the study of philosophy had already become fashionable, to some extent, at Rome, when Cicero wrote this treatise, yet it could not be said to be in high repute, before the publication of this author's *philosophical* writings. With many, as Plutarch remarks in his life of Cicero (cap. 5), the terms, *devoted to Greek study* and *pedant* were synonymous. On this account, Cicero deemed it expedient to commence the Tusculan Disputations with a commendation of the study of philosophy, and an apology for his own devotedness to this pursuit.

In order to accomplish this object in the most effectual manner, he begins with the declaration, that the Romans had always excelled the Greeks in all those undertakings in which they had seriously engaged. In the art of government; in military affairs, both as to discipline and valour; in steadfastness, constancy, probity, good faith, and magnanimity; no nation was to be compared with the Romans.

One point however remained, as to which the Roman philosopher felt bound to yield the palm to the Greeks, viz. learning. But here their superiority, he avers, is to be attributed merely to the fact, that the Romans had not entered into competition with them. He observes, that poetry had been cultivated among the Greeks, for many centuries; but that it had come into repute among the Romans, only quite recently. Every branch of literature needs to be encouraged and honoured, in order that it may flourish. Among the Greeks, not only poetry, but music, and geometry or mathematics, were much honoured; and consequently all these sciences flourished.

Oratory, however, had always been applauded among the Romans; and hence many had excelled in it; and this in a measure scarcely inferior to that of the Greeks.

Philosophy, so celebrated and so long cherished among the Greeks, had found as yet but few admirers at Rome; and even those books which had there been written concerning it, displayed but little learning and acuteness. What others had not performed, Cicero himself now undertakes to do. But he does not design wholly to lay aside the orator, in doing this; for to descant on questions of moment, *copiose et ornate*, he deems the perfection of philosophy. He intends, therefore, to imitate the example of Aristotle, who after hearing Isocrates speak, began to teach the principles of rhe tor

in his own School. The method which he adopts, is the Socratic one, i. e. by way of dialogue, in which question and answer make up the discussion, and afford opportunity for suggesting objections, and also for the solution of them.

Such are the contents of the first five sections, or the exordium of the Tusculan Questions. That they are well adapted to conciliate the mind of a Roman reader, and to allure him to the study of philosophy by flattering his pride and exciting his emulation, is so very plain that it scarcely needs to be remarked. The whole shews, moreover, that Cicero was deeply versed in the literature of his times, and had read and studied the entire circle of Greek and Roman authors.

(1)* Cum.... liberatus, *when at length I was entirely, or in a great measure, freed from the labours of pleading causes, and the duties of a senator.* The phrase *defensionum laboribus*, relates to the engagements of Cicero as an advocate, to defend those who were brought to trial before the courts at Rome. His duties as a Senator, also, were very numerous and weighty. No member of the Roman Senate, for a long time, had as much influence, or as urgent duties to perform, as himself.

(2) Brute, i. e. Marcus Junius Brutus, lineally descended from L. Junius Brutus, who was the principal agent in expelling Tarquin the Proud from the throne of Rome, about 509 B. C. M. J. Brutus was himself the staunch defender of Roman liberty; to save which, he assassinated Caesar in the Basilica of Pompey, after he had aspired to monarchical power. There appears to have been great intimacy and confidence between Cicero and Brutus. Hence we find him so often mentioned in the works of Cicero, and in a manner so highly honourable. It would seem that Brutus, who was remarkable for his attachment both to

* The numbers included in parentheses, designate merely the number of the note, for convenience' sake. The place to which the note relates is designated by P. 13 etc. and by L. 1. etc., i. e. page 13, and line 1, etc.

literature and to liberty, was as much a confidential friend of Cicero in literary studies, as in political life.

Retenta animo .... intermissa ; i. e. the remembrance and love of his philosophical studies were *cherished continually in his mind ;* although the pursuit of them had been necessarily *remitted on account of the exigencies of the times*, i. e. relaxed in some degree, less ardently followed ; and recently even *intermitted or broken off, during a long interval*, viz. by multiplied engagements in public business.

(3) P. 13. *l.* 6. Artium ... ratio et disciplina ; ratio means the *grounds* or *fundamental principles*, i. e. (as we say) *the reason* of any thing ; and disciplina, *the orderly and digested knowledge* of it.—Ars means, as employed by Cicero here, and often elsewhere, any *knowledge* or *science* which is acquired by learning or discipline.—Graecis et literis et doctoribus ; literis means here, *writings*, i. e. *literature* as contained in books ; doctoribus, *teachers* vivâ voce.

(4) P. 13. *l.* 13. Per se, *by themselves*, i. e. independently of the Greeks, or of any foreign aids.—Fecisse meliora, *improved, rendered better.*—Quae ... elaborarent, *which they deemed objects worthy of their labours.* —Nam ... familiares, *for the customs and rules of living, and domestic and household affairs.*—Melius .. lautius, *we maintain in a better and handsomer manner*, i. e. we establish these things on firmer ground, and in a neater way.—Institutis et legibus, *regulations and laws ;* where the first seems to refer to rules or regulations adopted and established by custom, without the formality of a law having the regu-

lar sanction of a penality.—Virtute, *courage, boldness, martial valour;* like the Greek ἀρετή.—Disciplina answers exactly here to our military word, *discipline.*—Jam illa... conferenda; he means to say, that the *natural talents* of the Romans surpass those of the Greeks, or of any other nation; although in *literature* the former might yield the palm to the latter.—Gravitas seems here to mean, *firmness* or *steadfastness* of character.—Constantia, *constancy,* i. e. uniformity and consistency of conduct.—Probitas, *probity, uprightness* of conduct.—Fides, *faithfulness,* viz. in keeping promises, treaties, etc.—Virtus here means what is equivalent to our English *virtue,* as a generic name for good qualities.—In ullis, sc. ullis populis vel gentibus.

§ 2.

(5) P. 14. *l.* 3. Doctrina.... superabat, *in learning and every kind of literature, Greece surpassed us;* where doctrina embraces the means and ways of teaching, and literarum means *the literature* which is the result of the efforts of learned men.—In quo, *in which* thing, viz. in every kind of literature.—Erat .... repugnantes, *it was easy to surpass those who did not enter into contest.*—Nam, like the Greek γάρ, a particle which is usually *causal,* but which not unfrequently marks a transition, and is employed when the writer passes on to new matter, which is designed to illustrate or confirm what he has already said. So here, nam, *moreover,* i. e. I may add, let me add that etc.—Cum (= quum or quom) is here an adverb, meaning *since, in as much as.*—Antiquissimum ... poetarum, *the class of poets were the most ancient of the learned.*—E doctis, *out of, belonging to, of*

the learned; like the Greek ἐκ or ἐξ, it makes (with the Ablative) a periphrasis for the simple Genitive.—Siquidem, (often written *si quidem*), *since.* —Homerus fuit, *Homer lived*, where fuit has the same sense as vixit; and often so.—Et Hesiodus [fuit].—Romam conditam, which, according to tradition, happened 753 years B. C., i. e. before the Christian era.

(6) P. 14. *l.* 8. Homer and Hesiod are too well known to need any description. Archilochus was a native of Paros, one of the Grecian islands called *Cyclades*, near the mouth of the Aegean Sea. The ancients placed him by the side of Homer, in respect to genius and talent; and they regarded him as the inventor of Iambic measure in poetry, which is so peculiarly adapted to satire. Only fragments of his works are now extant. His poems were remarkable for bitterness of spirit and obscenity. The time when he flourished, is designated by Cicero: *Archilochus* [lived] *during the reign of Romulus.*

(7) Serius.... accepimus, i. e. we Romans received it, after it had a long time been flourishing in Greece.—Annis enim fere DX., i. e. 510; the exact time when Claudius and Tuditanus, mentioned in the next clause, were Consuls, was A. U. 514 (239 B. C.); and Cicero, no doubt, could have easily ascertained this. But observe that he says *annis* FERE *DX.*, i. e. *about* 510 *years;* using the round number of ten, probably, instead of 14, which latter he has exactly expressed *in Bruto*, cap. 18.

(8) P. 14. *l.* 10. The *Livy* here mentioned, is Livius Andronicus, the first Roman dramatic poet, who

flourished about 230—240 B. C., and produced his first play in 240. The famous historian, Titus Livius, flourished about the commencement of the Christian era. Fragments of the old Livy may be found in the *Corpus Poetarum*.—Fabulam dedit, *composed*, *produced* or *published a play*.—Fabula (from fabulor *to speak)* most naturally means, *any kind of composition which is in the form of dialogue;* and, of course, this name is appropriate to tragedy, comedy, etc. Fabula also means, *fable*, *romance*, *fictitious story*, etc.; but in the passage before us it means *play*, i. e. tragedy.

(9) P. 14. *l.* 12. Quintus Ennius was born at Rudiae in Calabria, a province at the south-east extremity of Italy. He died B. C. 169; and as he is said to have lived to the age of 70, his birth must have been B. C. 239; and the year when *Livius fabulam dedit* must therefore have been B. C. 240. Ennius was in high repute, as a poet, among the Romans, in the days of Cicero and Virgil. He wrote *Roman Annals*, a poem in 10 books; an epic poem called *Scipio;* satires, tragedies, comedies, etc. Of all his numerous works, only some fragments are left; the best edition of which is that by F. Hessel, Amst. 1707. 4to.

(10) P. 14. *l.* 13. Plautus (Marcus Accius), flourished about 200 years B. C., and died about 184 B. C. He was born at Sarsina, a town in the extreme north of Umbria, a province in the north part of Italia Propria. He possessed a rare talent for comedy; and A. Gellius reckons the number of his plays at 130. Some twenty of his pieces are still extant, and have been often published; e. g. by Brunck, J. A. Ernesti, Bothe, and others. We have seen above,

that Ennius was born probably about 239 B. C.; and Plautus, who flourished about 40 years after this, although younger than Ennius (as Cicero asserts), could not have been much younger.

(11) P. 14. *l.* 13. Naevius (Cneius), a Latin poet, who lived during the first Punic war; a poetical account of which he wrote, and also comedies, tragedies, satires, etc. He is said to have died 203 B. C.; so that we must either construe the passage here as I have pointed it, or else suppose Cicero to have probably committed an error in reckoning Ennius (who was born 239 B. C.) to be older than Naevius. As I have pointed the text, the meaning is, that Livy composed plays about 510 U. C. (243 B. C.); and that Naevius did the same, about the same period; which would agree well with his chronology. In the like way, or to the same purpose, Nobbe points it, in his stereotype edition of Cicero by Tauchnitz; putting C. Claudio ... Plautus, in a parenthesis.

(12) Sero .... recepti means, that the poets were not read, nor poetry cultivated, at Rome, until long after it had flourished in Greece.—In Originibus, i. e. a work of M. Porcius Cato, named *Origines* because a part of it was employed in tracing the origin of the several Italian cities. Cato was distinguished for his temperance, his rigid morals, his love of order, and his learning. He wrote history, treatises on husbandry, oratory, etc. One book on husbandry is still extant. He was the ancestor of the celebrated Marcus Cato Uticensis, a cotemporary of Cicero, who laid violent hands upon himself, when he was about to fall into the hands of Caesar at Utica. This last

individual is the subject of Addison's famous play, named *Cato*. The historian, M. P. Cato, died about 150 B. C.

(13) P. 13. *l.* 15. Quamquam est... virtutibus, i. e. warlike virtues or heroic deeds were celebrated at feasts, by singing united with the music of the tibicen, *flute* or *pipe*. But although this was admitted in the revelry of a banquet, yet it was not considered respectable on other occasions; so the sequel teaches us.—Oratio Catonis, *a speech of Cato*, extant no doubt in the time of Cicero.—Aetoliam lies north of the Sinus Corinthiacus, and was conquered by the Romans in the time of Ennius. M. Nobilior was sent as Praefect over the conquered province, and took Ennius along with him, out of admiration for his talents and poetry.—Studia, *partiality, favour, inclination*, viz. to be devoted to poetry.—Nec tamen sic etc., (for *sic*, many copies read *si qui*), *nor even thus*, i. e. nor even under all these disadvantages, *did our poets who had much genius, fall short of a glory like to that which the Grecian poets obtained.*

(14) P. 14. *l.* 28. Polycletus, a celebrated statuary, and also painter, of Sicyon near Corinth, fl. 232 B. C. Parrhasius, a famous painter, of Ephesus, flourished about 415 B. C.—Omnesque .... gloria, *all are excited by glory to devote themselves to any pursuit.*—Jacentque .... improbantur, *and those things are always neglected, which are disapproved by any nation.*

(15) P. 15. *l.* 2. Nervorum ... cantibus, lit. *in the music of chords and voices*, i. e. in the music of instruments accompanied by singing.—Fidibus... cecinisse, *have sung admirably in connection with stringed instruments;* fides—is, Dec. III.—Discebantque id,

they learned that thing, viz. the art of music. Apud illos, viz. the Greeks.—At nos . . . modum, *but we have limited the bounds of this art by the utility of measuring and reckoning* ; i. e. we assign to it merely the honour of aiding us in the art of mensuration, and of making out an account of quantities.—Oratorem . . . autem eruditum, *we, on the other hand, eagerly did honour to the orator, although at first he was not learned, but merely eloquent ; in later times, however, he was also learned.*—Studiosum, *devoted to study, a lover of study.*—Catonem, i. e. the elder Cato or Cato Censorinus, the historian and orator.—Post, i. e. *after* the time of Galba, etc.—Lepidus, etc., viz. were *studiosi*, like Cato.—Gracchus, i. e. Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, sons of T. Sempron. Gracchus, famous for their eloquence and their seditious behaviour, both of whom perished by assassination, about 121 B. C.—Deinde ita magnos etc., i. e. after Lepidus etc., there arose orators *so distinguished, down to our own age, that we were very little, or nothing at all, inferior to the Greeks.*

§ 4.

(16) P. 15. *l.* 22. Jacuit, *was neglected, lay, prostrate.*—Quae, i. e. philosophia.—Occupati, i. e. occupied in pleading causes, and in the labours of the senate-chamber.—Prosimus . . . otiosi, *we may be useful to them, if in our power, when we are at leisure.*—Optimis illis . . . eruditis etc., *by those men, who mean well, but are not very learned.* But who are referred to by *illis* ? Ernesti prefers to read *illi ;* and so Nobbe ; and to make this pronoun refer to the *books* mentioned. But if the reading *illis* be retained (as in the text), it must refer to some of the *persons*

whom Cicero had just named; or to some other persons well known to the writer, and to those whom he addressed.—Hominis est . . . literis, *belongs to a man who extravagantly abuses both leisure and literature.* In saying this, he means to characterize the writers to whom he had just alluded; as the sequel plainly shews.—Itaque etc., *therefore*, i. e. because they have so written, *they read their books only in company with their own* friends and disciples; *nor does any one touch them, besides those who wish for the same license in writing.*—Si aliquid . . . industriâ, *if we have added any thing to oratorical reputation by our industry.* With Rath, I prefer *laudi* here to *laudis;* which Ernesti and Nobbe retain, but Carey has marked as suspicious. Oratoriae laudi means, *the Roman reputation for eloquence;* not merely the speaker's own personal fame.—Illa, viz. *those things* which had been added to the oratorical fame of the Romans.

§ 5.

(17) P. 16. *l.* 13. Docere . . . dicere, *also began* [like Isocrates] *to teach young men to speak;* i. e. taught them the precepts of oratory, or acted the part of a rhetorician. In most editions *dicere* is in the place of *docere*, and vice versâ. But as I am unable to make any good sense out of this, I follow the text of Ernesti and Carey.—Prudentiam, *knowledge, science*, i. e. philosophical science, in this case.—Nec pristinum etc., *not to lay a aside our former study of oratory, and yet to become conversant with this more important and more fruitful art*, viz. philosophy.—Scholas, *disputations, conversazioni, conversations on literary topics.* The word would also

designate *public lectures* or *recitations*.—Quid . . . possem, *what I could do in that way.*

(18) P. 16. *l.* 26. Senilis est declamatio, *is the declamation of my old age;* which shews that the Tusculan Questions were written in the latter part of Cicero's life. Indeed, he seems to have betaken himself to the study of philosophy, on account of the exigencies of the times; which, during the wane of his life, left little hope for a busy and ambitious politician, who was attached to the popular form of government. The whole of the introduction to the Tusculan Questions, is in fact, as has been above remarked, an apology for the study of philosophy, and an effort to render that an object of particular admiration and attention, which up to the period when he was writing, had not been generally in good repute among the Romans.—Declamatio and declamito designate the usage of *extempore speaking and discussion* on any subject proposed, for the sake of practice and improvement. As Cicero had done this to a great extent, when young; so he apologizes as it were for himself, in respect to his resuming the practice when he is old. His meaning is, that in what he is about to say, he resumes the practice of his youth, in descanting upon various topics.

(19) P. 16. *l.* 27. Poncre jubebam, *I required* [some one] *to propose something;* i. e. some subject on which he would wish me to speak.—Disputabam here means *to discuss in the manner of a disputation,* viz. by question and answer, the proposing of objections and answering them, etc.—Itaque, *and then,* or *and in this way.*—Scholas plainly means here *the discussions* held during the five days mentioned.

So the Greek word *σχολή* is often employed.—Fiebat autem ita, *the matter moreover was so managed.* —Sic eas . . . narretur, *I shall so represent them, as if the thing were acted out, and not merely narrated;* he means, that he shall represent them in the way of *dialogue*, so that the speakers or actors may in propriâ personâ (so to express it) present themselves before the readers.—Exordium here means, *the commencement* of the discussion which follows.

§ 6.

This section is a true specimen of the Socratic method of reasoning; in which Cicero makes the young man, (who had set out with the position, that *death is an evil*, and yet held that there is no existence after death), to contradict himself, or to maintain what is plainly absurd. The sum of the argument which Cicero employs, is, that if we are annihilated at death, it follows of course, that we cannot be miserable after this period; because misery denotes the existence of feeling and suffering; and these necessarily imply *the actual existence of a sentient being.*

On the weight and force of this argument, I shall not make any remarks here; nor in other cases of the like nature; so as to intermingle them with the Notes. I purposely reserve, for the most part, remarks of this nature, for insertion in the *Appendix;* in which I intend to examine, at large, the arguments of Cicero respecting the immortality of the soul, and also to suggest some considerations, relative to the arguments usually employed, in modern times, in discussing this subject. Enough, for the present, that Cicero has here applied his

dialectical skill in such a way, as absolutely to hedge up the path, in which his Collocutor was beginning to proceed.

(50) P. 17. *l.* 8.—*A.* Two questions may be asked in respect to this letter; first, What is the meaning of it? Secondly, is it *a manu auctoris?* As to the first question; the meaning of *A.* seems to be explained in Tusc. Quaest. Lib. II. 11; where Cicero, addressing his Collocutor, says: "At tu, *adolescens*" etc. *A.* then means *adolescens, young man.* But this should not be understood of a mere youth, as estimated by us at the present time. Among the Romans, as among the Hebrews, a person was called *young*, until he was some thirty years of age. Now as Socrates was usually surrounded by disciples in younger life; so Cicero represents himself, in the present case, as entering into discussion with a friend of the like age, i. e. *adolescens.* Indeed, the congruity of the whole thing requires this. Cicero is the *master;* they who question him, are his *disciples* or *pupils.* But the ordinary solution of *A.*, is by *Auditor.* So Carey and others.—As to the other question, the manuscripts exhibit the initial letters *A*, and also *M*, which follow; and there can scarcely be a doubt that they are *a prima manu.*

It will of course be understood, after what has been said, that *M.* stands for *Marcus Tullius Cicero.*

(21) P. 17. *l.* 12. Est miserum . . . malum, *it is a* MISERY, *then, since it is an evil.*—Nemo . . . miser, *all then are wretched,* or *there is no one who is not miserable.*—Si tibi constare vis, *if you will be consistent with yourself,* you must grant, etc.—Nam si solos etc.; the sentiment which follows is this: 'If you should

affirm merely that all are miserable who have yet to die, then indeed, you would represent all the living as miserable, inasmuch as they must all die; but still, should you go no further than this, death would at least be the end of our woes;' *nevertheless there would be an end of misery, in death.* 'But since you represent the dead also as miserable, you make us all subject to endless misery. On this ground we must necessarily admit, that those who died one hundred thousand years ago, or rather, that all who have been born, are miserable.'

(22) P. 17. *l.* 32. Cocytus fremitus, *the groanings of Cocytus.* Cocytus, according to mythology, was a river in Hades, flowing from the Styx, and named by the Greeks, *Κωκυτός*, from *κωκύω, to howl, to shriek;* i.e. Cocytus means, *shriek-river.*—Transvectio Acherontis, *the passage over Acheron;* which was another river in Hades, into which (according to Homer in Odyss. x. 513) Periphlegethon and Cocytus emptied themselves. The Greek *Ἀχέρων* seems to be equivalent to *ὁ ἄχεα ῥέων,* i. e. *which flows with griefs,* or *the river of sorrows.*

Tantalus, well known in mythology, was a king of Lydia, the middle province on the western shore of Asia Minor, and son of Jupiter and the nymph Pluto; also the father of Niobe, Pelops, etc., all famous in fable. He is represented as plunged up to the chin into a pool of water in Hades, and as tormented with an insatiable thirst; but the moment he attempts to catch at the water, it recedes from him. Some add to this, that a bough of delicious fruit hangs above his head, which, forced by raging hunger, he attempts to seize, but which is instantly removed beyond his reach by a blast of

wind. Others represent him as sitting under a huge stone that is suspended over his head, which every moment threatens to fall. This dreadful punishment was inflicted, because he served up his son Pelops for a supper made to regale the gods; which he did in consequence of doubts as to their real divinity, and in order to put their knowledge to the test. So Pindar; but others say, it was because he stole nectar and ambrosia from the table of the gods, and gave them to men; and others assign still different causes.—Siti enectus means, *dying with thirst, tortured to death with thirst.*

Sisyphus' story may be found in all the books of mythology. He is represented as the son of Aeolus and Enaretta, and the founder of Ephyre, afterwards called Corinth; also as the most crafty and subtle prince of all the heroic ages. His punishment in Hades is represented, as a continual effort to roll a huge stone up a steep hill, which no sooner reaches near the top, than it is precipitated back to the bottom, and he commences his work anew. The cause of this punishment is usually represented, to be a trick which Sisyphus played upon Pluto. At his death, he commanded his wife to leave his body unburied. When he came to Hades, he begged indulgence of Pluto, to go back and punish the seeming negligence of his wife, in leaving his body unburied; and having obtained his request, he declined returning to the infernal regions. Pluto then sent Mars after him; and when he was brought back by force, Pluto condemned him to the punishment above stated. Others assign different causes.—Sudans nitendo, *sweating because of strenuous exertion.*—Hilum, *in the least, in any degree.*

(23) P. 18. *l.* 5. Minos et Rhadamanthus, both (according to mythology) sons of Jupiter and Europa, and born in Crete. For their distinguished justice while kings on earth, the Greeks represented them as severe and impartial judges in Hades. Minos hears the causes of the dead, and shakes the fatal urn by which their destiny is determined; and Rhadamanthus obliges them to confess their crimes, and punishes them for their offences. Cicero has here omitted Aeacus, son of Jupiter and Aegina, and king of Oenopia, who is often associated with Minos and Rhadamanthus.—L. Crassus . . . M. Antonius; the former a celebrated orator cotemporary with Cicero; the latter, Cicero's teacher in rhetoric, at Rome, otherwise called Marcus Antonius Gnipho.

(24) P. 18. *l.* 7. Quoniam, *whilst;* the sense seems to require *quamquam*, as Ernesti remarks; but *quoniam* is admissible in the sense now given to it.—Graecos judices, i. e. Minos and Rhadamanthus, as stated above.—Tibi ipsi . . . dicenda, [but] *the cause must be pleaded for yourself, the crown being of the highest value.* The recent translation of Cicero's Tusculan Questions, by W. H. Main (Lond. 1824), renders maximâ coronâ, *before a very great assembly.* The Latin is, no doubt, capable of this; because *corona* sometimes means *the crowd which surrounds* or *encircles* any one. But I apprehend the true force and point of the expression here would be lost by such a version. I understand Cicero, who had just named Demosthenes, as alluding here to the last and highest effort of this masterly orator, viz., the celebrated oration *περὶ στεφάνου*, i. e. *pro coronâ.* Demosthenes, in the course of his life, had been twice crowned on the public stage at Athens; once

for his services in expelling the Macedonian garrison from the island of Euboea; and the second time, after the league made with the Thebans. In 334 B. C., his friend Ctesiphon proposed in the Senate, that Demosthenes should be again crowned for his many public, patriotic, and disinterested services. Aeschines, the rival of Demosthenes, took offence at this, and accused Ctesiphon of acting unlawfully and precipitately in this matter, and demanded that he should be fined fifty talents of gold. From various causes, the matter did not come to trial until eight years afterwards; when Demosthenes undertook the defence of Ctesiphon; and through him, the vindication of his own claims, which was the real basis of the dispute. As this was the last, so it was the most perfect of all the public speeches of Demosthenes; and indeed, it is the unquestionable master-piece of ancient ages. An allusion to these well-known facts I suppose Cicero to make, in the phrase maximâ coronâ; which, on the ground that I take, means as much as to say: 'The crown for which you will plead, will be one of the highest possible value;' i. e. it amounts to the question of eternal happiness or misery. The idea of a *great assembly* before which individuals are to plead their cause at the bar of the judges in Hades, is, as it seems to me, foreign to the *classical* circle of thought; although it is familiar to us, because we insensibly transfer the scriptural account of the judgment day, to the heathen judgment day. It comes, therefore, from the Scriptures, rather than from the Greek or Roman views of our final trial.

P. 18. *l.* 16. Male, Hercule, narras, *by Hercules, you*

speak unluckily. The reason follows: Quia . . . dicerem, i. e. 'I might exhibit some eloquence in descanting against such things,' viz. if he had not been prevented by his Collocutor's disclaiming any belief in them.—Quis enim non etc., *who now could not* [be eloquent] *in a matter of this kind?* Convincere, *refute.*

(25) P. 18. *l.* 31. Nusquam . . . possunt, literally *they cannot be nowhere*, i. e. they must be somewhere. —Quid tandem, literally *why at last?* Tandem, in such a case, is expressive of surprise or strong feeling; just as we should say, in English: 'Why, in all the world? Why, for heaven's sake?'—Istuc, *that;* put for isthoc.—Illas fortunas, *those* [splendid] *possessions*, viz. such as the persons present were well acquainted with.—M. Crassus, i. e. Marcus Licinius Crassus, one of the triumvirate with Caesar and Pompey, who was exceedingly rich, and met with a violent death, B. C. 53.—Cneium Pompeium, Pompey the Great, as he has been called, one of the same triumvirate, who also came to a violent end.—Qui . . . careant, i. e. who die.

(26) P. 19. *l.* 15. Revolveris eodem, *you move in a circle*, i. e. you argue in one.—Etiam quod sentio, *the very thing which*, or *exactly what, I think.*—Esse . . . dicis, *then you affirm that they* [who are dead] *do still exist.*—Portâ Capena, a gate of Rome so named, because it led towards Capena.—Calatini, etc., heroes and patriots of former days.

The Greek ἀξίωμα means, in logic, *whatever is so said, in a perfect sentence, that it must be either true or false.* Pronunciatum, then, is a *proposition, declaration, something declared.*—Id ergo . . . falsum, is not exactly fitted to the previous *omne pronuntia-*

tum. The fact is, that the construction of the sentence is broken off by the parenthesis, and begun anew or resumed at *id* etc.; *that then is an affirmation, which is true or false.*

(27) P. 20. *l.* 30. Ecqui, sign of interrogation merely, like the word *num; do you see then*, etc.? —Dejeceris, *you have removed* or *abstracted*, viz., by granting that men are not miserable after death, the sum of their misery is of course greatly diminished; as the sequel shews.—Haberemus in vita, i. e. we should, while living, have continually before us endless misery.—Calcem, literally *the heel;* but here figuratively, *the extremity.*

Epicharmus (fl. 440 B. C.) was a poet and Pythagorean philosopher, who introduced comedy at Syracuse, under king Hiero. He was imitated by the Roman Plautus. He is reported to have made a metrical version of the maxims of Pythagoras, and so to have divulged the secrets of the School. Aristotle and Pliny make him the inventor of the Greek letters χ and ϑ.—The phrase, acuti nec insulsi hominis, corresponds pretty exactly to our vulgar English expression, *a shrewd sort of a man, and no fool of a fellow.* At least, this gives the sense of the original, better than a more stately expression.

Ut Siculi, *inasmuch as he is a Sicilian;* for Sicilians were deemed, by the ancients, to be men of acute minds.—Quam, i. e. quam sententiam.—Me Graece . . . Latine, *that I am not any more wont to introduce Greek when speaking Latin, than I am to introduce the Latin while speaking Greek.*—Jam agnosco Graecum, *I readily discern the Greek;* but does he mean the *Greek man*, or the Greek lan-

guage that corresponded with what Cicero had uttered? The latter, Mr. Main says; and perhaps correctly; for a reference to what *precedes* the quotation, would incline one so to think. Still it is possible, that the speaker means to say: "I discern in this sentiment the shrewd Greek philosopher;" but, on the whole, I cannot think this to be the probable interpretation. He seems to design to say, that although Cicero had not expressed the Greek, he could discern what it must be, or recal it to mind. The verse of Epicharmus, *Ἀποθάνειν ἢ τεθνάναι, οὔ μοι διαφέρει,* which Sextus Empiricus (advers. Mathemat.) has preserved, does not appear to contain the sentiment which Cicero has here expressed in Latin.—Perfice, *accomplish* or *complete* your undertaking, viz., to shew, that *I should regard the not being obliged to die, as miserable.*

(28) P. 21. *l.* 18. Jam ... est, *that now is indeed no difficult task.*—Cui proximum etc., *near to which* [death], *is the time after death*, etc.—Id est enim etc., *for that* [viz. dying] *is coming to that* etc.—Uberius ista, [speak] *more at large upon these things.*—Haec ... assentiar, *these thorny matters* (*as I confess*) *compel me before I can yield my assent to them.*—Ut enim non efficias etc., *although you may not effect*, etc.; tamen etc., *yet you may succeed in shewing*, etc.—Continentem orationem, *continuous* or *uninterrupted speech.*—Superbum ... esset, *that would be acting haughtily* or *arrogantly;* for *esset* Ernesti reads *est*, but (with Rath) I prefer *esset.*—Geram tibi morem, *I yield to thee*, or *I grant your request;* mos sometimes signifies *one's own will* or *opinion;* and gero, *to manage, direct*, etc. Hence gero tibi morem, literally *I di-*

rect my will for you, tibi being in the *Dativus commodi*, as grammarians say.—Homunculus unus, literally *one little man*, a man of an inferior cast, out of the many such who may be found; spoken in the way of modesty, so as not to pretend to too much.—Probabilia conjecturâ sequens, *seeking after what is probable by supposition*, i. e. what we may suppose to be probable.—Tu, ut videtur, *you* may go on *as you please;* we put ourselves in the attitude of listeners.

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§§ 7—9.

In this discussion, (as should be done in all others which are properly conducted), the writer aims first at the *definition* of the main word or topic: *What is death?* On the part of some, the answer to this is, that it is the separation of the soul and body, or the departure of the former from the latter. But others think that the soul perishes with the body. *What then is the soul?* A fundamental question, of course, in the whole discussion.

In the investigation of this topic, Cicero adduces (in § 7. § 8) all the various theories respecting the soul, which had been proposed by different philosophers; and on some of these he makes remarks, in § 9. Of course, all those theories respecting the soul, which make it a part, or the whole, of the body, e. g. the heart, the brain, the blood, or that harmony which is the result of all the parts of the body being united, are considered as affording no ground of hope for immortality; because, if either of these theories be true, the soul must be dissolved with the body. Other theories, e. g. such as represent the soul to be air or ether, fire or caloric, the perennial principle or cause of motion and life, etc., Cicero considers as affording some room for hope, that the soul, when it leaves the body, may find a permanent place of abode in the celestial regions.

§ 7.

(29) P. 22. *l.* 17. Mors, etc., *our first business, then, shall be, to inquire what death itself is, which seems to be something familiarly known.* Animi, *of the mind* or *soul*, *νοῦς*, i. e. the intelligent and rational part of man, in distinction from his physical or bodily part. So

evidently *animus* is used here. But this is not its only meaning, in the Latin language. (1) Sometimes it is equivalent to *anima*, i. e. the animating living principle of our nature, as contained in the breath; and this seems to be the original sense of the word, inasmuch as it plainly comes from the Greek ἄνεμος, *wind, breath.* (2) Animus sometimes designates also *the faculty of thinking and desiring*, in distinction from the material nature of the body, which of itself cannot do this. (3) Animus denotes, also, *the faculty of perception and feeling*, in distinction from the material nature of the body; and in this last sense, as well as in its second one, it becomes equivalent to *mind*, as designating our intellectual and rational part. Like our English word *mind*, also, animus designates the various affections and exercises of the soul; e. g. will, desire, courage, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, hope, manner of thinking, opinion, thought, etc. That Cicero uses *animus*, in his present book, for *mind* (in a generic sense), i. e. for soul, in distinction from, or in opposition to, the body as material and mortal, is plain from the very nature of the case. Of course, our English word *soul* or *mind*, is a correct translation of it.

(30) P. 22. *l.* 21. Occidere, *to fall* or *to perish.*—Alii statim, i. e. alii censent statim; and so in the following cases of the word alii.—Semper, i. e. semper permanere. The reader will note *these* THREE *classes of opinion, respecting the* DURATION *of the soul.* Next follows a recension of the different opinions respecting *the* NATURE *itself of the soul.*—Nasica . . . Corculum, *Nasica* (i. e. Scipio Nasica), *that shrewd man, twice made consul*, [was surnamed, dicebatur implied] *corculum*, i. e. little heart.

(31) P. 22. *l.* 30. *Empedocles thinks, that the soul is the blood suffused around the heart.* Empedocles, who flourished about 444 B. C., was a native of Agrigentum, a town on the south-western shore of Sicily, a philosopher and poet, and one of the most distinguished men in his country. He wrote a poem, in three books, on the *Nature of Things;* which Lucretius had before him, when he wrote his poem of the like kind; but which, with all the other works of Empedocles, has perished, excepting only a few fragments. The story of Empedocles plunging himself into the crater of mount Etna, is probably a fiction. The sentence of Empedocles to which Cicero here alludes, is this: *Αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα, for the blood around the heart of man is his mind;* found in Stobaeus, Eclog. Phys. p. 131.—Animi principatum tenere, *to contain the principal portion*, or *the predominating portion of the soul.*

(32) P. 23. *l.* 4. Declarat nomen, (Ernesti and Nobbe: declarant nomen), I understand as an elliptical expression, equivalent to *hoc declaret nomen, this the name declares*, i. e. the very name which we give to the *soul*, declares that it has been deemed the same thing as *anima*, the *breath* or vital principle. The sequel shews that such was the intention of the writer.—Agere animam means, *the panting of a dying person, to pant for breath.*—Animam efflare is *to breath out one's breath, to expire.*—Et animosos, i. e. et dicimus *animosos*, i. e. we speak of *animosos, animatos*, and also say, *et animi sententiâ.* —Bentley suspected the genuineness of the words, nam et ... sententia; Rath has so marked them in his edition; but I prefer, with Nobbe, to mark

only, et animosos . . . sententia; which I have included in brackets, in order to denote the probability that it is not genuine; at least, it does not seem to be to the purpose of the author, and I can make no tolerable reasoning out of it.

(33) P. 23. *l.* 8. Zenoni Stoico, a celebrated philosopher, and founder of the sect of the Stoics, was born at Citium in the island of Cyprus, and died B. C. 264, at the age of 96 years. He spent his literary life at Athens; where he lectured on philosophy, in the portico called *στόα*. Hence the name *Stoic*, given to him and his followers. Temperance, regularity of life, indifference to bodily appetites, and universal sobriety of demeanour, were virtues insisted on by the Stoics; and which these philosophers, at least many of them, seem to have carried higher than any other sect of ancient Greece.

§ 8.

(34) P. 23. *l.* 9. Sed haec . . . vulgo, *but that these things which I have mentioned, the heart, the brain, the breath, fire*, [are the soul], *is commonly* [said]; that is, these opinions are common.—Reliqua fere singuli, *other things, for the most part, only particular persons* [affirm].—Ut multi ante etc.; with Bentley and Rath, I begin a new sentence here. Ernesti puts only a comma after singuli; but the nature of the sentence which follows, with the correlates ante . . . proxime, shews that a different division should be made.—Ante, *anciently*, viz. *before* the time of Aristoxenus. Proxime, *in later times*.

(35) P. 23. *l.* 11. Aristoxenus, a celebrated musician, was born at Tarentum of Calabria in Italy. He wrote 453 treatises on philosophy, history, etc. He was a

disciple of Aristotle; and three books of his on music, are still extant, being the most ancient that we have respecting this science. He flourished about 340 B. C.

(36) P. 23. *l.* 13. Intentionem quandam, i. e. many of the ancients, and in later times, Aristoxenus, [have said that the soul is] *a kind of straining up* or *tuning of the body itself.*—Velut etc., *as in singing and instrumental music, what is called harmony*, [arises from such a tuning]; *so from the nature and conformation of the whole body, its various motions arise, like the sounds in music.*—Hic, viz. Aristoxenus.—Artificio suo, *his art* as a musician. —Et tamen ... Platone, *and yet he said something which, whatever it might be, was long before both said and explained by Plato.*

(37) P. 23. *l.* 19. Xenocrates, born at Chalcedon in Bythinia, a town opposite Byzantium; a pupil of Plato, who succeeded Speusippus in the school of Plato; and who was much respected and admired for his virtues. He died B. C. 314, at the age of 82.

(38) P. 23. *l.* 21. Pythagoras, a native of Samos one of the Grecian islands; a disciple of Pherecydes of Syros; a famous moral and political reformer, at Metapontum and Crotona, cities on the Tarentine bay, at the south-east part of the Italian peninsula, usually called *Magna Graecia.* His doctrine of *metempsychosis* and *the harmony of the spheres*, are well known. He applied the doctrine of *even* and *odd*, in numbers, to the system of the Universe; and he drew from this application, the conclusion that this system is a system of *relations*, i. e. of *numerical* proportion; and so, *a living harmony of numbers.* (See in Rixner's Geschichte der Philos.

Vol. I., a detailed account of *the music of the Spheres*, in the Appendix.)

(39) P. 23. *l.* 20. Numerum seems to mean, *harmonical conformity*. If we ask for *definite* ideas, in respect to such philosophy as that of Pythagoras and his followers, with regard to this point, we may ask in vain. The general idea of this *numerical conformity* seems to have been, a kind of harmonizing *anima mundi*, diffused through all its parts; and of course existing in human beings. To explain it, Pythagoras compared it to music, and to the harmony (as he named it) of even numbers.

(40) P. 23. *l.* 22. Ejus doctor, i. e. the teacher of Xenocrates.--Cujus ... in arce, *whose ruling part*, i. e. *reason he placed in the head, as in a kind of citadel.*—Et duas partes ... locavit, *and two parts he made subordinate*, viz. *irascibility and desire, which he located in their appropriate places, irascibility in the breast, and desire under the region of the heart.* For *suis*, Ernesti and others read *disclusit;* with Rath and some of the Mss., I prefer *suis*.

(41) P. 23. *l.* 28. Dicaearchus, of Messene in the province of Messenia, belonging to the south-western part of the Peloponnesus, was famous for his knowledge of philosophy, history, and mathematics. There are no remains of his works, at present.—Quem ... exponit, *which, being pronounced at Corinth, he has published in three books.*—Duobus, *in the* other *two* books.—Disserentem, *who maintains.*—Frustra que .... appellari, *and that without any reason, animals are also called* ANIMATED BEINGS.—Neque, i. e. he also maintains, *that neither* etc.—Animum vel animam, i. e. neither a rational soul, nor an animating principle.—-Quippe ... quidquam, *because*

there is no such [anima], *nor any thing whatever, unless* etc.—Ita figuratum, etc., *so formed, that by the tempering of nature it lives and thinks.*

(42) P. 24. *l.* 13. Quatuor illa genera principiorum, *those four kinds of elements*, i. e. the well known four, viz. water, earth, fire, and air.—Cum .... complexus, *when .... he had comprised* or *represented.*— Et tam multa alia, *and also many other things*, viz., meminisse, etc.—*Ἐνδελέχειαν*, (so, on the whole, I think, with Rath, it should be written, and not as Ernesti writes it, *ἐντελέχεια*), means *perennity, continued existence in the same state.* *Ἐντελέχεια* means *activity, action itself*, or *actual being.* Neither the one nor the other of these Greek words seem fully to correspond with Cicero's explanation. On the whole, however, his emphasis seems to lie upon *continuatam* and *perennem*, rather than on *motionem;* which would favour the reading *ἐνδελέχειαν.*

§ 9.

(43) P. 24. *l.* 24. Nisi .... sententiae, *unless, perchance, some have escaped me, these are nearly the* [various] *opinions respecting the soul.* After *fere*, the common editions insert *omnium ;* but the leading Mss. omit it ; and so Rath.

(44) P. 24. *l.* 25. Democritus, of Abdera in Thrace, at the head of the Aegean Sea ; a disciple of Leucippus of the same place ; born B. C. 500 ; called *Πένταθλος*, because of his skill in logic, physics, ethics, mathematics, and music. The *atomic* philosophy seems to have taken its rise from him. Cicero seems hardly to represent his principles with fairness here ; for he did not maintain the *fortuitous* concourse of atoms, but that their movements were

necessary, and yet that they were directed by the laws of the highest reason. See Rixner, Gesch. der Philos. I. p. 128.

(45) P. 24. *l.* 26. Levibus ... corpusculis, *smooth and round particles* or *atoms*.—Apud istos, i. e. among philosophers of that class.—Confundere, *to mix them together, to unite them*.—Ut ... disserantur, *although those matters*, viz. respecting the constituent elements of the soul, *be not discussed*.—Nisi hac ... hoc, *unless this question* [respecting the essence] *of the soul be solved, now, if you think proper*, [we will discuss] *this*.—Illud aliâs, *otherwise* [we will discuss] *that*.—Efficiet enim ratio, *for reason will make it out*.

(46) P. 25. *l.* 15. Si anima est, *if it is air, breath*.—His sententiis omnibus, *according to all these opinions*.—Sensus, *sensation*.—Non sentientis ... intersit, *but to one destitute of all sensation, there is nothing which can be of any consequence*.

(47) P. 25. *l* 31. Num etc., i. e. can we defend the immortality of the soul more eloquently than Plato has done?

Sed nescio quo modo, etc.; a remarkable and very affecting concession of an anxious and inquiring mind. All the arguments which a Plato and a Socrates had produced, could operate, as it would seem, with only a momentary and imperfect force upon it. With Plato's Phaedo in his hand, the inquiring youth could not, for the time being, gainsay his reasoning; but so little of deep impression did it make, so little of solid satisfaction did it give, that at the moment when direct attention to the subject ceased, then conviction and satisfaction began to diminish and to vanish away. Cicero does not,

indeed, say this in his own person; but can there be any good ground of doubt, that he drew the sentiment from his own feelings? I apprehend it must have been nearly or altogether so, with a great part of the few among the heathen, who professed to believe in the real immateriality and immortality of the soul. They saw through a glass darkly. They were groping their way by dim twilight. The gospel, and that only, has "brought life and immortality to light," in a manner that admits no doubt nor fears as to the doctrine of a future state.

Dasne, *do you not concede*, either that the soul endures etc., or etc.—Do vero i. e. I grant that the one or the other of these must be true.

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§ 10.

The first argument which Cicero employs to show that the soul survives the body, is an *argumentum ad hominem*; i. e. it avails only for those who hold, as did the Greeks and Romans, that the gods now existing and *immortal*, were once human beings. For all such, Cicero says, the funereal rites and ceremonies that are practised, will exhibit sufficient proof, that renowned men and women are regarded, and have from time immemorial been regarded, as surviving the destruction of the body. Thus it is in respect to Romulus, Castor and Pollux, Ino, and others. Nay, even the *Dii Majores* are all of the like class; as their sepulchres in Greece, and their mysteries, clearly shew. We may add to these considerations, the general persuasion respecting the appearance of ghosts or spirits.

(48) P. 26. *l.* 23. Auctoribus . . . possumus, *we can adduce the best authorities in respect to that sentiment which you wish should be established.*—Et primum . . . antiquitate, *and especially* [we can adduce] *all antiquity.*—Ortu, *its first origin.*

(49) P. 26. *l.* 30. Insitum, *implanted* by nature.—Cascos, the same in meaning as *antiquos;*

but the word *cascos* is antiquated or obsolete, being probably a Sabine word.—Esse in morte sensum, *that there is sensation in a state of death*, i. e. after death.—Tum ... sepulcrorum, *both from the ordinances of the priests and the ceremonies at graves.*—Nec violatas ... sanxissent, *nor, when* [these ceremonies] *are violated, would they have punished with a scrupulosity which could not be appeased.* Religio, *conscientiousness, scrupulosity;* sancio sometimes means to apply the penalty of a law, i. e. *to punish;* and this seems to make the best sense here.—Mortem non ... delentem, *that death is not such a destruction as removes and makes an entire end of every thing.*—In ceteris ... tamen, *in regard to others*, [this soul] *is retained in the ground, but still continues to exist.*

(50) P. 27. *l.* 11. Ex hoc ... opinione, *according to this, and in the opinion of our countrymen.*—Ennius, see Note 9.—Indeque ... Hercules, *and from thence Hercules, penetrating to us, and even to the ocean*, i. e. the Atlantic.—He probably refers here to Gades (now Cadiz), situated anciently on an island in the Atlantic, some distance north of the straits of Gibralter; where Hercules was worshipped, and where he probably once came. The pillars of Hercules are usually supposed to have been at Calpe (Gibralter) on the Spanish coast, and Abyla, opposite to it on the African side; and it is said that these were erected, as the limits of the western world. But Silius Italicus calls Gades the *cognata limina* [mundi], Lib. III. 3; and Isidorus says: "Hercules, cum *Gadibus* pervenisset, *columnas* ibi posuit, sperans illic esse orbis terrarum finis, Orig. Lib. XIII. c. 15. Add

to this, that Gades is on the Atlantic ocean, in accordance with the expression of Cicero, *usque ad Oceanum;* while Calpe (Gibralter) and Abyla are within the Mediterranean Sea. Gades, therefore, was naturally the extreme boundary of the western world, as known to the ancients.—Tyndaridae fratres, *the brothers, sons of Tyndar*, i. e. Castor and Pollux, reckoned as tutelar Genii by the Roman people. The particular story to which Cicero seems here to refer, is, that Castor and Pollux were present, in the Macedonian war, at the battle in which Perses the king of Macedonia was conquered, near Pydna, B. C. 168; that they not only assisted the Romans to obtain this victory, but appeared immediately after it at Rome, washing off from themselves the blood and dust of battle in the river Tiber, and announcing victory to the imperial city. The like phenomena, however, the mythology of the Romans often ascribed to the sons of Tyndar.

(51) P. 27. *l.* 20. Ino, Cadmi filia, etc.; the mythology is complex, and very absurd. Athemas, king of Thebes in Boeotia, married first Themisto, by whom he had Phryxus and Helle. Pretending that Themisto was subject to fits of insanity, he afterwads married Ino, by whom he had Melarchus and Melicerta. Ino, becoming jealous of the first children of her husband, sought in various ways to destroy them. Juno, in revenge for this, sent one of the Furies to the house of Athamas; who taking possession of him, in a fit of madness he killed Melarchus the son of Ino, and pursued her, in his rage, in order to destroy her. She, flying with Melicerta in her arms,

plunged into the sea; upon which she was changed into a sea-goddess, whom the Greeks called *Λευκοθέα*, and the Romans *Matuta*. Only free born, married women were permitted to enter her temple. The meaning of the name *Matuta*, seems to be *morning-goddess*, i. q. Aurora; and so the Greek name would not unnaturally import.

(52) P. 27. *l.* 22. Quid? *What* more shall I say?—Ne plures persequar, *not to particularize any more* individuals.—Caelum, commonly written *coelum* = *κοῖλος*, *hollow*, *concave*, *the welkin*.—Ipsi illi ... reperientur, *those very individuals*, *who are reputed as gods of a higher kind*, *will be found to have gone from us to heaven*. This is a very striking passage; and it casts great light over the whole field of heathen mythology. All the objects of Greek and Roman worship were then, after all, mere *men* who had undergone *ἀποθέωσις*. "Cease ye from man," one might well say, with the sublime prophet of the Hebrews, to all the worshippers of such gods. But the purpose for which Cicero here makes such an appeal, is one of great interest. He is labouring to shew that the soul is immortal. How can this be done? 'All antiquity,' says he, 'believed it. All that is done for the dead, shews that we consider them as still having a regard to their fame and honour. The fact, that even the gods themselves (to whom we pray and look for help, and whom we all believe to be *immortal*) were once men, shews that the souls of men are immortal; yea, these gods, even of the highest order, we acknowledge, were once mere men.' The argument is certainly ingenious; and to a popular believer in the Roman gods, was an

argumentum ad hominem which was invincible. For *us*, such an argument has no further weight, than as it goes to shew, how deeply seated in the human breast is the desire or expectation of an immortal existence.

(53) P. 27. *l.* 26. Majorum gentium Dii, are Jupiter, Neptune, Apollo, Mars, Vulcan, Mercury; Juno, Minerva, Ceres, Venus, Diana, Vesta; six male, and six female ones. So Ennius the poet reckons them by name.—Quere ... Graecia, *ask whose sepulchres are shewn in Greece;* i. e. in so doing you will find what I have said to be true.—Initiatus, i. e. *initiated* into the mysteries of the heathen mythology, become a *μύστης*.—Mysteriis, *the secret rites and doctrines* of the heathen mythology or theology, not disclosed to the world. These rites, no doubt, were symbols of things which the reputed gods had done and said; and among these, was what had been done by them before their transmigration to heaven. On this account, Cicero appeals to the *mysteries* as a proof that what he had been saying with respect to the gods having once been men, was true.—Tum ... intelliges, *then surely will you understand, how widely this extends;* viz. how widely the declaration that he had made, may be extended, how generally true it is. Denique is sometimes employed, as here, as an adverb of intensity, i. e. serving to strengthen the affirmation.

(54) P. 27. *l.* 32. Physica, *natural philosophy, physics.*—Tantum ... cognoverant, *persuaded themselves of only so much as they understood from the instructions of nature*, i. e. their own internal nature.—Maxime nocturnis; night being the time,

when spectres have always and every where been supposed usually to make their appearance.—Ut ... vivere, *so that those seemed to live, who had departed from life.*

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§ 11.

The second argument is, that as universal belief in the existence of the gods seems to be a good reason for admitting the truth of this; therefore the general laws of our nature, that we should believe in the doctrine of a future state, is a good reason for believing it. It is in reference to this, also that we grieve over our departed friends; not because of disadvantages to which we are subjected, on account of their death, but because we think them deprived of the pleasures of life.

Again; that all men have an instinctive apprehension or expectation of a continued existence, is testified by all our arrangements for the future; by sepulchres, eulogies of the dead, heroic deeds, devotedness to one's country, etc. Poets, artificers, philosophers, all develope the same trait of character, as to their expectations concerning the future. Especially is this trait discernible, in all those, who attain to superior excellence in any way. It is therefore *a law of our nature;* and as such, its testimony must be regarded as true.

This placed on its proper basis, is a fundamental argument in favour of a future state; as we shall see hereafter. The development of it, however, may be made, I think, in a more convincing way than is here done. But even here, are sparks of celestial fire, shewing that heathenism itself could not wholly deface the image of God, which he has given to our immortal part; at least, that it could not do this as to the mind of a reflecting man, such as Cicero was.

(55) P. 28. *l.* 5. Ut ... videtur, *moreover, this seems to be adduced as a very solid* reason. *Ut* is frequently used with the superlative of adjectives, in this way. Ernesti suspects the genuineness of it here, and thinks we should read *at*; but this seems to be occasioned by overlooking the idiom.—Deorum opinio means, *a belief that gods exist;* opinio est means, *one believes.*—Collocutio hominum means, *men's conferring together*, i. e. in the way of conversation and discussion. Cicero means to say,

that no conferences with each other, no natural agreement in consequence of such conferences, no ordinances, no laws, have occasioned men thus to harmonize in their opinions about the immortal gods; in other words, it all results from the teaching of nature merely; and so it results, of course, *from a law of our nature*.—Suo incommodo, *on account of his own* [personal] *inconvenience* or *suffering*.—Dolent, i. e. [some] *grieve*, etc.—Fletusque maerens, *and weeping occasioned by grief*.—Idque sentire, *and that he is sensible of this*, viz. of being deprived, etc.—Nulla ratione ... doctrina, *independently of any reasoning or instruction*, i. e. simply as guided by nature.

(56) P. 28. *l.* 25. Tacitam, *silently*, i. e. without any teaching or leading, as above said.—Quod ... sint, *that all are solicitous, and peculiarly so, about those things which are to happen after they are dead.* He means by this, to shew that a longing after immortality is a part of our very nature; which no doubt is a real, as it is a most important truth.

(57) P. 28. *l.* 28. Statius (Caecilius), a comic poet, cotemporary with Ennius, a native of Gaul, and originally a slave. He acquired great reputation by his comedies, although his Latin was not pure.—Synephebis, a play so called, from *συνέφεβοι, young persons of the same age*.—Quid ... pertinere? *To what does he look, unless that even after ages concern himself?*—Ergo ... non seret, *shall the industrious husbandman, then, plant trees, the fruit* (or *berry*) *of which he will never see; and shall not a great man establish laws, institutes, the republic?*—Nisi nos ... cogitare, *unless we have respect also to the future*.—Illud ... natura, *can you doubt it, that a*

specimen of what is really natural, should be selected from that nature what is best in its kind?—Carey and some others read thus: Quid illud? num etc. with Rath I prefer, Quid? Illud num etc., as this construction of *quid* then accords with that in the preceding sentences.—Quam eorum, i. e. quam natura eorum, etc.—Munivisset, *had prepared* by his famous deeds, etc.—Et religione ... consecrata, *and rendered sacred by the religious feeling of all men.*

§ 12.

(58) P. 29. *l.* 16. Iisdem ne ... terminaretur? *Shall we say that their fame is terminated by the same bounds as their life?*—Licuit ... Themistocli, *Themistocles might have enjoyed his ease;* where the construction is, licuit Themistocli esse otioso, esse taking the same case after it as before it.—Ne et ... quaeram, *not to mention things ancient and foreign.*—Quo dempto, *which* [expectation of the future] *being taken away.*—De principibus; *concerning leading men* or *rulers.*—Funera fletu faxet, *nor perform my funeral rites with weeping;* faxet (by syncope) for *fecerit,*—Vivu', i. e. vivus, the *s* being dropped by apocope.

(59) P. 30. *l.* 3. Sed quid poëtas? *But why* [should I speak of] *the poets?*—Opifices, *artists.* Phidias, a celebrated statuary of Athens, who died B. C. 432. By request of Pericles, he made a statue of Minerva, and on her shield, he carved his own likeness, and also that of Pericles. For this he was banished from Athens; and he took his revenge afterwards, by making a statue of Jupiter Olympius, which eclipsed the glory of his Minerva, and which was kept by the people of Elis.—Et si

... maxime, *and if we think those whose minds excel either in genius or virtue, to be peculiarly adapted to discern the power of nature, because they possess a nature best in its kind.*

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§§ 13—18.

But if the soul survives the body, *where* and *how* does it exist? This question gives occasion for a kind of episode here, on the metaphysical nature of the soul, and its final place of residence; which extends through §§ 13—18. Vulgar ignorance, says Cicero, has formed a multitude of superstitious notions on this subject; because the uninformed minds of men were unable to contemplate any thing but sensible objects. Pherecydes first taught the proper eternity of the soul; which was received and supported by the disciples of Pythagoras; from whom it passed to Plato.

Mathematicians (natural philosophers) teach, that of the four elements, two, i. e. earth and water, sink downwards; and two, i. e. fire and air, mount upwards. Now if the soul be igneous or etherial; and *a fortiori* if it be *harmony*, or that *fifth something* described by Aristotle; it will of course mount *upwards* on its departure from the body, and ascend to a very great distance from the earth. But I do not see how *harmony* can arise from the disposition of members and the figure of the body destitute of a soul. It were better for Aristoxenus, who maintains this, to attend to his music, and leave reasoning on this subject to Aristotle his master. The fortuitous concourse of atoms, moreover as a cause of animated being, we must at once reject. If then the soul consists of any of the four elements, it must necessarily be that of fire or air; and of course the soul, consisting of either of these, or of these combined, on quitting the body, must mount into the upper regions. And that the soul is of a warmer or more glowing nature than the concrete air, is clear from the warmth which it imparts to our bodies, that are formed from mere terrene materials.

The soul, moreover, is capable of the highest celerity of movement; by which it can easily permeate the clouds and vapours and obscurity which encompass the earth, and escape to that element in the upper regions, consisting of combined ether and solar warmth, which will be homogeneous with itself, and where it will find its own proper balance and resting place, and therefore cease to ascend. Here it will be nourished as the stars are, i. e. by the pure and glowing ether of those upper regions.

Here, also, being freed from all bodily desires and lusts, and left to the full and free exercise of its own proper powers, it will gratify its insatiable thirst for knowledge; which, moreover, will ever be increased in proportion to its gratification and its opportunities. Even here, on earth, the beauty of the natural creation excites ardent desire for more extended knowledge. And if we now count it a great thing to visit the extreme western part of the Mediterra-

nean and to see the Euxine Sea on the east; what will be our rapture, when we can see all the regions of the earth, with all their various forms and productions!

Besides all this, we may consider, that at present we do not really see any thing, with our physical organs. These are the mere inlets to the soul, which alone has any proper sensation. When we come, then, to those upper regions, where we shall no longer be impeded by any of our physical organs, nothing will hinder our having the clearest, most extensive, and altogether satisfactory views of every thing that we desire to know.—Such therefore will be the state and condition of the soul.

And such being the case, I wonder at the strange conduct of the Epicureans, who think it a great thing to have freed men from the fear of the future, by shewing that the soul is of a mortal nature, and expires with the body. To me the sentiment of Pythagoras and Plato is much more probable and welcome.

The objection made by many, viz. that they cannot understand *what* the nature of the soul is, which is eternal, amounts to nothing; for can they understand any better what the soul is, when *in the body*, than when *out of the body*? To me it is much more difficult to see how the soul can dwell in a habitation so foreign to its true nature, and how it is to contemplate it as freed from such a habitation: unless, indeed, we are to maintain the position, that we can understand nothing which we do not see with our eyes; and then we must disbelieve the existence of the gods. Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus, because they could not tell *what* the soul is, rejected the idea of its existence. But when the oracle of Apollo said: *Γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, it meant, that we should become acquainted with our souls, *which are our only proper selves.*

Thus it is evident that one main design of Cicero, in the whole of this apparent digression, is to remove objections against a future state, made from the nature and dwelling place of the soul.

(60) P. 30. *l.* 26. Censebant, i. e. antiqui homines censebant.—Frequens... theatri, *the crowded assembly at the theatre.*—Audiens... carmen, *when hearing so pompous a strain.* Adsum etc., *I am present, and I come from Acheron, with difficulty, through a deep and dangerous passage; through caves formed by rough rocks, over-hanging, huge; where the thick darkness of hell is immoveable; rigida stat* is a more probable reading than rigida constat; the meaning of which former is *stands stiff*, i. e. immoveable. The quotation is from the Hecuba of Euripides, sub. init.—Valuit, *did prevail.*—Sublatus, *removed;* the lexicons derive this

word from *tollo*, its own proper root being out of use.

(61) P. 31. *l.* 5. Animos ... complecti, *they could not form any idea of minds living by themselves*, i. e. existing independently of the body.—Aliquam, *some kind of.*—Tota *νεκυία, all the νεκυία of Homer; νεκυία* means sacrifices and rites instituted for the dead, in order to evoke the shades (umbrae) from the under-world or Hades.—*Νεκρομαντεῖα, places where necromancy was practised.*—Faciebat seems hardly to admit of a tolerable sense here. It may be rendered, *procured, made, constructed*, and possibly *made of*, i. e. esteemed, valued, for this is one of the senses of facio, even when it governs the Accusative; although it is seldom so used in such a connexion.

(62) P. 31. *l.* 9. Averni lacus was near to Cumae in Campania; hence *in vicinia nostra.* By this lake is the fabled entrance to the infernal regions, as described by Homer and Virgil.—Ostio ... Acherontis, *at the mouth of the deep Acheron;* which (Acheron) here means a river in lower Italy that must have been near the lake mentioned; see Scheller's Lat. Lex.

(63) P. 31. *l.* 11. *Falso* sanguine; so I find it, in my edition of Ernesti's Cicero; but in Rath, Nobbe, and Carey, *salso sanguine.* What *salt* blood is, I am unable to imagine. *False* blood may very easily be attributed to the *imagines mortuorum*, i. e. mere *umbrae* or *shadows* of living beings; so Main in his version: "No mortal blood." —Ad oculos ... referebant, i. e. they made every thing to be visible to the eye, in whose existence they believed.—Et ... abducere, *and to withdraw our thoughts from objects with which we are familiar,*

(64) P. 31. *l.* 18. Itaque ... dixit, *therefore*, (*what in my opinion others had said for many ages, but, so far as we have it on record*), *Pherecydes of Syros first said*, etc. Syrius (*Σύριος*), *belonging to Syros*, one of the Grecian islands (Cyclades), not far from Delos, and at the mouth of the Aegean Sea. The *Syrius* here has been mistaken by some for Syrus, *a Syrian*. Pherecydes was born about 595 B. C. and died about 535. He was the teacher of Pythagoras; and with the disciples of Pythagoras, Plato was intimate; so that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul seems to have come down from Pherecydes directly to Plato.—Antiquus sane; for, as the above dates shew, Pherecydes was born almost 500 years before Cicero.

(65) P. 31. *l.* 21. Meo regnante gentili, *during the reign of my relative*, (Main renders: *my namesake Tullus*), i. e. during the reign of Servius Tullius, which was from 578 B. C. to 534 B. C. Serv. Tullius was the son of Ocrisia and Tullius, who belonged to Corniculum, a town of the Sabines, a little north of the river Anio, and but a short distance from the city of Rome. In a war between the Sabines and Romans, Tullius the husband of Ocrisia was killed, and she came into the hands of Tarquin the Elder, king of Rome, as a slave. Tarquin presented her to his wife; who brought up her son, Servius Tullius, in the palace. Afterwards Tarquin gave to Tullius his daughter as a wife; and upon the death of this king, S. Tullius, his son in law, was made king, and reigned 34 years. He was the last of the ancient Roman kings, save one, viz. Tarquin the Proud; who is

mentioned in the next sentence, and who married the daughter of S. Tullius, himself being the grandson of Tarquin the Elder. Tarquin the Proud began to reign 534 B. C., and 25 years afterwards was expelled from the throne. Cicero retained the name of the family *(Tullius)*, from which he was descended.

(66) P. 31. *l.* 23. Maxime confirmavit; Pythagoras and his disciples appear to have been much in earnest on the subject of the immortality of the soul. The so called *Golden Verses* of Pythagoras, (composed probably by some of his followers), bear testimony to a high state of moral and religious feeling among this sect of philosophers. Plato seems to have fully imbibed their ardour in respect to these matters, by being conversant with them.—Superbo, i. e. Tarquinius Superbus, the last of the ancient Romish kings; as just stated above.—In Italiam venisset, i. e. to the south part of it, which was usually called *Magna Grecia;* where, particularly at Metapontum and Crotona on the Tarentine Bay, he effected a great moral and political reformation. All this line of coast was filled, in those days, with Grecian colonies. Hence the name, *Magna Grecia;* which is mentioned in the next clause.—Tenuit, lit. *restrained, held in;* but here it seems to mean, *exercised influence over.*—Cum . . . auctoritate, *as well by the credit of his learning, as by his weight of character.*

§ 14.

(67) P. 31. *l.* 29. Redeo ad antiquos here means, that he reverts from the *saecula postea* which he had just named, to those individuals whom he had been previously mentioning.—Non fere reddebant,

they scarcely rendered.—Nisi... explicandum, *unless what might be explained either by numbers or by imagery.* He refers here to the Pythagorean *numerical harmony* of the universe (as stated in Note 38); and as to *descriptionibus*, I understand it to mean, the *mythic stories* which were told concerning the souls of men after their decease, their transformations, appearances, etc.—Nisi quid dicis, *unless you have some objections to make.*—Et hanc ....relinquamus, *and relinquish the whole of this topic in regard to the hope of immortality.* Cicero seems to say this, rather for the sake of whetting the curiosity of his Collocutor, or for the sake of ascertaining whether he had succeeded so as to create in him an interest in the subject proposed.—Macte virtute, *bravo! well done!* lit. *elevated in virtue;* used by way of exclamation. Macte seems to be a participle, from the obsolete *mago*, *maxi*, *mactum*, *to enlarge*, *to elevate*, etc.

(68) P. 32. *l.* 13. Num...hoc, *shall we then doubt this also, as we do most other things?* Quamquam ... minime etc., *certainly this least of all, for mathematicians* etc. Quamquam, *to be sure*, *forsooth*, German *freilich.*—Terram ... vocant, *that the earth, situated in the midst of the universe, in respect to the compass of the whole heaven, acquires as it were the likeness of a point, which they* [the mathematicians] *call κέντρον, the centre.* Cicero seems plainly to refer here to the astronomical and mathematical speculations of the Pythagoreans, who placed the earth in the centre of the universe, and made the planets and stars revolve around it in concentric orbits, which were circumscribed at intervals from each other that corresponded, as to their

respective distances, with the tones in an octave of music; the seven planets (including the moon) making seven of these tones, and the fixed stars the eighth.—Quatuor . . . corporum, i. e. water, earth, fire, and air.—Ut . . . momenta. *that they have powers among themselves, separate (as it were) and discrepant.*—Terrena . . . ferantur, *that earthly and humid substances, by their own inclination and weight, tend, at equal angles, toward the earth and sea.* As he had just said that the earth was a point in the center of the universe, so all ponderous substances in the atmosphere must *converge* toward it. Hence they do not move in a perpendicular direction, (one absolutely so considered), but being *convergent*, they make angles (although equal ones, when compared with each other), in their descent toward the earth. If this be not the explanation, I do not understand the passage; which, indeed, is quite possible; dicat meliora, qui intelligit!

(69) P. 32. *l.* 23. Altera animalis, i. e. *airy, atmospheric;* for as anima often means *air*, so animalis may mean *airy;* and clearly it does so here.—Illae superiores, viz. the earthy and humid substances before mentioned.—Hae, viz. fire and air.—Rectis lineis, *perpendicularly*, in distinction from the *angulos* above.—Sive . . . repellantur, *either their nature itself seeking the upper regions, or because those substances which by nature are light, are repelled by those which are heavy.*

(70) P. 32. *l.* 31. *Animales* is explained here by the author himself, i. e. *spirabiles*, lit. *that which may be breathed*, viz. air.—*Numerus* here refers to *the numerical harmony* of the Pythagoreans.

—Quinta illa, viz. that fifth principle maintained by Aristotle, as mentioned above (in § 8), and which, he there says, is *vacans nomine*. Cicero here means to say, that the principle is well understood, although it is not called by a specific name.—Multo . . . efferant, *they are much the more incorrupted and pure, so that they must recede to the greatest possible distance from the earth.* But integriora and puriora, are of the *neuter* gender, and so do not agree with *animi*, in form; the concord, therefore, is made out by *things* implied after these adjectives, and *things* means souls; just as in *varium et mutabile semper femina*. He means, that if we allow the soul to be either *harmony* or Aristotle's *fifth principle*, it is still more remote from ponderous matter, than if we maintain it to be air or fire.—Nec . . . . jaceat, *and not such a mind as vegetates in the heart or in the brain, or as lies merged in the blood of Empedocles*, i. e. in the blood surrounding the heart, as Empedocles maintained; see § 7.

§ 15.

(71) P. 33. *l.* 8. Quorum alter . . . sentiat, *the one of whom* [Dicaearchus], *who could not perceive that he had a soul, seems never to have been affected with grief.* Alter etc.; see the mention of these, §§ 8, 9.—Quorum varia . . . . plures, *whose various composition* [viz. of intervals of sounds] *may also constitute a variety of harmonies.*—Membrorum . . . non video. *The mere placing of the limbs, and the form of the material body, destitute of a soul,* ([quod corpus] vacans animo), *I see not how they can make out a* HARMONY.

Sed hic etc., i. e. Aristoxenus had better yield

the point concerning the soul to Aristotle; and busy himself with teaching *music* rather than philosophy.—Praecipitur, *is he admonished.*—Quam puisque norit etc.; the original Greek to which Cicero refers, is in Aristophanes (Vesp. 1422): "*Ερδει τις ἣν ἕκαστος εἰδείη τέχνην.*—Quam tamen... voluit, *which* [concourse], *as Democritus would have it, becomes warm and spirable, that is animate;* i. e. Democritus supposes that warmth and breathing animation result from a fortuitous concourse of atoms.—Ex inflammata... constat, *consists of ignited air.*—Superiora... est, *must necessarily tend towards the upper regions;* i. e. it must so do, because of its rarified state.—Haec duo genera, viz. heat and air.—Hoc etiam, *even on this account*, viz. because they have the nature of heated air.—Ab his, i. e. warmth and air combined.—Aer, viz. the common atmosphere.—Ardentior, *of a more igneous nature.*—Ardore animi, *with the glowing heat of the soul.*

§16.

(72) P. 34. *l.* 19. Naturamque... agnovit, *and attains to a nature like its own*, (i. e. to an element of the same nature), *and discerns it.*—Junctis... insistit, *it takes its station among the fires, which are compounded of thin air and the tempered ardour of the sun.*—Examinātus, *weighed off, balanced.*—Et sustentabitur etc. i. e. it is nourished by the pure ether and the genial warmth of the upper regions; which also feed the stars. The planets, it will be recollected, were looked upon by Cicero and his cotemporaries as animated beings, nourished by the warmth and etherial fluid of the upper regions.

(73) P. 34. *l.* 30. Facibus, lit. *torches*, i. e. passions, warm desires.—Aemulemur, *we envy.*—Quo faciliorem . . . dabunt, *in proportion as that will afford a more easy knowledge of heavenly things, in the like measure will they impart to us stronger desires of knowing them.*

(74) P. 35. *l.* 13. Patriam . . . excitavit, *roused up that ancient philosophy, (as Theophrastus says), kindled with the desire of knowledge.* Patriam et avitam, *belonging to sire and grand-sire*, i. e. ancient. —Fruentur eâ, i. e. ea cognitione. Ostium Ponti, *the mouth of the* [Black] *Sea.*—Ea, i. e. ea navis. Cicero adverts to the ship, in which Jason and his companions sailed, in order to obtain the golden fleece at Colchis, which lies at the east end of the Black Sea.—Europam, etc.; Europe and Lybia are divided by the Mediterranean Sea. The Greek and Roman poets often called Africa by the name of *Lybia;* a name usually given, in later times, only to one province of Africa, on the confines of Egypt; while on the other hand, Africa was often used only to designate *Carthage.* Hence *rapax unda* refers to the waters in the straits of Gibraltar or Fretum Gaditanum, which flow with great violence; for so the preceding *freta illa* leads us to conclude. What is meant, is, to describe a remote country; and this was reputed to be at the western extremity of the earth.

Circumscriptionem, *compass.*—Nos enim etc., *for now we do not discern with our* [bodily] *eyes, those things which we see.*—Ullus sensus, *any sensation, perception.*—Viae quasi, etc.; he means to describe the conformation of the external senses, which are a kind of inlet or road to the internal

ones.—Itaque etc., *when buried in thought, or prevented by the power of disease, we neither see nor hear, although our eyes and ears are open and in a healthy condition;* a remarkable fact, which shews, that what recent philosophy names *attention*, is necessary, in order that the mind should perceive; and that perception does not belong to the bodily organs alone. This whole subject, (and a deeply interesting one I deem it to be), is finely developed by Dr Abercrombie, in his recent excellent work on the Intellectual Powers.—Quibus . . . adsit, *by which, however, the mind cannot perceive any thing, unless it is itself present and performs the work.*—Quinque nuntiis, i. e. the five senses.

Cum quo . . . pervenerit, *when the mind, set at liberty, shall have come thither where its nature tends.*—Intersepta, *hindered, obstructed.*—Quale quidque sit, *what every thing is.*

§ 17.

(75) P. 36. *l.* 25. Quamvis copiose etc., *how copiously could we descant on these matters*, etc.—Insolentiam, *the strange conduct*, viz of the Epicureans, to whom he here adverts.—Naturae . . . admirantur, *who wonder at the knowledge of nature*, which Epicurus displayed.—Inventori et principi, i. e. to Epicurus as inventor, etc., of such advanced knowledge.—Ut Deum; so Lucretius calls him, once and again, Lib. V. 8.—Terrore etc., i. e. from all fear of the future.

Acherusia templa, *the Acherusian temples*, means, the infernal palaces or temples of Pluto, which stands for the *domains* of Pluto, i. e. Hades. Acherusia is an adjective formed from the noun Ache-

rusia, which is the name of a lake near the mouth of the river Acheron, a sluggish stream, with an unhealthy country around it. In consequence of this, Homer, by a somewhat natural figure, represented the river and lake as communicating with Hades. Popular superstition and poetic μῦθος confirmed and perpetuated this fiction. The river Acheron, thus made the subject of fable, is on the north-east part of ancient Greece, and flows into the Ionian Sea near the promontory of Chimerium, in Thesprotia, a province of the ancient Epirus, and a part of modern Albania. The adjective Acherusia means the same as *belonging to Acheron* (i. e. to hell), because of the connexion between the river Acheron and the lake Acherusia.

Besides the Acheron here mentioned, there was another river of the same name in Campania, on the west side of Italy, flowing into the sea between Misenum and Cumae; also a lake Acherusia in Egypt, near Memphis, over which the bodies of the dead were conveyed, in order that sentence might be passed on them according to the life which they had lived. The poetic fiction of Homer, however, seems to have arisen from the *Malaria* which surrounded the Grecian river Acheron, in its course through the lake Acherusia.

(76) P. 37. *l.* 6. Alta Orci, *the depths of Hell.*—Palatia etc.; so I read with Nobbe. I do not see how the usual reading: Orci *pallida... obnubila* tenebris, etc. can agree together.—Ex quo etc.; i. e. if the Epicureans must be first taught by their divine master (as they call him), before they can disbelieve these things; then we can see what great geniuses they must have been. Of course,

this is said ironically.—Adepti sunt, i. e. in their own view they have made some famous attainments, etc.—Quod ut ita sit, *which, although it may be so,* or *which, granting it to be so,* etc.—Ut enim, *for although.*—Frangeret, *he would make me yield, subdue me.*—Velle . . . videatur, *he seems desirous of persuading others, certainly to have persuaded himself.*

§ 18.

(77) P. 37. *l.* 22. Animosque . . . mulctant, *and thus inflict the punishment of death upon souls, as if they were condemned to capital punishment.*—His, viz. *to these* persons who so think concerning the soul.—Vacans corpore, *when destitute of a body.*—Quasi vero etc., *just as if they could understand what* [the soul] *is, when in the body, what its shape, its magnitude, its place;* an observation replete with good sense, by way of reply to the skeptics in question; who surely were no better acquainted with any of these things, than they were with the condition of the soul after it leaves the body.—Ut, si . . . aciem, *so that, in case every thing in a living man which is now concealed, could be subjected to inspection,* [they could understand] *whether the soul would become visible, or whether its tenuity is so great as to escape our sight.* For vivo (according to Bentley and Rath), the editions in general read *uno;* to no tolerable purpose.—Haec reputant isti, *these considerations let those weigh well.*

(78) P. 38. *l.* 5. Qualis . . . sit, *what the soul in the body can be.*—Tamquam domi, *as in a strange home,* i. e. in a home which is not congenial to its proper nature. Domi in the Gen.; for, in the sense

which here belongs to it, this is the common construction; it is even doubtful whether it has a Nom. case, in this sense.—Quam qualis, *than* [the question], *what* etc.—Domum here in the Acc., because it means *to its home*. In answer to the question, *whither?* domum is employed.—Nisi enim . . . possumus, *for unless we are destitute of ability to understand what that is, which we have never seen*, surely etc. After complecti, most editions insert *non;* which disturbs the sense. It is omitted by Rath, and a number of manuscripts.—Est illud . . . videre, *this indeed is the greatest thing of all, that the mind should be able to contemplate itself.*—Et nimirum . . . Apollinis, *and in fact the direction given by Apollo* [γνῶθι σεαυτόν] *has the same force.*—Corpora, *mere physical bodies.*—Non esset . . . sit, *this precept would not belong to a mind of shrewdness so superior, that it would be attributed to a god.*—Hoc est . . . cognoscere, probably a gloss from the margin, and marked as suspicious in all the editions before me.

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§ 19.

Having finished his remarks on the metaphysical nature of the soul, and the place where it is finally to dwell, Cicero returns to his main object, viz. to shew that the soul is eternal. This, he says, must be allowed, when we consider the fact that it is self-moved; for that which is so, must have its original principles within itself, and can be affected by nothing extraneous. Consequently, as such is plainly the case with the soul, it must be indestructible and eternal, having neither origin nor end. The soul is conscious of the fact, in respect to its being self-moved.

On this *third* argument of Cicero, to prove the immortality of the soul, (which seems to be a favourite one with Plato and with him), I shall make some strictures in the Appendix. For the present I would say merely, that it seems partly to be *petitio principii*, and partly to *prove too much*.

(79) P. 38. *l.* 30. Ne esse . . . sciet, *can it* [the soul] *know that it does not exist?* Ne . . . se? *That it is not moved?*—Ratio, *mode of reasoning, ratiocination.*—Phaedro, i. e. *the Phaedrus* of Plato.—Quod autem . . . aliunde, *what communicates motion, or what receives it from an external cause.*—Vivendi finem etc., shews that the *quod*, at the beginning of the sentence, relates to an animated being.—Hic fons, i. e. this self-moving being is the source, etc.—Siquidem, *since.*—Ut motus . . . movetur, *that motion is an original principle, inasmuch as it is self-moved*, i. e. self-created or originated.—Id autem, i. e. id principium.

(80) P. 39. *l.* 19. Vel concidat . . . . moveatur, *should even all heaven and earth rush together, it* [the mass] *must necessarily stand still, nor could it acquire any force, impelled by which it could be moved;* i. e. so far as these consist of inert matter, they are wholly destitute of this self-moving power.—Motu . . . suo, *its own interior* [self-moving] *power.*—Quae . . . moveat, *which* [moves of itself], *if there be any one of all* [the objects of nature] *that always moves of itself.*—Neque . . . est, *nor is it born, surely; it is eternal.*—Plebeii, *of the lower sort.*—Una, *at the same time*, or *at once.*—Nisi . . . haec, *unless you have some objections to make to these things.*

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§ 20.

The internal powers and attributes of the soul shew it to be partaker of a divine nature. If one could explain how such attributes originated, he might then explain how they could perish. Or if the mere principle of animal life were all that is to be accounted for, then we might explain this, by comparing it with the principle of life in the vine or in a tree. Or if animal appetency alone were to be accounted for, then we might compare it with that of brutes.

But it has qualities very different from all these. It has a memory, or a power of recollecting, which is boundless. Question a child in such a manner as to elicit his powers; and he will shew that he has in himself the elements of all knowledge. These must be innate, belonging to the nature of the soul, and depending on the knowledge which it acquired in a pre-existent state. Its connection with the body would, in itself, never render it able to exhibit such powers. Nay, for a time this connection actually hinders the development of those powers. *To learn*, then, is nothing more than *to recollect*.

Simonides, Theodectes, Cyneas, Charmadas, and others, have shewn to what a prodigious extent the powers of memory may go; and so they have displayed the lofty attributes of the soul.

(81) P. 40. *l.* 15. Videor posse dicere, *I seem to be able to tell.* Animum ipsum, [as to] *the mind itself.* Tam . . . arboris, *I should suppose the life of man to be supported by nature, as well as* [the life] *of a vine, or of a tree.*

(82) P. 40. *l.* 23. Habet primum, [but] *it* [viz. the soul] *has, first of all*, etc.—Inscribitur, *is entitled.*—Pusionem, *a little boy.*—Eodem . . . didicisset, *he comes to the same conclusions, as he would if he had studied geometry.*—Sed . . . recognoscere, *but recognizes them by recollection.*—A pueris, *from childhood.*—Cumque nihil esset, *and since it would be nothing;* i. e. provided it had not a previous existence, it would be nothing, as the sequel shews.—Non potuit . . . . agnoscere; *the soul, pent up in the body, could discern none of these things*, i. e. if it had not enjoyed a prior existence.—Cognita attulit, *it* [the soul] *adduces things already known*, i. e. [ergo] cognita attulit, viz. when it calls up its ἐννοίας.

(83) P. 41. *l.* 19. Cum tam etc., i. e. when it first comes to dwell in the body, its unwonted and confused habitation.—Sed cum etc., i. e. after a while, when it becomes wonted to its place of abode, then it begins the process of recollection, etc.

These things are ingeniously said, in order to account for it, how children, in very early years, manifest so little knowledge. Whether the allegations will abide the test of philosophical scrutiny, is another question.

(84) P. 41. *l.* 27. Simonides, a celebrated poet of Cos, who flourished about 538 B. C. He composed elegies, dramas, and epic poems. He is reported to have added the letters η, ω, ξ, ψ, to the Greek alphabet. He was famed, as it seems, for his memory.

(85) P. 41. *l.* 28. Thodectes (flor. c. 340 B. C.), a Greek orator and poet, of Phaselis in Pamphylia, and a disciple of Isocrates. He was greatly renowned for an extraordinary memory.

(86) P. 41. *l.* 30. Cyneas, of Epirus, (flor. c. 280 B. C.), the prime minister, and ambassador to the Romans, of Pyrrhus the famous king of Epirus.

(87) P. 41. *l.* 30. Charmadas, I do not find particularly described. Metrodorus, here named, a friend of Mithridates king of Pontus, and sent by him as an ambassador to Tigranes king of Armenia. He died about 72 B. C. He was distinguished for learning, and for his moral virtues.

(88) P. 41. *l.* 32. Hortensius, a famous Roman orator, who left the stage of action not long after Cicero came upon it; who took the place of Hortensius. The latter died B. C. 50.

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§ 21.

Do such powers then belong to the brain, blood, heart; to atoms, or earthly substance? Or has the soul capacity, like a vessel, which *holds* all these things that it treasures up? Or is it like wax, capable of receiving impressions? Would a power, derived

in this way, be adequate to investigate hidden matters; to invent names for things; to bring men into civil society; to invent literature; to note the courses and stations of the planets and stars; to invent agriculture and the arts of life, to cultivate the more refined arts as matters of taste and improvement? The mind that can do all this, is like the mind of him who formed the heavens and the earth; for such things cannot be done, except by those who bear his likeness.

(89) P. 42. *l.* 4. Illa vis, i. e. *that power* of memory.—Anima... nescio, *whether the soul is air or fire, I know not.*—Nec me... nesciam, *nor do I blush, like those* [philosophers], *to confess my ignorance, when I am ignorant.*—*Capacitatem, power of containing or holding.*—Fundus, *the ground, the original substratum.*

(90) P. 43. *l.* 5. Institiones, *stationary positions, standing still.*—Omnes magni, i. e. *all* who have done such things, *are great.*—Nam et etc., *the nature of sounds being discovered, and their variety well joined together, great delight is afforded to the ear,* viz. by music.

(91) P. 43. *l.* 12. Et astra suspeximus, *and we look up to the stars.*—Non re... errantia, *not wandering in reality, but merely in name.* This refers to the astronomical views of the Platonists, viz. that the planets were guided by certain fixed and invariable laws, in all their motions, although they were unable to tell what these laws were. Hence *non re... errantia.*—Is docuit... caelo, *he teaches that his own mind is like that of him, who made those heavenly bodies,* i. e. that man, is man in the image of God; a truly noble sentiment, a gleam of the true doctrine of immortality!—Nam cum etc., *when Archimedes reduced the movements of the moon, sun, and five planets to a circular one.*—Ut... conversio, *so that one revolution would govern motions*

very unlike in respect to slowness or swiftness.—Si ... fieri sine deo non potest, *if ... nothing can be done without divine aid.*

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§ 22.

The higher flights of poetry and oratory, also, seem to require some divine efficiency. Philosophy, likewise, which teaches the worship of the gods and the rights of man, and modesty and magnanimity, and dispels darkness from our eyes as to the past and the future, in regard to things above or below—this must be a power that is of a divine nature. I give no credit to the fables of the poets, concerning nectar, ambrosia, Ganymede, etc. ‖ *To live, to invent, to be wise, to remember, IS DIVINE*; and as the soul does this, it must be of a nature like to that of the gods.

(92) P. 43. *l.* 25. Mihi vero etc., *to me indeed it does not seem, that any of these more notable and illustrious achievements can be wanting in a kind of divine power; so that I can scarcely imagine a poet to pour forth* etc. The exact shape of the latter part of this, in Latin, is thus: *can be wanting in divine power, so that I can imagine* etc., i. e. can be so wanting in divine power, that I could even imagine a poet to be able to pour forth his sublime strains without such a power, etc. It is the shape only of the Latin sentence which makes any difficulty. The sense I have given in the first version.

Haec nos etc.; means that philosophy first taught religion to men.—Juventate, *Hebe*, i. e. youth, the goddess of youth. Mythology represents her as the daughter of Jupiter and Juno, and the cup-bearer to the gods; also as blooming in perpetual youth.—Nec Homerum etc.; i. e. he does not regard the mythological fables of the poets, as things worthy of credibility.—Ganymede is commonly reckoned, in mythology, as the son of Dar-

danus; but there are discrepancies of opinion on this point. Cicero here makes him the son of Laomedon.—Divina . . . nos, i. e. 'it would have been more becoming, to have exalted us to a likeness with the divinity, than to have lowered him to our standard;' a truly noble sentiment, a spark of immortal fire!—Aut anima, *either air.*—Illa natura, sc. deus.—Primum haec . . . animorum, *this belongs especially to the gods and to souls.*

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§ 23.

The soul is a *simple* substance; not concrete or mixed, and therefore terrene. It is not even humid, or atmospheric, or igneous; for none of these elements can think, understand, or remember. It has a power peculiar to itself, and distinguished from all others, which must necessarily be divine, and therefore eternal. For of the divinity itself we predicate a mind free from all mortal composition, omniscient, and endowed with an eternal self-moving power. Like to this is the soul of man.

(93) P. 44. *l.* 28. Consolatione, i. e. his treatise entitled *Consolatio*, written soon after the death of his daughter Tullia, and which contained most of the sentiments exhibited in this *Disputatio.*—Flabile, *airy, atmospherical.*—Concretione, *composition*, or *materiality.*—Motu sempiterno, i. e. with the perpetual power of voluntary motion, self-moving, i. e. having spontaneity.

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§ 24.

If you inquire now, where the mind dwells, and of what form it is; my reply is, that it matters not. If we cannot answer these questions, still we do know that it possesses sagacity, memory, power of motion, and celerity. Compare our knowledge of God, with that of our own souls. When we see the splendour and beauty of the sky; the changes of days and seasons; the measured revolutions of the sun; the waxing and waning of the moon; the courses of the planets; the sky adorned on all sides with stars,

the earth with its variety of climates, cold and hot, cultivated and uncultivated, barren and fruitful; the multitude of flocks and herds, for feeding and clothing us, and assisting in our labours; man himself, comtemplating the heavens and worshipping the gods; and all the fields and seas ministering to his comfort—when we see all these and numberless other like things, can we doubt whether there is a Maker and Governour of the Universe? In like manner, when you see memory, invention, celerity of motion, and all the beauty of virtue in man, you must acknowledge the divine efficiency of the mind.

This passage reminds us forcibly of the statement made by Paul, in Rom. 1: 20, viz. that "the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are seen, *being understood by the things that are made*, even his eternal power and Godhead." What better commentary on this could be offered, than the passage in Cicero, the contents of which I have just stated.

(94) P. 45. *l.* 22. Per te uti, *to use with your liberty.*—Ut se ipse videat, *that it can see itself.*—Non videt... suam, *it does not see* (*what is least of all*) *its own form*, I take to be the language of the inquirer or objector; in answer to which is the sequel.—Fortasse, *it may be so.*—Quamquam id quoque, *although* [I might maintain] *this also*, viz., that it does see itself.—Sed relinquamus, *but let us pass this by.*

(95) P. 45. *l.* 32. Speciem... coeli, *in the first place, let us look at the beauty and splendour of the sky.*—Deinde... non possumus, *then the great celerity of its revolution, so great that it exceeds our thoughts.*—Commutationes.... quadripartitas, *the changes of the seasons distributed into four.*—Ad temperationem, *to the appropriate condition*—Quasi... dies, *designating the days as it were with calendar-marks.*—Stellas, *planets*, as here used, i. e. Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn.—In medio mundi universi, *in the midst of the whole universe;* vide supra, p. 32.—Sub axe... septem, *placed under the axis towards the seven stars*, i. e. placed in the northern hemisphere. The seven stars here named, are the *septem Triones*, as the Latins

called them, which make up the constellation of the *Great Bear*. The *Triones* appear to revolve around the axis of the north-star; but whether Cicero was acquainted with this fact, I do not know. *Axe* means here *the north pole;* so that *sub axe posita ad stellas septem*, is as much as to say, placed under that pole, which is in the direction of the seven stars, i. e. of the Great Bear. If we suppose *axe* here to mean the extremity or northern part of the axis, just as *north pole* does in English, (a supposition which is altogether probable), then all those, in the view of Cicero, lived *under* (sub) the axis, who lived in the northern hemisphere; for the north pole was *above* them. Or if we suppose Cicero to have had the idea, that the *north star* marks the direction of the earth's axis, then all in the northern regions live under it (in a literal sense), as it passes over them. In either case, we get the generic idea here aimed at, viz., the northern [temperate] zone.—Oris, *regions;* i. e. the two temperate zones.—[2] *Ἀντίχθονα, the opposite* or *corresponding land* or *country.*

[2] *Ἀντίχθων*, among the Greeks, literally meant an inhabitant of a corresponding and opposite zone; e. g. to those who live in the *northern* temperate zone, the inhabitants of the *southern* one are *ἀντίχθονες*. So Tatius (cap. XXX): *τοὺς κατὰ διάμετρον ἐν ταῖς ὁμοίαις ζώναις οἰκούντας*, i. e. *those who live opposite to each other in the like zones*, viz. the two temperate ones. So Pomponius Mela (c. 1): "Reliquae zonae [the temperate ones he now speaks of] paria agunt anni tempora, verum non pariter. *Antichthones* alteram, nos alteram incolimus."

In a like sense *Antoeci* (*ἄντοικοι*) is employed

by the ancients. But, although most of the enlightened men among the Greeks and Romans held the earth to be *round*, yet as they had a knowledge of only a small part of its surface as being habitable, and had no proper idea of its true motion, they in general strenuously denied the possibility of *Antipodes*. Some few only admitted it. In *theory*, according to their views, it might be possible; in *fact* it was deemed altogether improbable. See Cellarius, Orbis Antiq. I. 7.

Ceteras partes etc., *as to other regions uncultivated, because* etc.; i. e. the two frigid zones and the torrid one are uninhabitable; for such was the view of Cicero and his cotemporaries.—Pampinis, *with tendrils*.—-Convestirier, i. e. convestiri with the antique termination.—Tanti operis et muneris, *of so great a work and exhibition*. The public shows given by individuals, the Romans often called *munera*. The term as here used, alludes to these. Hence *Moderator*, in reference to *muneris*. The whole paragraph is a protracted and composite sentence, although not difficult to be understood. The grammatical and rhetorical construction of it, however, as to accuracy, it would not be easy to vindicate. But the sentiment is exceedingly fine and noble. Indeed, I know of nothing which equals it, in the whole extent of the heathen classics, when considered in a religious point of view.

§ 25.

It matters not at all, then, as to the *place* or *form* of the soul. It cannot be concrete, or made by a combination of different substances, and so it is not divisible, dissoluble, or perishable.

Socrates, persuaded of this, sought not to avert death. He believed that there are two ways in which the soul may depart; the one for souls contaminated with vices and crimes, a devious path, which leads to seclusion from the assembly of the gods; the other for the upright and pure, who, having imitated the gods in this life, are associated with them in the next. The good man, therefore, should anticipate death with joy. Nor can he doubt that such should be the case, unless, like those who look steadily at the sun and lose their sight, he should dim his mental vision by too long and steadily contemplating the glories of his own mind. But still, we should not so desire death, as prematurely to seek it and procure it for ourselves.

(96) P. 47. *l.* 9. In quo etc., i. e. you will ask: In quo etc.—Alias, *elsewhere*, or *at another time.*—Ubi sit, *wherever it may be;* i. e. whether in the head, or heart, etc.—Quae est etc., language of the inquirer.—Propria . . . sua, *peculiar, I think, and belonging only to itself.*—Sed fac etc., *but suppose it to be either igneous, or airy,* etc.—In . . . cognitione, *in acquiring a knowledge of the soul, however,* etc.—Quin, *but that.*—Nec . . . igitur, *consequently it cannot perish.*—Liberam contumaciam, *a noble disregard.*

(97) P. 48. *l.* 17. Ut cygni, *that as swans,* etc.—Quâ providentes etc., *by which* [power of divination] *they foresee what good results from death.*—Deficientem solem, *the departing* or *setting sun.*—Injussu . . . demigrare, *that we should depart hence without his order.*—Nae, *surely.* Ille vir sapiens, *the man who is wise.*—Nec . . . ruperit, *nor will he break off those chains of the goal,* i. e. he will not try to escape from death.—Ut ait idem, i. e. Socrates.—Commentatio mortis, *is a reflecting upon death,* i. e. continued meditation upon this subject.

§ 26.

Let us learn, then, by frequently abstracting and separating (as it were) the mind from the body, to prepare for death. What is this practice, but a kind of dying? If we accustom ourselves to this, when we are loosed from the body, we shall ascend with easier and more rapid flight, as we shall not be encumbered by bodily chains. Should this be our happy lot, then is it easy to show, not only that death will be no evil, but that it will be the highest good.

(98) P. 49. *l.* 14. A re familiari, *from our domestic affairs.*—Hoc commentemur, *let us meditate on these things.*—Disjungamus . . . mori, *and let us separate ourselves* [i. e. our souls] *from our bodies*, [viz. by drawing them away from the objects of sense, and employing them in reflection]; *that is, let us accustom ourselves to die.* Death is the separation of soul and body. Now as the soul, when it is abstracted from attention to the bodily senses by reflection, is as it were separated from the body; so Cicero here calls this habitude of mind, *dying* or *death.* What was imperfectly effected by reflection, i. e. the abstracting of the soul from the body, is, according to him, only completed by what is usually called *death;* an ingenious thought, if not a solid one.

(99) P. 49. *l.* 23. Hoc et etc., *this,* viz. this practice of meditating, and living as it were abstracted from the body.—Erit . . . simile, *will be like our living in the celestial regions;* i. e. it will be a state in which the soul lives by itself.—Minus etc., i. e. the soul, disencumbered of corporeal propensities, will wing its way to the upper regions with more ease and speed; as the next sentence shews.—Ut ii, qui etc., refers to such as have been bound with chains in prison, for many years, and who, when first set at liberty, are unable to walk with any facility.—Quo, etc. *when we shall have come*

thither, i. e. into the celestial regions.—Vivemus, *shall really and truly live*, the word being emphatic here.—Haec vita, i. e. our present life on earth.—Si liberet, *if circumstances permitted*, or *if it should be desired*.

(100) P. 50. *l.* 1. Nihil ... relinquere, *I wish for nothing more than to quit these present scenes*, i. e. to die.—Veniet ... properabis, *the time will come and speedily too*, [viz. when you will quit them], *and* [this], *whether you delay or hasten it*.—Ab eo, after *abest* is unusual in Cicero, and is here marked as suspicious.—Ut verear ... potius, *that I suspect there cannot happen to man, not indeed any other evil, but no other good which is preferable*.—Siquidem ... sumus, *since we shall either become gods, or be associated with them*.

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§ 27.

But there are many objectors to the doctrine of the soul's immortality. Among these are the whole race of Epicureans and especially my favourite Dicaearchus. The Stoics also allow us merely a long life, like that of the crows. But as they allow the most difficult part of our problem, viz. that the soul can survive the body, it is not worth while to contend with them. More to our purpose is it, to consider the arguments of Panaetius, who, in other respects a zealous Platonist, differs from his master in regard to the soul, and strenuously denies its immortality on two grounds, viz., (1) The soul is procreated; as is evident from the resemblance of children to their parents, both in body and in mind: and whatever is procreated, is perishable. (2) The soul is affected with grief and disease; and whatever can be thus affected, is perishable.

(101) P. 50. *l.* 10. Adsunt enim, *there are some*.—Ego ... posset, *but I will never let you off, in this discussion, so that* (uti) *death can, with any shew of reason, appear to you as an evil*.—Quî potes, *how can you?*—Acerrime ... disseruit, *most strenuously, however, has my favourite. Dicaearchas, descanted against*

this immortality.—*Lesbiaci*, *Lesbiac*, i. e. belonging to the island of Lesbos, the capital of which was Mytilene, where the discourses of Dicaearchus were delivered.—Stoici . . . cornicibus, *the Stoics, moreover concede to us an enjoyment* [of life], *like that which belongs to the crows.*

(102) P. 51. *l.* 1. Labamus, *we stand in doubt.*—Id, viz. the changing of our sentiment, or rather, doubting in regard to immortality.—Simus armati, *let us be armed*, i. e. prepared to repel such doubts. Num quid . . . dimittamus, *is there any reason why we should not dismiss our friends, the Stoics?* i. e. omit any longer discussion of their sentiments.—Istos vero; *them surely* [we may dismiss].—Posse animum etc., viz. *that the soul, when disengaged from the body, can continue to exist.*—Ut se, *inasmuch as* etc.

(103) P. 51. *l.* 17. Panaetius, a philosopher of Rhodes, about 138 B. C. He taught philosophy in Rome; and Laelius and Scipio Africanus were among his pupils. He wrote a treatise on the duties of man. Lempriere calls him a *Stoic* philosopher; Cicero here makes him a Platonist, one point only excepted.

(104) P. 51. *l.* 20. Homerum philosophorum, *the Homer of philosophers*, i. e. of such a rank among philosophers, as Homer was among poets.—Nasci . . . appareat, *that souls are produced*, [he maintains], *because a likeness in those who are procreated, shews this; which* [likeness] *appears, indeed, in the temper of the mind, and not in their bodies only.*—Nihil esse etc., viz. *that there is nothing which suffers pain* etc.—Quod . . . interiturum, *that which may be sick, may die,*

§ 28.

The answer to the above objections, is not difficult. (1) When we speak of the mind, we do not mean the seat of passions and desires and antipathies; for these spring from the body. [So Plato; who expressly distinguishes the *rational* soul from the *animal* one; making the latter only to be the origin and seat of all such affections.] (2) The similitude to parents, which appears in children, may be accounted for on the ground of animal or corporeal resemblance only. For in the first place, the similitude is chiefly physical. Secondly, what is not so, but apparently mental, has its origin in the manner in which the body affects the soul, and is owing entirely to this influence, which in various respects is great. We need not suppose, then, that similitude of mind arises from procreation. In fact, one might easily shew that the dissimilitude between parents and children, is even more striking than the resemblances; e. g. this was the case with the nephew of Scipio Africanus, and the sons of many other famous men.

(105) P. 51. *l.* 31. Sunt enim . . . dicatur, *for they belong to a person who does not recognize, that when one speaks respecting the eternal nature of souls, he speaks of the mind, which is free* etc.—Quas etc., *which he* [who defends the immortality of the soul], *against whom these things are said, supposes to be removed and separated from the mind.*—Jam similitudo, *the similitude, now,* [above spoken of] *appears* etc.—Et ipsi . . . sint, *and as to souls themselves* (Nom. independent), *it is of great consequence in what body they are placed.*—Multa enim . . . obtundant, *for many things are derived from the body, which sharpen the powers of the mind; and many, which blunt them.*

(106) P. 52. *l.* 11. Ingeniosos, *men of genius, of distinguished talents.*—Ut . . . feram, *so that I,* [who am not melancholy], *must bear with it, to be called somewhat stupid.*—Idque . . . constet, *and as if the thing might be proved.*—Quod si . . . similitudo, *but if there is so much efficacy, in regard to cast of mind, in those things which spring from the body,* (*and these are the very things, whatever they are, which make*

similitude), *this likeness of the soul creates no necessity why it should be produced by birth.*

(107) P. 52. *l.* 21. Quaererem . . . . nepos, *I should like to inquire of him, which of his progenitors, the son of Africanus' brother resembled.* This brother of [Scipio] Africanus was named Paullus. Nothing special is known concerning him.—Facie . . . similis, *in appearance, so like his father; in his manner of life,* [like] *all prodigals.*—Cujus etc., *whom did the grand-son of Crassus, that wise, eloquent, and distinguished man, resemble?*

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§ 29.

Having now accomplished the most important object of this discussion, viz., that of establishing the immortality of the soul, let us return to the first question with which our discussion commenced, viz., *Whether death is an evil?* On the supposition, that we have not established our point in regard to the soul's immortality, and granting, for the sake of discussion, that the soul perishes with the body; still, death is not an evil. On the ground now taken, there is *no sensation* after death. If you say, that dying is in itself an evil; I reply, that this is momentary; that it is often attended with little or no pain; and sometimes even with pleasure. Then again, if you say: It is a departure from good; my answer would be, that it is a departure from evil. Indeed, one might well weep over human life; as Hegesias and others have shewn. Many, convinced of this, have voluntarily procured their own death. In my own case, deprived as I am of domestic comfort and public employment and honour, would not death long since have been a deliverance from evil?

(108) P. 52. *l.* 28. Hoc nunc etc., *we have proposed, that when enough may have been said respecting the immortality of the soul,* [we should then consider] *whether there is any evil in death, even in case the soul does not survive.* Alte spectare, *are looking upwards.*—Mali . . . sententia, *what evil does even such a sentiment bring upon us?*—Insimulat, *accuses,* viz. he accuses Democritus of asserting it.

—Ut, *although*, or *however*.—Et falsum etc., lit. *I both think this to be false, and that it takes place, generally*, etc.; where the first and second *et* answers to our *in the first place, in the second place*, etc.—Discessus ab etc. viz. *departure*, etc.—Quid ego etc., *what, now, if I should mourn over the life of man? I could do this truly, and of good right.*—Etiam... miseriorem, *also to make life itself more wretched, by mourning over it.*

(109) P. 53. *l.* 33. Hegesias is called a *Cyrenaican*, because he was of the Cyrenian school of philosophy, i. e. the school established by Aristippus of Cyrene, about 392 B. C. Hegesias was the pupil of the younger Aristippus, son of the one just named. The character of his philosophy is described in the sequel.

(110) P. 54. *l.* 3. Callimachus, a historian and satirical poet of Cyrene, who lived in the age of Ptolemy Philadelphus.—Lecto... libro, viz. Plato's Phaedo, on the immortality of the soul.—Ἀποκαρτέρων means, *one destroying himself by inanition* or *starving*.—Id facere, *do the same thing*, i. e. recount the miseries of life.—Ille qui... putat, *who thinks, that in general it is expedient for no one to continue in life.*—Etiamne... expedit, *was not* [death] *desirable for us* [me], *who* etc.—Certe... abstraxisset, *death surely, if we had fallen before this, would have taken us from evils, not from enjoyments;* i. e. deprived of social and public enjoyments, as I have been, the evils of life, on the whole, have more than counterbalanced the good.

§ 30.

Now and then a solitary instance occurs, like that of Metellus, in which we may say, that death is a departure from good. But how few are these instances! Look at the examples of Priam, of Pompey; and indeed most examples are of a similar nature.

(111) P. 54. *l.* 16. Sit igitur . . . acceperit, *let there be, then, some one who has no evil to endure, who has received no wound from fortune.*—Metellum etc., i. e. a numerous progeny honoured the peaceful funeral rites of Metellus.—Hic si, i. e. Priamus.—Astante . . . laqueatis, *while barbarian wealth continued, the carved and wainscoted walls.*—The term *barbarica* we should hardly expect; as the Trojans appear to have spoken the same language with the Greeks. Nevertheless Homer, Ovid, Lucian, and Euripides apply the epithet *βάρβαρον* to the Trojans; and this, because they were foreigners, and enemies to the combined body of the Greeks.—At certe . . . evenisset, *but surely matters turned out better with him*, i. e. better than is usually supposed or estimated.—Nec . . . canerentur, *nor should those* [words] *be sung in such a doleful way*, viz., Haec etc.—Istâ, i. e. istâ fortunâ; see fortuna above, in the first sentence of this section.—Tamen eventum etc., a passage which has greatly troubled the critics. "Quid hoc est," says Ernesti, "nemo intelligat; quis dicit *eventum amittere?*" I construe it thus: *If Priam had sooner died, he would have escaped the occurences of life in general; and even at this very time, he lost all sensation of evil.*

(112) P. 55. *l.* 8. Aegrotasset, *had been sick*, but was now convalescent.—Coronati, viz. in token of joy.—Puteolani, *the inhabitants of Puteoli.*—Vulgo

ex oppidis, *in crowds from the towns.*—Ineptum etc., *a foolish business, to be sure, and savouring somewhat of the manners of the Greeks; yet* [one which is deemed] *fortunate.*—Utrum igitur etc., *had he died even then, would he have been taken away,* etc.? —Non liberi defleti, *his children would not have been mourned for.*

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§ 31.

Let us examine the accuracy of the language which is applied to the dead, i. e. to the dead, on the supposition that the soul does not survive the body. Many say, *mortuos vitae commodis carere, that the dead are deprived of the blessings of life.* But this can be truly and correctly said, only of those *who have sensation;* and therefore it is incorrectly applied to the present case.

(113) P. 56. *l.* 3. Quia . . . vis, *because this meaning is connected with it.*—Liberis, i. e. caret liberis. —Valet . . . vivis, *this will apply to the living.*—Qui nulli sunt, i. e. *who,* (according to the opinion above stated) *are non-entities.*—Confirmato . . . relinquatur, *that being confirmed, from which* (*if our souls are mortal*) *we cannot doubt but that destruction in death will be so great, that not the least ground of suspecting any sensation is left.*—Hoc . . . fixo, *this then being well established and fixed.*—Ut sciatur, viz. *that it may be known.*—Nisi . . . verbi, *unless when it is employed as saying* CARERE FEBRI (to be free from fever), *with a tropical sense of the word.*—Quod est malum, *which* [being deprived of good] *is an evil.*—Non indiget, *does not stand in need of it.*

(114) P. 56. *l.* 30. Sed in vivo etc., *but in regard to a living man, it is intelligible to say, that he is deprived of a kingdom.*—In te, *in regard to you.*—Satis subtiliter, *with any good degree of accuracy.*—

Potuisset in Tarquinio, *it might* [have been said] *in respect to Tarquin, when* etc.—Carere . . . est, *for to be in want of* (carere), *has respect to a sentient being.*

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§ 32.

In accordance with my views concerning death, have all the great and good men of ancient times acted, who put their lives in peril, or sacrificed them, for their country. If there be no existence after death, then surely death was no evil to them. It matters no more to us, what will take place centuries to come, than it does what took place centuries ago.

(115) P. 57. *l.* 7. Quae, i. e. quae mors.—Arcens etc., *hindering that tyrant in his return,* [viz. Tarquin the Proud], *whom he had driven away.*—Decius (Mus), a celebrated Roman Consul, who was slain in a battle with the Latins, 338 B. C. His son, Decius, fell in like manner, when fighting against the Gauls and Samnites, B. C. 296; Cicero says—decertans cum Etruscis. His grandson did the same, when fighting against Pyrrhus and the Tarentines, B. C. 280.

(116) P. 57. *l.* 20. Cum vero, *but since.*—Quamquam . . . saepe, *however,* [I have already said] *this quite too often.*—Sed . . . mortis, *but* [I have done so] *because in this is the very ground of all the pusillanimity, which arises from the fear of death.*—Nec pluris . . . captam, *nor is M. Camillus any more affected with the recent civil war, than I am affected with the capture of Rome, which took place while he was living.* L. Furius Camillus (B. C. 365) appears to be the person here designed; for it was he that drove away the Gauls under Brennus, who had invested Rome, and conquered the country. Cicero calls him *Marcus* Camillus; it would seem by mistake.

§ 33.

But the brevity and uncertainty of life, and even the fact that we may be insensible after death, should not deter us from doing good to our friends and country, nor from love to virtue. If sleep, as some suppose, be an image of death; than is death an insensibility to evil.

Why then should we deplore the time of our departure? Those who die in youth, suffer much less then those who die in advanced years. Priam wept oftener than Troilus. Old age takes away knowledge, which is the highest good of life; and therefore it is not desirable. Even the longest life, is a mere nothing, compared with eternity.

(117) P. 58. *l.* 12. Quo minus ... consulat, *that he should exert himself less, at all times, for the republic and for his friends.* Quare licet ... consequatur, *wherefore let it be that the mind is mortal, which determines to strive for the attainment of eternal things; not with a thirst for glory which you will never enjoy, but* [with a thirst] *of virtue, which glory necessarily follows, even when one does not desire it.*—Alteri, i. e. mortui; alteros, i. e. vivos.—Quam, i. e. quam mortem.—Ne sues ... ipse, *the very swine do not desire this; not to speak of him* or *myself*, i. e. of the quis quam just mentioned. Non modo ipse literally means, *not he only, or not myself only* and in the sense which I have given to it above, *non modo* is frequently employed by Cicero.

(118) P. 58. *l.* 31. Caria lies near the south-west extremity of Asia Minor. The fable is, that Endymion was loved by Diana, i. e. the moon or Luna, who paid him nightly visits, in order to kiss him while he was asleep. Some make his sleep to last a great number of years. The fable is modified in a great variety of ways, among the ancients: and probably it had its origin in the fact that Endymion, being a shepherd, cultivated astronomy, and spent much of his time in observing the moon;

in doing which he would of course very frequently fall asleep.—Nondum ... experrectus, *has not, as I imagine, yet waked up*; i. e. he sleeps the sleep of death.—Cum luna laboret, *when the moon is in trouble.*

§ 34.

(119) P. 59. *l.* 8. Ante tempus mori, *to die before one's time.*—nulla praestituta die, *no particular day* [of giving it up] *being fixed.*—Quid est etc., *why then should you complain*, etc.?—Ab hoc, i. e. from the child that perishes in the cradle.—Acerbius, *more severely, sternly*; i. e. this is what such persons allege.—Hic etc. *he too* [i. e. puer parvus] *was just hoping for great things, which he was beginning to enjoy.*—Aliquam ... secus, *that some part should be obtained rather than none; why should it be otherwise in respect to life?*

(120) P. 59. *l.* 22. Callimachus, see Note 110.—Multo saepius etc. Priam lived to a great age, and to endure many sorrows; Troilus, his son, was slain by Achilles, in early life.—Nullis ... jucundior, *to none, if life should be still further prolonged, could it be more agreeable.*—Prudentia, *knowledge, science.*—A tergo insequens, *following on behind.*—Nec opinantes, *not at all expecting it.*

(121) Ratâ parte, *for his proportionate part.*—The Hypanis was in Thrace (Roumelia), on the European side, and is now called the Bog, and empties into the Borysthenes, and with it finally into the Euxine or Black Sea; which last is the meaning of *Pontus* here, as indeed it commonly is.—Eo magis, *still more* would such an insect die in decrepid old age, if the day were solstitial, i. e. at the time of the summer solstice in June, when the days are the longest.

§§ 35—37.

Let us then despise all fears of death, and place our chief happiness in contempt of human things and in the love of virtue. Let us not anxiously place our hopes on visionary expectations of happiness in the present world. The example of Theramenes, so loftily despising death, fills me with delight.

The plea of Socrates also, before his judges, is quite to my purpose. He maintained, that whether death is an end of all sensation, or a migration to another place, it is a great good. In the first case, it puts an end to our multiplied evils and sufferings; in the second, it brings us into the society of the illustrious dead, and extends the circle and the means of knowledge.

Others of the like character I might mention; e. g. the Spartan who treated with disdain the condemning sentence of the Ephori; the Lacedemonians at Thermopylae; Theodorus; the woman of Sparta.

(122) P. 60. *l.* 20. Si ante... sumus, *if death comes before we have obtained what was promised by the Chaldeans*, i. e. the fortune tellers or soothsayers, who predicted much prosperity to us.—Pendemus animis, *we keep our minds in a state of suspense.*—Quam iter etc., *how pleasant must be that journey, which being finished, no care remains*, etc.

(123) P. 60. *l.* 28. Theramenes, an Athenian philosopher, of the age of Alcibiades, about 420 B. C. He was one of the thirty tyrants (so called) of Athens; but he was opposed to the views of his colleagues. On this account he was accused by Critias, one of them who was exceedingly bitter against him; and he was condemned to death by his inexorable judges, although Socrates interceded for him.—Non miserabiliter, *not in a manner that claims our pity.*—Venenum... obduxisset, *he had swallowed down the poison, with the greediness of one who is thirsty.*—Ut id resonaret, *that it made an echo*, i. e. when striking the floor of the prison, upon which it was thrown.—Propino... Critiae, *I drink health to the beautiful Critias.*—Taeterrimus, *most inimical.*

(124) P. 61. *l.* 6. Extremo spiritu, *with his last breath.*—Cum . . . contineret, *when he already held, in his bowels, death commencing.*—Ei, i. e. to Critias.

§ 36.

(125) P. 61. *l.* 13. Eodem . . . Theramenes, [condemned] *by the same wickedness of the judges, as Tharemenes by the tyrants.*—Minoem, i. e. ad Minoem.—He and Rhadamanthus were the sons of Jupiter by Europa, and were Cretans; Aeacus was the son of Jupiter and Aegina, and king of the island Oenopia, to which he gave the name of his mother, *Aegina.*—Triptolemus, the son of Cereus king of Attica, by Neraea. He became a favourite of Ceres; taught men agriculture extensively; and after his death was advanced to divine honours. Socrates here reckons him as a *fourth* judge in Hades.

(125) P. 62. *l.* 10. Judicio iniquo circumventos, etc. Palamedes, son of Nauplius king of Euboea, by Clymene. It was he who detected the feigned madness of Ulysses; feigned in order to avoid going to the Trojan war. Ulysses afterwards, at Troy, caused money to be buried in the tent of Palamedes; forged a letter as from Priam to Palamedes, requesting the latter to betray the Grecian army, and stating that he had stipulated to do so for the sake of the money. In this way Palamedes came to be unjustly condemned and put to death, by the Grecian chiefs. He is said to have invented the letters ϑ, ξ, χ, φ, of the Greek alphabet.—Ajax, after Achilles' death, contested with Ulysses for the armour of the hero; and judgment being unjustly rendered in favour of Ulyses, Ajax killed himself.

§ 37.

(126) P. 62. *l.* 11. Tentarem etc., *I should put to the test the knowledge* etc.; a thing in which Socrates, during his life-time, greatly delighted.—Summi regis, i. e. Agamemnon.—Ulysses is well known, in fable, for his skill and cunning.—Sysiphus, see Note 22.

(127) P. 62. *l.* 28. Nae ego . . . malim, *surely I should much prefer this state of mind, to the wealth of all those* etc.—Etsi etc., *however, as to his denying that any one besides the gods can know, he himself does know, viz. which is the best.*—Suum illud, *his own peculiarity.*—Finis . . . potest, *there can be no end.*—Ephori, magistrates at Sparta, first created about 760 B. C., by Lycurgus, resembling the tribunes at Rome, i. e. supreme censors of all public proceedings.—Sine versura, *without lending or borrowing.*—Ut, *inasmuch as.*

(128) P. 63. *l.* 28. Leonidas, the brave king of Sparta, and leader of the three hundred Lacedemonians who fell at the battle of Thermopylae, only one of them escaping.—Vigebant; from this word, back to quid, included in brackets, the text has been suspected by some, and condemned by Bentley and others. I do not perceive any solid ground for difficulty with it.—Fortes et duri, *rigid and severe.*—*Theodorus of Cyrene,* a teacher of Plato in geometry.—Ista . . . . purpuratis tuis, *threaten those dreadful things to your* effeminate courtiers, *clothed in purple.*—Humine . . . putrescat, *whether he rots on the earth, or in the air.*

§ 38.

(129) P. 64. *l.* 14. Cujus hoc dicto, viz. *putrescat.*—In quo moritur, i. e. in the Phaedo of Plato, where his death is described.—Sicubi, i. e. si alicubi.—Durior, *sterner.*—Asperius, *more roughly.*—Sed . . . ponitote, *but give me a staff with which I may go off.*—Illi, [said] *they.*—Quid igitur, i. e. he replied: Quid etc.

(130) P. 65. *l.* 8. Si quid ei accidesset, *if any thing should befal him*, i. e. in case he should die.—At illa, i. e. she (Hecuba) who mourns over Hector, in the play.—Passa aegerrime, *I have suffered most wretchedly.*—Accius, the ancient Roman tragic poet, represents it better.—Et . . . . Achilles, *and Achilles sometimes considerate.*—Pressis . . . modis, *in well-adjusted and mournful modulations.*—Ne combustis, non extimescit, *he fears not lest his burned* [members should be abused].—Siris for siveris, *you will* [not] *let.*—Cum . . . tibiam, *when he pours forth such fine heptameter verses, at the modulation of the pipe.*

(131) P. 66. *l.* 11. Cum, *when*, or rather here, *although.*—Execratur, *falls to uttering imprecations.*—See the story of Thyestes and Atreus in Lempriere.—Primum . . . Atreus, *specially that Atreus may perish by shipwreck.*

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§ 39.

I am aware that burial and the corruption of the body, are shuddered at by the multitude. But in respect to these things, mine are the sentiments and feelings of Socrates, Diogenes, and Anaxagoras. The plays are full of errors and lamentations, on these subjects; but without any good ground. How can a dead body be sensible of any sufferings?

(132) P. 67. *l.* 3. Magorum, *of the magi.*—Hyrcania, in middle Asia, bordering on the Caspian Sea. —Optimates, domesticos, *the nobles* [feed] *private domestic ones.*—Cum suis ... potest, *when declining life is able to console itself with its own praises.*—Nemo ... munere, *no one was ever short lived, who fully performed the duties of perfect virtue.*—Parum diu, *not a very long time;* which, with nemo, makes the sense above given.—Multa ... fuerunt, *many seasons, opportune seasons, for my death have occurred.* —Quam ... obire, *which I could wish I had undergone.*—Nihil ... vitae, *for now nothing was to be gained; the duties of life were accumulating.*

(133) P. 67. *l.* 32. Tamen ... sequitur, yet it follows virtue, *as a shadow* [follows a substance]. —Verum ... beati, *but the judgment of the multitude concerning the good, is to be praised, rather than* [that we can say] *these are happy on this account,* viz. on account of being praised.

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§ 40.

The glory of the illustrious dead can never be taken away. Let us not suppose, then, that to die is to lose this good.

(134) P. 68. *l.* 4. Ante enim etc, *for sooner will the sea overflow Salamis itself* etc.—Salaminii tropaei refers to the trophy of the great naval victory at Salamis, gained by the Greek fleet over that of Xerxes; in which the Persian fleet was nearly ruined, and the whole plans of Xerxes frustrated. —Boeotia Leuctra was famous for the victory there achieved by Epaminondas, the celebrated Theban general, over the army of Cleombrotus king of Sparta, B. C. 371; in which 4000 Spartans,

with their king, were killed. This battle took from the Spartans the power of ruling over Greece.

(135) P. 68. *l.* 17. Secundis ... mori, *in prosperity, also, let him be willing to die.*—Non enim ... decessio, *for the accumulation of good things cannot be so agreeable, as the giving of them up will be troublesome.*—Laconis (Gen.), *of a Lacedemonian.*—Olympionices nobilis, *a noble victor in the Olympian games.*—Accessit ad senem, i. e. ad Diagoram.—Non ... es, *for you cannot ascend to heaven*, i. e. without dying; and nothing else is now wanting that you should go there. So, in substance, Ernesti. But I do not see the point of the discourse in this way. I understand it thus: Die, for you can expect nothing beyond this. Heaven, however, will be no ascent for you; i. e. you are already higher than it can make you. Quod in ... maxime, *because that in distress and trials, this is the greatest of consolations.*

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§ 41.

The immortal gods have added their testimony, that death is a good, and no evil. So the cases of Cleobis and Biton, of Trophonius and Agamedes, of Midas and Silenus and Terinaeus, shew. Consider. too, the examples of Codrus, Menocaeus, etc.; to all of whom death appeared glorious.

(136) P. 69. *l.* 23. Nec vero ... ipsi, *nor are they* [the teachers] *wont to feign these things*, but etc.—Primum etc., *in the first place, Cleobis and Biton, sons of the Grecian priestess are mentioned.*—Satis ... jumenta, *a long way from the town to the temple, and the beasts* [which drew her] *stopped.*—Precata ... dicitur, *is said to have asked of the goddess.*—Pietate, *their filial respect.*—Judicavisse etc.,

they say that the god did so decide; and even that god, to whom the other gods concede that he can divine beyond the rest.

(138) P. 70. *l.* 16. Silenus, according to fable, was the nurse and preceptor of Bacchus. Midas was a king of Phrygia, who shewed him great hospitality.—Missione, *dismission, liberation.*—Nam nos etc., *for it becomes us assembling together, to mourn over the house*, etc.

(132) P. 70. *l.* 28. Elisium, *of Elis.*—Psychomantium, *the place of necromancy*, i. e. for consulting the Manes of the dead.—Euthynous, the name of the son who was mourned for.—Rebus . . . judicatam, *decided by things from the immortal gods.*

(139) P. 71. *l.* 10. Repetunt ab Erechtheo, *they derive an example from Erechtheus.* This person was, according to tradition, the sixth king of Athens, and died about 1347 B. C. He was the father of Cecrops 2nd; and in a war against Eleusis, he sacrificed his daughter Othyania (or Chthonia), to obtain a victory which was promised by an oracle, on such a condition. Cicero, in using the plural (filiae) here, seems to imply that more than one of his children were devoted to death; and this, by a voluntary act on their part, *cupide mortem expetiverunt.*

(140) P. 71. *l.* 12. Codrum, i. e. [they appeal to] *Codrus* etc. Codrus was the 17th king of Athens, and died about 1070 B. C. When the Heraclidae attacked Athens, and an oracle declared that the party should be victorious whose king was killed in battle, they gave strict orders to their troops to spare the life of Codrus. But he put on the disguise of a common soldier, and then, attacking the

enemy, he was slain, and Athens became victorious.

(141) P. 71. *l.* 16. Menoeceus, a son of Creon king of Thebes, who, when the prophet Tiresias ordered the Thebans to sacrifice one of those who sprang from the dragon's teeth, (see the article Cadmus in Lempriere), in order that they might obtain the victory over the Argive forces, came forward, and voluntarily devoted himself to death; and thus the victory was ensured.

(142) P. 71. *l.* 18. The story of Iphigenia, the daughter of Agamemnon is well known. The Greek fleet, on their way to Troy, were detained by contrary winds at Aulis, in the straits of Euripus; and on consulting the oracles, they were told that the sacrifice of Iphigenia was necessary, in order that they might have a favourable voyage. This accordingly took place, as some say; and so Cicero here seems to consider it. But see Iphigenia in Lempriere.

(143) P. 71. *l.* 20. Harmodius . . . et Aristogiton, two intimate friends, at Athens, who delivered their countrymen from the tyranny of the Pisistratidae, B. C. 510. They received the honours of immortality from the Athenians, and had statues erected to their memory.—Leonidas, see Note 128.—Epaminondas of Thebes is too well known to need description.

(144) P. 71. *l.* 22. Nostros non norunt, *our countrymen they are not acquainted with;* i. e. they, the Greek philosophers, who appeal to such examples as I have mentioned, are not acquainted with our countrymen.

§ 42.

These things being true, we ought to use every effort to persuade men the rather to wish for death; certainly not to fear it. Let us regard the day of our departure as a joyful day; for we are not made by chance, but the gods who consult the welfare of the human race, have made us; and this, not that we may endure labours and sufferings, and then come to a state of eternal wretchedness. Let us believe that there is a refuge prepared for us, where we may be eternally happy.

(145) P. 71. *l.* 25. Quae cum ita sint, magna tamen etc., *which things although they are thus, yet much eloquence must be employed*, etc.—Ita conniventem, *thus closing our eyes.*—Melior ... oratio, *the saying of Ennius is better than that of Solon.*—Noster, i. e. Ennius, who was a Roman poet.—Sapiens ille, i. e. Solon.—Velis passis, *with sails wide spread;* passis from pando.

Habes epilogum, *you have the epilogue*, i. e. the concluding part of my discourse.—Optime, inquam; *for the best reason, I should say.*—Quot dies, *so long as.*—Tusculanum means, a country house of Cicero, in the vicinity of Tusculum. This latter place was about 12 miles from Rome; and is reported to have been founded by Telegonus, a son of Ulysses and Circe. It is now called Frescati; and is famous for the magnificent villas in its neighborhood.

APPENDIX.

§ 1. *Immateriality of the soul.*

In order rightly to judge of the weight which should be allowed to the arguments of Cicero in favour of the immortality of the soul, it will be in a measure necessary, in the first place, to consider the real state of this subject, as it is now presented before the public in Christian lands. If by due consideration we can find ground which is solid and tenable, we may then proceed to the examination of Cicero's arguments, applying to them the tests which have previously been established. In this way, and in this only, can we learn to put a just estimate upon the nature and importance of the arguments which the Roman philosopher employed, or upon those which are usually employed at the present time, in order to establish the immortality of the soul.

Every human being, in the appropriate use of his faculties, is conscious of what he calls *internal* and *mental* operations. He forms ideas or notions of things, he thinks, he reasons, he remembers, he compares, he judges, he desires, he fears, etc.; and of all these and the like actions and emotions, he is perfectly conscious. He can no more doubt the reality of these mental actions and emotions, than he can doubt whether he exists. Indeed, they are themselves the certain, and (to him) in-

dubitable evidences, that he does exist. A consciousness of them, is consciousness both of existence and of mental action.

Most men are agreed in calling these phenomena *mental action* or *mental development;* i. e. they trace every thing of this nature to a cause or being, which they name *mind.* If the doing of this be not a simple dictate of the first, spontaneous, and elementary principles of our nature, (and I am inclined to believe it is), still it is something which results almost of course from even a very limited acquaintance with external things, i. e. with the material world.

We are in part composed of an element which we call *matter.* We are every where surrounded by this same element. To this, in consequence of the senses which are given us, and as a result of examination, we assign the qualities of solidity, extension, ponderosity, disvisibility, colour, figure, etc. These qualities enter essentially into our idea of matter; and without them matter, in the proper sense of this word, cannot be supposed to exist.

The qualities which we assign to matter, are of such a kind, that we are unable to perceive any necessary connection between them, and thinking, willing, reasoning, judging, etc. A great portion of the matter which we daily see, is plainly destitute even of sensation; and *a fortiori* it must be destitute of thought and reason and spontaneity.

But the matter of which our bodies are composed, is matter placed in a peculiar state; it is highly and most skilfully *organized.* If matter, i. e. brute and common matter, such as we see in most of the terrestrial objects around us, cannot think

and reason and will; yet may not matter, *organized* with more than human skill, be susceptible of thinking and reasoning and willing?

A deeply interesting question; and one that leads to the very gist of our subject. In answer to it, I would remark, (1) That all organized bodies are not capable of thought and volition and spontaneous motion; at least, we have not the slightest evidence that such is the case; since many of them do not exhibit any of the phenomena which accompany developments of this nature. For example; trees and vegetables, i. e. every object which exhibits merely what we call vegetable life, afford not the slightest evidence of any thing like thought, volition, or reason.

(2) When we ascend one gradation higher, and come to a class of beings that exhibit *animal* but not rational life, it is natural to inquire, whether this be merely the result of the structure or peculiar organization of matter. And here we are at a loss. Our sources of evidence are inadequate. What secret properties may be in matter, which do not develope themselves unless in consequence of a peculiar organization, but which may and will develope themselves when such an organization takes place, is more than we can possibly tell. It lies beyond the boundaries of our present knowledge. We must either have a consciousness of the living power of the brute animal, or must witness some external phenomena that would develope this power, in order to settle the question respecting it on the real ground of knowledge. As matters now are, and since we can have no access to either of those sources of knowledge, all we can do is, to

judge of probabilities on the ground of *analogy*. And here, too, we are encompassed with no small difficulty. Has a brute most analogy with vegetable organized matter, or with human beings? If a brute has thoughts, desires, fears, pleasures, pains, and even consciousness; if, in a low degree, it may be said to reason, i. e. to deduce certain conclusions from certain premises, and so is widely distinguished from the vegetable world; still it is not capable of indefinite improvement in knowledge and reasoning; it has no moral sense; it is limited, and forever and irresistibly limited, to a very narrow circle, in all its susceptibilities, emotions, and powers of improvement; while man, so far as can be known from his present nature, is susceptible, in almost every respect, of improvement that is unlimited and endless. A difference heaven-wide, like this, between man and brute, seems to bring the latter nearer to the vegetable than to the rational creation.

But we dismiss this subject, because, as I have already said, it is beyond the boundary of human knowledge. Let us come, (3) To man. Here we have a source of knowledge, which is out of our power when we strive to become acquainted with the nature and properties of the brutes. We are not only conscious that we think and will and reason and remember, but we do spontaneously feel, while we are conscious of these and the like things, that they are not properties or results of matter. We assign to them as a cause, that living intelligent, rational principle or essence, which we call *mind* or *soul*. And this is so universally and spontaneously done, that I hesitate not to number

it, as Dr. Abercrombie in his recent and admirable work on the Intellectual Powers has done, among the first or elementary and intuitive principles of knowledge; and consequently I must regard the fact in question, as one incapable of demonstration by a process of reasoning. No *elementary* truth is capable of demonstration. It has higher evidence in its favour. It is the spontaneous dictate of the very nature of our minds; and unless they are so formed as to mislead and deceive us, this dictate must be truth.

I cannot help feeling a conviction, that the actions of our minds can never be traced to the mere organization of matter; and this conviction is of the like tenor as the conviction, that the apparent external objects of nature around us have a *real* existence. We cannot *prove* this last fact. No less a philosopher than Berkeley, undertook to prove the contrary. But after all, it is a universal law of our nature, which determines that the real existence of external objects is matter of fact. Every body believes it; always has believed it; and always will. And so, a conviction that mind is not matter, and *vice versâ*, seems to be at least as widely extended among men, as thought and reason and moral consciousness are.

So much for the truth itself of the *immateriality* of the soul. It is not a subject of direct demonstration, because it is a truth that lies out of the boundaries of demonstration, and is of a higher and more satisfactory nature.

The reader will observe here, that I speak now merely of the *immateriality* of the soul, and not of its *immortality*. These two things, sometimes

confounded, (as indeed they are by both Cicero and Plato), may be perfectly distinct, and immeasureably diverse. We should therefore consider them separately from each other.

(4) But although I have supposed the *immateriality* of the soul to be a *first principle* of our knowledge, and therefore to rank higher than demonstrative truth; yet I am by no means satisfied, that on the score of reasoning we may not be compelled, as it were, to concede the immateriality of the soul. If I ask the question: *Whether the phenomena of mind proceed from the same cause as the phenomena of matter?* I am constrained, in order to make out an answer, to take into consideration a number of particulars, which seem to render the affirmative of this question quite improbable.

(*a*) The developments of matter and mind are exceedingly different. Thinking, willing, reasoning, etc., it must be admitted, are very diverse from solidity, extension, gravity, divisibility, etc. These last properties are the developments of matter. They are essential to our notion of it. These are effects of some cause, or at least qualities of some substance, which, appropriately to its own nature, makes such developments.

(*b*) All our knowledge of matter comes through the medium of the senses; all our knowledge of mind comes only by consciousness. The *sources* of knowledge, then, are exceedingly diverse, in the respective cases under consideration.

It is very natural now to ask: Must not the *sources* of mental and material phenomena be different, when the phenomena themselves are so

widely different, and when our means of becoming acquainted with them are so very diverse? I see not how we can well avoid the conclusion, that the causes of each set of phenomena, must be different in themselves.

(*c*) *Divisibility* is an invariable quality of matter, in all its modifications of which we have, or can at present have, any conception. But how am I to divide thought, will, consciousness? If you say, that these are only phenomena of the mind, and not the mind itself; and that some of the phenomena of matter are equally indivisible, e. g. solidity; my reply is, that of all the acts of the mind divisibility is an impossible predicate. You may increase or diminish the *intensity* of thought or affection. Other changes the nature of these things does not admit. But we can divide a solid piece of matter; we can separate its form, i. e. divide it into several forms of the like kind, or of different kinds, etc. And although quality, in the *abstract*, cannot be divided, the matter which possesses it may be modified, so that this quality, as belonging to it, may receive changes of a nature very different from that of greater or less intensity. The phenomena of matter in this respect, therefore, are very different from those of mind; and consequently, as we may infer with probability, they proceed from a different cause.

(*d*) All our *sensations* are dependent on external causes for their origin or continuance. For example; we could not see without light, let our physical organs of vision, or our minds, be in ever so perfect a state. We could not hear without a vibration of the atmosphere, or of some other

body which is capable of percussion. And when we had once seen and heard, we should cease to do so, provided these external causes were never more to influence us.

On the other hand; what the mind has once received, it can continue, by the aid of memory, ever to use and appropriate. It recals; reflects; makes new combinations of its own thoughts; and produces new results. It can, when once furnished with a store of ideas, so combine and arrange them, as to invent or imagine new ideas, such as correspond to no actual existences. In this state, if all the external universe were shut out from it, or absolutely annihilated, it could, for aught we can see, go on with these mental processes unembarrassed, or at least without being obliged to cease from them.

Can that be material, then, which is so independent of matter, in a multitude of its operations?

(*e*) On the supposition that the soul is *material*, how can we account for consciousness of identity, or memory of the past? Nothing is more certain, than that every part of our material bodies, all their organic structures, are changing, and changing every hour and moment, from the cradle to the grave. All the organic matter in my bodily frame has been completely shifted, a great many times, since my physical being commenced. One and all of the physiologists agree in the absolute certainty of this. How then can *identity* have been transmitted? If I am matter merely, or skilfully organized matter merely, and this is all that I am; then it is certain that there never has been any two moments in my whole life, in which personal

identity could with truth be asserted; for there never has been any two moments, in which entire material identity existed.

How, moreover, can a consciousness of such an identity be transmitted, provided we are wholly material? In the first place, it would be a consciousness of what is not true; and how can this be allowed? And secondly, I see not how to account for it, that with the full knowledge, that no material particle now in me is what once belonged to me, I yet can, in no way possible, resist the conviction, that I am the very same being that I was forty years ago. Shall we resort to the old atomic philosophy and say, that the movements of our atomic particles are all intelligent; and that while some of the worn out particles of our bodies are moving off by means of the blood, and others coming in by the same medium, the former communicate to the new comers a consciousness that they are the same as the old residents? This would be to make the atoms of Democritus a *pseudologous* race; of which character that philosopher never suspected them to be.

We come by a kind of necessity to the conclusion, then, that a nature different from a material one exists within us; one which remains unchanged as to its essential or constitutional being, through all the different stages of our existence, and which, by the aid of consciousness and memory, spontaneously decides upon its own identity. The fact itself, that it does so decide, is known to every human being, and needs no proof; and this decision is plainly to be classed among the elementary or intuitive principles of the knowledge of our own nature.

For these reasons, now, we may justly regard it as highly probable, that our minds cannot be the result of any organized combination of matter. But after all, I apprehend that the *full* persuasion of this truth, as I before said, is one of the intuitive principles to which our very nature leads us. However, we may justly, perhaps, regard the thing itself as the more certain, if other considerations, as above stated, all combine to render it probable.

Thus far, then, we seem to have found our way clear; the soul is not *material.* But this proposition, it will be remembered, is merely *negative.* We have not said what the soul *is;* but what it *is not.* What I have said goes to shew, that thinking, willing, reasoning, and other mental phenomena, proceed from a cause different from matter, however ingeniously or skilfully this may be organized. Even this was felt by some ancient philosophers, who lived in the depth of heathen night. Aristoxenus represented the soul as a species of *harmony;* Xenocrates and Pythagoras ascribed a kind of *numerosity* (numerus) or *melody* to it; while Plato and Cicero are most clear and strenuous, on the point of its absolute immateriality.

I may now venture to add, (5) That the certainty of the existence of the mind, is as great as we have, or can have, of any fact or truth whatever. So say Stewart and Abercrombie; men who are exceedingly well qualified to judge of the force of argument. The former adds, that "even the system of Berkeley, concerning the non-existence of matter, is far more conceivable, than that nothing but matter exists in the universe." Why must not this be true? The man who thinks, and reasons, and

wills, does by these very acts create the most perfect and irresistible conviction of which he is susceptible, that his mind exists and acts. He has a perfect conviction, that the matter of which his body is composed, and which is every moment changing, cannot love and hate, suffer and enjoy, hope and fear, reason and investigate, explore the heavens and measure the earth, as he does. He knows that when he loses an arm, or a leg, or both, and other parts also of his body, his mental powers may remain, and usually do remain, in undiminished vigour. How can he feel, then, that matter is his only self? He cannot. In the madness of sensual intoxication, he may affirm this. From the love of paradox, he may dispute in favour of it; but to feel an abiding conviction that his mind and body are one and the same substance, is what cannot well be imagined to be within the power of any rational being, who is in any tolerable degree enlightened.

§ 2. *Immortality or endless duration of the mind or soul.*

This is a question of higher moment and deeper interest to us, than any other, I had well nigh said, than all others, which can be raised. Of what great consequence can it be, that we can think and reason and will, that we can survey and measure the heavens and the earth, and that all our mental powers are capable of indefinite improvement, if, after a few days or years, the existence of all these splendid attributes is to come to a final end? To inanimate matter, and to the vegetable and brute creation, has a lot fallen, which

is enviable compared with our own, in case that death is the end of our being. All the inferior creation suffer comparatively little, and hope for or expect nothing. We suffer much, and hope for every thing; and if we must endure the one, and the light of the other be forever quenched, then is the lot of the inferior creation greatly preferable to ours.

Even the question, whether there is a God, although of deeper interest to the universe in general, is one of less interest to us individually, than the question whether we are to live forever. For if there is a God, and yet death is the end of our being, of what consequence will it be to us, at last, who or what exists? It follows, therefore, that we have a deeper interest in the question concerning the perpetuity of our own being, than in any other.

But how shall this be solved? Can the proof, or the entire conviction, that the soul is immaterial, i. e. that it is not matter, satisfy us that it is also immortal? I am unable to see how this consequence necessarily follows. I am speaking now of investigation independently of the Scriptures. On this ground, I cannot see what hinders, that the origin of the being or action of our mental powers, may not be an invariable concomitant of the organization of our bodies; for thus it appears to be: and so, it is like a multitude of other concomitant existences and powers in the kingdom of nature. And if our *mental structure* (sit venia verbo) first arose cotemporaneously with our bodily one, i. e. when the latter was so joined together as to

make a human frame, why may it not cease to be an organized mental structure, when the body dies?

I know of no process of reasoning, which can disprove this. The argument of Plato and Cicero, that because the mind is immaterial, it is therefore immutable and immortal, I acknowledge is striking and specious; and it has been adopted by a multitude of reasoners on the subject of the soul's immortality. But Plato and Cicero, who were both very sensible to the force of argument, having once reasoned in such a way on this point, felt themselves obliged to be consistent, and to go the whole length to which the argument would naturally carry them. If the soul is immutable and eternal in itself, said they, it must have existed from eternity *a parte ante*, as truly as it will exist in eternity *a parte post*. Consequently (for so they concluded) all human souls must be absolutely existent, i. e. they have always existed. Of course, as we must now see, the number of them, according to this, is incapable of increase or diminution. Transmigration naturally comes along in the train of such ratiocination, in order to answer the question, where has the soul hitherto been? And this, Plato, with his teachers the Pythagoreans, fully embraced; Cicero, hesitatingly and with apparent reluctance, for he generally keeps it out of sight.

I need not stop here to refute the doctrine of transmigration, or the anterior existence of human souls; although the latter is, at the present time, strenuously affirmed by Beneke of Heidelburg, a living and recent commentator on the Epistle to the Romans. But allowing that souls came into being as souls, cotemporaneously with the organization of matter

into a human body; what is there to prove that, as souls, i. e. as possessed of their present powers and attributes, they may not perish, or undergo an entire change at death, like to that which we see in the body? I know of no direct proof of this, independently of revelation, and in the way of ratiocination. I do not see how we are to get at materials, out of which we may construct an *argument.* No one comes back from the invisible world to tell us what the soul is there; so that we cannot derive any knowledge of this kind from direct testimony. And as to knowledge from *experience;* we ourselves have never been in a state of death; we have had no experience. Whence, then, is our proof to come?

A truly difficult question, independently of Scripture and our moral sense. Yet some things may perhaps be said on this subject, which will serve to render it probable, that the substance which we call *mind,* does not perish by the death of the body.

But we can reason on this point, only from analogy; because, as I have already hinted, the state of the soul after death is neither a matter of consciousness, nor of experiment, nor of observation, nor of testimony. Of course, I lay the Scriptures out of the question, for the present. How then stands the matter of analogy, according to the light of nature?

The body, when death occurs, loses its organized state; and consequently the physical powers that were connected with, and dependent on, this state, are also destroyed. But in regard to the existence of the matter itself which composes the body, considered simply as matter, this surely does not cease

to exist after death. Every physiologist and chemist well knows, indeed, that matter may be endlessly modified and diversified in its combinations; but he knows equally well, that there is not one particle more or less of matter now, than there was on the day that the creation was finished. Matter is indestructible by any power, save that which called it into being.

By analogical reasoning, then, we must of course be led to say, that the substance or essence of the mind or soul, whatever this may be, can never be at all affected in the way of *annihilation*, by the dissolution of the body. We may easily believe, that the actions and affections, i. e. the phenomena of the soul as connected with the body, may be modified, in some degree, by the dissolution of the material organs of sense, through the medium of which the soul obtained all its *sensitive* ideas. But such a *modification* merely, not annihilation, is all which can in any degree be rendered probable, in the way of argument from analogy. In no other way can any argument be made to bear upon the subject.

But does the substance *mind*, retain, after the death of the body, *those powers which it exercised independently of the senses?* As the disorganization of the body has destroyed its active physical powers; and as the soul came into being cotemporaneously with the organized body, and in connection with it began the development of its powers—may not this development cease, when the organized body is destroyed? *Nodus vindice dignus*—who can solve it?

When we are told with the strongest confidence

by Plato and Cicero, and have been told by multitudes of others, that spontaneity of action in the soul necessarily proves the eternity of it, can we consistently receive this as sound and legitimate argument? For myself, I must say that I cannot perceive why, so far as arguments of this nature can go, we may not as well render it probable, that souls may *cease* to act, or (so to express myself) be disorganized, as that they *begin* to act. The latter we fully believe, because we cannot adopt the theory of a pre-existent state, and a metempsychosis. And the subject of possibility in the nature of things, as known to us without the light of revelation, being the only one which we now have in view; who is able to produce any solid argument in this way to shew, why the disorganization of the mind or soul may not take place simultaneously with physical dissolution; or at least, why it may not speedily and certainly follow it? How can *spontaneity* of action in the soul, (which Plato calls κίνησις, and Cicero *motus*), be a certain evidence of eternal existence? Can it be shewn that God, or (if you will) Nature, can not form a human being with powers of spontaneous action? When it can, then of course it must be proved, that the souls of men have never been formed at any period, but have existed from all eternity; and consequently that neither God nor Nature is their Maker. This Plato does maintain, when he is urging the argument for immortality; although he contradicts it elsewhere. And the like is implied in what Cicero says, although he seems fearful of the consequences that will result from pressing this argument.

I see no way then in which, by the simple light

of nature and ratiocination, we can *prove* the immortality of the soul. The two great sources of knowledge respecting a future state, consciousness or experience, and testimony (independently of Revelation), are wholly wanting, or are at least inaccessible. Consequently the *materiel* for argument, (if I may be allowed the expression), cannot be supplied; and therefore an argument cannot be constructed.

The utmost, indeed, which can be done in this way, is to shew that the dissolution of the body cannot be supposed to annihilate the substance of the mind; since it does not at all annihilate the substance of even the body itself. But still we are obliged to admit, that the dissolution of the body must *modify* the actions and affections of the soul, in some degree; because, when all our bodily organs are dissolved, one great inlet of ideas to the soul is dissolved. That class of mental phenomena which are strictly denominated *sensations*, must of course cease.

But the purely mental phenomena—what of these? They may cease, or may not; who can assure us the one or the other? It is indeed as clear as noon-day, that the most inveterate skeptic never can bring a single argument to prove that these phenomena do cease, when the body is dissolved. This is utterly beyond his power. If there is any probability on this subject, it is in favour of the other side of the question; inasmuch as the purely mental phenomena seem to be very little connected with the body, and in a manner to be independent of it; as we have seen under § 1 above.

Here then, as it seems to me, must unassisted reason, or rather, *ratiocination*, leave the subject. Demonstrative or argumentative power is not sufficient, of itself, to remove the obstacles which impede our vision into futurity; and the simple ground of this is, that demonstrative arguments cannot be constructed, for want of materials.

How then did Socrates, Plato, Cicero, and many others of the most eminent heathen philosophers, persuade themselves that the soul is immortal? I answer, that it was not, I apprehend, merely by the force of the arguments which they employed; for on a critical examination of them, it will be found that few of these will abide the test; but it was because a *moral* feeling or nature within them gave to their apparent arguments most, if not all, of their real weight. To this principle I must now advert, in order to complete what I have to say on the doctrine of the soul's immortality.

My own apprehension relative to this great subject, is, that the evidence which satisfies us of a future state, is derived from the moral constitution of our nature. It is like the feeling, that there is a right and a wrong in morals. This last sensation brings along with it an apprehension of accountability; and this connects itself with a future state. If you say, that multitudes of the heathen have no clear views of this point; this will prove nothing. The tendency of all the systems of heathen religion notoriously is, to support the notion of an existence in a future state. A future state, a reward for those who please the gods, and punishment for those who do not, seem to be interwoven, in some form or other, with the

very nature and essence of all religion. What is this but a development of that very principle in our nature, to which I have just been adverting?

If I should affirm, that men are *rational* beings; and an opponent should reply, that multitudes act in a manner which gives little or no evidence of their possessing reason; should I be satisfied, even if I admitted this, that men are not rational beings? No; I might concede the full truth of his allegation, and reply merely, that men, being free agents, could and did abuse their reason, and pervert and extinguish it.

And so in the case before us. Be it that multitudes of the heathen have little or no belief in a future state, or little or no knowledge of it; then we may say of them, that they have perverted their moral nature; they have extinguished the light which Heaven had kindled in their breasts; just as the apostle charges them with having done, in respect to a knowledge of the eternal power and godhead of the Creator. But perverted or extinguished moral feelings can never prove that such feelings have no existence, i. e. no well grounded basis, in our moral nature.

I cannot hope to do better justice to this part of my subject, than Dr. Abercrombie has already done, in his excellent book to which I have more than once referred. I must beg the liberty, therefore, of making a quotation from him. This I shall do, merely remarking, that I know not how my own sentiments could be more exactly expressed, than in his words.

"Our speculations respecting the immateriality of the rational human soul have no influence on

our belief of its immortality. This momentous truth rests on a species of evidence altogether different, which addresses itself to the moral constitution of man. It is found in those principles of his nature by which he feels upon his spirit the awe of a God, and looks forward to the future with anxiety or with hope; by which he knows how to distinguish truth from falsehood and evil from good, and has forced upon him the conviction that he is a moral and responsible being. This is the power of conscience, that monitor within, which raises its voice in the breast of every man, a witness for his Creator. He who resigns himself to its guidance, and he who repels its warnings, are both compelled to acknowledge its power; and, whether the good man rejoices in the prospect of immortality, or the victim of remorse withers beneath an influence unseen by human eye, and shrinks from the anticipation of a reckoning to come, each has forced upon him a conviction, such as argument never gave, that the being which is essentially himself is distinct from any function of the body, and will survive in undiminished vigour when the body shall have fallen into decay.

"When, indeed, we take into the inquiry the high principles of moral obligation, and the moral government of the Deity, this important truth is entirely independent of all our feeble speculations on the essence of mind. For though we were to suppose, with the materialist, that the rational soul of man is a mere chemical combination, which, by the dissolution of its elements, is dissipated to the four winds of heaven, where is the improbability that the Power which framed the wondrous compound

may collect these elements again, and combine them anew, for the great purposes of his moral administration. In our speculations on such a momentous subject, we are too apt to be influenced by our conceptions of the powers and properties of physical things; but there is a point where this principle must be abandoned, and where the soundest philosophy requires that we take along with us a full recognizance of the power of God.

"There is thus, in the consciousness of every man, a deep impression of continued existence. The casuist may reason against it, till he bewilder himself in his own sophistries; but a voice within gives the lie to his vain speculations, and pleads with authority for a life which is to come. The sincere and humble inquirer cherishes the impression, while he seeks for further light on a subject so momentous; and he thus receives, with absolute conviction, the truth which beams upon him from the revelation of God,—that the mysterious part of his being, which thinks, and wills, and reasons, shall indeed survive the wreck of its mortal tenement, and is destined for immortality."

I have only to add, that a conviction of such a nature appears to be deeper, more uniform, more operative, than any which could possibly be produced on untutored men by nicely refined arguments, or indeed by any arguments. God, by giving us a constitutional feeling that there is a judgment to come, has implanted in our very souls a fundamental knowledge of the first great law of moral restraint, viz. that we are accountable for all our actions; and what of the account is not adjusted here, we may naturally apprehend, will be adjusted

in a future state. The skeptic and the scoffer may as well destroy the very being of the soul, as destroy this apprehension. It will return, after it has been driven off. It will come back with awful power, when they are upon a dying bed. It will cling to them forever and ever, in that world the existence of which they have denied, but which ere long will open upon them with all its dread realities.

It will be acknowledged by all, that there are *first* truths of a purely intellectual nature; and there are *first* truths of a moral nature. On these all processes of ratiocination, both intellectual and moral, are built. My view of the doctrine of the soul's immortality, as established by the light of nature, is, that *it is one of those* FIRST *truths*, which are impressed on our moral constitution by its Maker. It was the feeling that springs from this, which gave weight and power to the arguments employed by Plato and Cicero, in order to establish the doctrine of a future state. More time and more improvement in moral and religious philosophy were needed, before this could be fully developed; and so these philosophers have given us but an imperfect development of it. Still, we shall see in the sequel, that Cicero did not overlook so important a consideration; although his development of it is in a way somewhat indirect.

It is important to keep these remarks in view, when we come to examine the arguments which Cicero has adduced in favour of the soul's immortality. We shall be able, then, to account for it, that some of them appear to have had more weight in his mind, than we can well allow them to have, considered simply as arguments.

We come now, in the concluding part of this dissertation, to advert to the Scriptures, as having taught us fully and explicitly the doctrine of a future state. This lies so upon the face of the whole New Testamant, that to prove it by quotations, would be quite superfluous. But plain and explicit and often repeated as the declarations of the sacred writers are, in regard to this subject, it is remarkable that they have no where once attempted to establish the doctrine of the soul's immortality by ratiocination or argument. They seem every where to take it for granted; in other words, they do plainly regard it as one of the indisputable truths, which lie in the elements of our moral nature. If any one doubts or denies this statement, let him produce a single passage from sacred writ, which contains a demonstrative argument in favour of the soul's immortality.

Paul asserts that *the gospel has brought life and immortality*, i. e. immortal life, *to light*. Is not this true? Will it be said, that I have already admitted this truth to be one of the dictates of our moral nature? I have so. But this does not hinder a full recognition of the fact (which is equally plain), that men, by their evil passions and pursuits, have perverted and darkened this truth; just as they have that, which respects the eternal power and godhead of the Creator. It was reserved for the gospel to scatter the darkness which evil passions and sensuality had spread over the moral world. This it has fully done. The testimony that the gospel is true, cannot be resisted by a candid mind; and if so, then the credibility of all which it asserts respecting a future state, is established. And es-

pecially may we admit this, when it falls in with the current of our moral nature.

Moreover, what the light of nature could not do effectually, the gospel has done. *It has given* AUTHORITY *and* AWFUL SANCTION *to the doctrine of a future state;* such as never could exist without it. Who that duly considers this, will not look up to the great and glorious Author of the gospel, with unfeigned gratitude and thankfulness? The mere child in Christian lands, now knows more fully, and believes with more assurance, that the soul is immortal, than Socrates, Plato, or Cicero did. Hear what Cicero makes his respondent say, in his first book of Tusculan Questions. The Roman philosopher had referred his Collocutor to the Phaedo of Plato, as containing arguments sufficient to establish the existence of the soul after the death of the body. The Collocutor replies: *I know not how it is, but so it is, that while I read, I give my assent; but when I have laid aside the book, and begin to reflect upon the immortality of the soul by myself, all my assent glides away.* So, no doubt, it was with most of the minds of the heathen. They had variable, indistinct, unimpressive notions of a future state. They saw it by twilight. They looked to ratiocination to establish it; but they could find none which did not, at least sometimes, seem capable of being contradicted. Consequently their convictions were not, in general, of a solid and lasting nature. It is after all, then, "the glorious gospel of the blessed God," which "has brought life and immortality fully to light."

§ 3. *Examination of Cicero's arguments for the immortality of the soul.*

The way is now prepared for a review of Cicero's ratiocination. It will be necessary, in general, to make only a *brief* statement; for I may now refer to what has already been said, as the test by which I should desire the weight of his arguments to be examined.

1. His first argument is, that the gods, both superior and inferior, were once human beings or men; and as all allow their present existence, they must of course allow the continued existence of the soul after death; § 10.

It is unnecessary to make any remark on this argument, except merely, that it could avail, of course, only as an *argumentum ad hominem*. Those who believed in the immortal existence of the gods, that once were men, could not reject the conclusion, that the soul exists after death.

But while we may admit the ingenuity of this appeal, how can we help deploring that moral state, in such a man as Cicero, which could admit the idea of a plurality of gods; and of gods, who in their origin were *merely* human?

2. It is a law of our nature to believe in, or to anticipate, a future state; §§ 11, 12.

Here the very essence of the evidence in regard to a future state, is in some measure developed by the Roman philosopher. But observe how much in the twilight he is, with respect to it. He illustrates it by saying, that when we grieve for the dead, we grieve at their deprivation of the comforts of life; and that when men engage in great and

glorious undertakings, it is with reference to future fame, and implies some sensation of it after death. And this is all: not a word of the judgment to come; of accountability; of heaven or hell. The gospel must needs throw light on these things, in order that they should be fully developed. But still, who does not feel himself delighted, that some sparks of immortal fire are here emitted? The image of God within the human breast does here exhibit, although in a manner indistinctly, some of its true features. It is a lovely image, even in obscurity.

3. Self-motion, i. e. spontaneous action, is the third argument of Cicero, in favour of his position. The power of self-motion, he says, cannot be traced to any external cause. It exists in and of itself; and therefore it must have always existed, and will always exist; § 19.

But this proves a great deal too much. It proves, that souls were not created, but are self-existent and eternal; a thing which, on other occasions, neither Cicero admits, nor Plato, from whom he has directly quoted the whole argument. It never can be shewn, that God cannot create a free-agent, i. e. a being which possesses spontaneity of action.

4. The powers of the soul, its native knowledge, its capacity for improvement, its memory, its faculty of invention and unlimited acquisition and investigation, shew that it is like the gods in its origin and nature. What it executes in art, poetry, oratory, philosophy, and the like, helps to confirm this same truth; §§ 20—22.

It cannot be denied, that there is some weight

in all this. All nature discloses benevolent design, on the part of its Creator. For what purpose has the Divinity given such exalted powers to man? The beasts reach the highest point of which their limited nature is capable. Man only begins to develope himself, in the present world. Is he then the most imperfect of all created things, in regard to the full development of his powers? It is difficult to believe this, and yet to maintain the doctrine of benevolent design. It would seem, that there must be another state of being, where this development can be more fully completed.

5. The soul is a simple, unmixed substance; not concrete; consequently it is not material, and not subject to dissolution; § 23.

But this is a *petitio principii*. The substance of the soul, it may be satisfactorily shewn, is *not* material. But to prove that it is *simple* and *unmixed*—how can this be done, unless we become experimentally acquainted with the nature and properties of spiritual substance or essence? As this is impossible, so such an acquaintance is out of question.

And even if we could establish the position, that the soul is of *simple* element; how could we prove that a simple element may not undergo some change, analogous to the death or dissolution of the body?

It is manifest, therefore, that this whole argument is a *petitio principii*.

6. From the works of creation and providence we argue the existence of the gods, as immortal beings; from similar works, then, we may conclude that man, as to his nature, is like to them; § 24, seq.

There is something so attractive and delightful

in what Cicero says upon this point, that I cannot forbear asking the reader to turn to the passage and reperuse it. I know not, in the whole compass of heathen writings, a passage so noble on the subject of the Godhead, as the one which the Roman philosopher here exhibits. What an admirable proof of the correctness of that which Paul has alleged, in the sublime and beautiful passage in Rom. I. 19, 20!

But after all, the argument, merely as argument, is liable to exception. That our works are like those of the Divinity, does indeed prove resemblance. But how will our *present* resemblance, in this respect, prove that our existence will be *eternal?* I see no certain ground to conclude, that a being, which is in some respects like the Divinity at present, may not exist, and yet this existence be temporary. The *probability* is, indeed, highly in favour of his *continued* existence; as may be seen by adverting to the fourth argument above exhibited. But the *certainty* we can hardly think to be capable of adequate *proof*, by considerations of this nature.

Such are the principal considerations urged by Cicero, in favour of our continued existence after the death of the body. It is a remarkable circumstance, and a most deplorable one too, that throughout his whole dissertation, the Roman philosopher scarcely adverts to the distinction in a future state, between the righteous and the wicked. The apostle states such a belief as one of the first principles of religion, and as standing by the side of the great truth, that there is a God: "He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that *he is the re-*

warder of those who diligently seek him." And who are the diligent seekers? The righteous, surely. But what is to become of the wicked, then, i. e. those who do not seek him? The implication necessarily is, that they are to receive punishment.

Indeed this must be regarded as one of the elementary principles of all religion. Men may differ about the time, and manner, and measure of retribution to the wicked; but the fact itself, none but atheists can consistently deny.

Yet plain and important as the doctrine of retribution in a future state is, when the existence of the soul is once granted, Cicero does not appear to have directed many of his thoughts toward it. My impression from a frequent perusal of his whole treatise on the soul, is, that he took it for granted, that all men of a tolerably decent character will be happy in another world. Now and then he adverts to the punishment of the wicked; but he seems to mean, by them, only persons of a most profligate and debased character.

Near the commencement of his dissertation, he holds the following conversation with his Collocutor: "*M.* Quid, si [animae] maneant? *A.* Beatos esse, concedo." And what Cicero makes his respondent here say, viz., that if the soul does survive the body, it will be happy, this author seems, in all parts of his treatise, to have taken for granted.

One passage, however, shews, that when he thus speaks, he has such characters in view as have been, on the whole, what he deems to be virtuous. The passage to which I refer is in § 25. p. 48, seq. The substance of it is, 'that Socrates taught the doctrine, that there are two ways in which souls

go, when they depart from the body. Those "qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent, et se totos libidinibus dedidissent, quibus caecati; vel domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinavissent; vel republica fraudes inexpiabiles concepissent; to these there is a *devious* path to be trodden, and one which leads away from the council of the gods. But to those who had been upright and chaste; to such as had contracted the least possible contagion from their bodies, and had always been prone to abstract as it were the soul from them; to those who, during their physical life, had studiously imitated the gods; to all such an easy return would be granted to that upper world from which they originally came.'

To this sentiment of Socrates and Plato, the Roman philosopher seems to yield his entire approbation; "nec vero de hoc quisquam dubitare potest." Yet all important as such a sentiment is, in the light of moral retribution; and infinitely interesting as this retribution is to every individual; it seems to have had but little *practical* influence or interest in the mind of Cicero. Once only, in his whole dissertation, has he distinctly brought it to view, as above stated. Every where else he seems to go upon the ground, that if we exist at all after death, we shall of course be happy. Yet I doubt not, that justice requires us to consider him as speaking, in all such cases, of those whom he deems to be reputable and virtuous.

How immeasurably different all this is from the tenor of the gospel, must be evident even to the most superficial reader. There, a judgment to come; a reward of every man according to the

deeds done in the body; a heaven and a hell; are the all-absorbing, all-important topics. "Knowing the terrors of the Lord," the Christian preachers were led "to persuade men." But the philosopher at the head of heathen Rome, scarcely makes any of these matters a subject of thought; certainly not of serious interest. How true the exclamation of the Psalmist: "The entrance of thy word giveth light; it giveth understanding to the simple!" And equally true, the asseveration of Paul: "The world by wisdom knew not God."

Cicero, after the brief account of Socrates' views given above, quits the subject, without once adverting to the surprising, and (I think we may truly say) revolting, μῦθος, which Socrates, or rather Plato, introduces near the close of the Phaedo, in order to shew the future condition of the soul. We can scarcely doubt, that Cicero considered the whole of it as a mere play of the imagination. There is one passage, however, in which he has disclosed to us what kind of a heaven for the soul he did suppose to exist; and it is a deeply interesting matter to learn, how the mind of an enlightened and philosophizing heathen could and did think on such a subject.

The sum of his views may be found in § 16, and is as follows: 'Whether we allow the soul to be fire, or air, or melody, or the *fifth* principle of Aristotle, it is obvious that it is lighter and more buoyant than the moist atmosphere which surrounds the earth. On the death of the body, it must of course mount upwards, until it reaches the etherial regions, which are tempered like itself; and there, as *in equilibrio*, it stops, and dwells in the upper

sphere among the stars, and is nourished by the same etherial aliment which supports them.'

Such is the provision for the future abode of the soul, and its continued existence; an evident advance, and a great one, upon the μύθος of Socrates and Plato, as exhibited in the Phaedo. But what are its state, its occupations, its enjoyments? They may be summed up in two things; (1) Freedom from corporeal appetites and passions. (2) The boundless and endless pursuit and attainment of knowledge.

The first of these considerations, in Cicero's mind, sprung, no doubt, from the moral principle which belongs to the soul, and which longs after something that will raise it above carnal and physical appetites and pleasures. In this, we recognize an irradiation from the eternal light that beams above. The second consideration originated from the unquenchable thirst which Cicero felt, and every kindred soul must feel, for pursuing the acquisition of knowledge, through ages that have no end. "If the gods," said Lessing, "should make me the offer of the actual knowledge of all things, I must decline the boon; should they proffer me the eternal and successful pursuit of it, I would accept it with the highest gratitude." In this sentiment we may discern the same feelings, which led Cicero to represent his heaven as consisting mainly in the pursuit of knowledge. The society of the great and virtuous he does indeed reckon as one ingredient in the cup of future blessedness; but the enjoyment of even this, consists principally in receiving and communicating knowledge.

How many a Christian face should be covered

with blushes, to see a heathen outstrip most persons in such noble desires! Paul could say: "Now we know in part . . . but then shall we see and know, even as we are seen and known." And the Hebrew prophet could say: "Then shall we know, if we follow on to know the Lord." And while Paul and this prophet, and all others enlightened as they were, expected the joys of heaven to be something more and higher than those which consist in the acquisition of knowledge; yet they by no means underrate the pursuit of this. It was doubtless viewed by them, as it in fact is, as one of the means by which we approximate to a greater likeness with the omniscient Author of our being.

To be freed from sin—all sin, either of thought, word, or deed—to be holy, to be like God, to love him, and serve him, and praise him, and thank him, forever and ever, is, after all, the most essential part of the Christian's heaven. But here Cicero did not sympathize with the Christian. He had no knowledge, such as the Bible gives, of the only living and true God. The gods whom he worshipped, had once been men; or if we may suppose him to have risen above this, in his speculations, (as he sometimes appears to do), still *holiness* as developed in the Scriptures, was not an object of his contemplation. The gods with whom he hoped to reside, were of a mixed, I might say of an atrocious, character. Hence he does not once think of heaven, as a place where *moral* resemblance to them is the grand point of happiness. Truly, we may say once more: "Life and immortality are brought to light in the gospel!"

We have now seen what kind of a heaven the

highest speculations of reason, without a Revelation, will form. It will scarcely be pretended, that Cicero is not as favourable an example of this nature, as can be selected from the whole heathen world. He has evidently improved upon the speculations of Plato and Socrates. And after all, what is there in his Elysium, which will bear any comparison at all with the heaven which the Bible discloses?

We come next to the objections against the doctrine of immortality, which Cicero discusses and answers.

In §§ 13—18, he introduces and descants upon the objection, which is raised by asking the question: 'How and where does the soul exist?' As to the place of its existence, what has already been said, discloses his views. In regard to the question, *How* do souls exist in a future state? he says, very rightly, that this can serve the objector no good purpose; for if the question be asked: How do souls exist in our present state, in union with the body? it is just as difficult to answer this, as it would be to answer the objector's question; nay even more so, inasmuch as the body is a kind of heterogeneous tenement for them, alien from their real nature.

Then again, he suggests, we may just as well ask how the gods exist; whom all do allow to exist.

More to the purpose are the objections raised by Panaetius, § 27, seq. These are, (1) The soul is procreated; therefore it may be destroyed. The evidence that it is procreated, lies in the resemblance of children to their parents. (2) The soul can be affected with grief and pain; and that

which can thus be affected, must be perishable in its nature.

To the first of these objections he replies, that most of the similitude arises from mere physical conformity; and even where there is a like disposition of mind, it springs, in a great degree, from similar external circumstances and from physical similitude. Then again, there are multiplied cases of entire *dissimilitude* of disposition, between parents and children, which would afford equal proof of the contrary proposition.

The second objection he answers, by stating that all the passions of grief, vexation, fear, anger, etc., must be predicated merely of the body and the animal soul; but not of the intellectual and rational soul, which is wholly free from all such emotions; § 28.

On this we may remark, that it is clearly a *petitio principii*, borrowed from the speculations of Plato, respecting the transcendental and immutable nature of the soul. That this cannot be established by argument or proved by *a priori* considerations, we have already seen.

Such then is the treatise of Cicero, on the immortality of the soul. Such is the highest point, to which reason (unenlightened by revelation) did attain, in the heathen world. "The world by wisdom knew not God;" it is equally true, that they did not know themselves.

The rest of Cicero's dissertation, from § 27 to the end, consists of various considerations, designed to shew that we ought not to fear death. 'It is effeminate to cherish such fears; the great and good have always despised it; it is a deliverance from

innumerable and intolerable evils; it introduces us to the society of the great and good; it frees us from fleshly passions and infirmities; it is a small thing in itself, and has been rendered terrible only by the exaggerations of the poets; and finally, if it is the extinction of being, it is no evil, because it delivers us from all suffering; if it be not an extinction, it must be a great good.'

Such are the considerations, by which one of the greatest men who ever adorned the heathen world, labours to cheer himself and his friends, when looking forward to the hour of dissolution. Are they props on which we can lean? Are most of them any thing more than the result of a Stoicism, which appears in a higher measure still, among the Aborigines of our western wilds? God be thanked, that the Christian, while walking through the dark valley of the shadow of death, has a rod and a staff to lean upon, which will hold him up in a very different manner! Who can bring the example of a *moral* triumph in a dying hour, on the part of a heathen? The death of Socrates comes the nearest to it, of any thing I have ever read or heard. Yet this falls immeasurably short of such a triumph as the humblest Christian may enjoy. All the darkness of the heathen system seems to be concentrated about the dying bed of a heathen; while all the glories of the upper world are opened upon the dying Christian.

One question more remains of deep and affecting interest. To what height of assurance or confidence, did the hope of a heathen that he should exist and be forever happy beyond the grave, ever arise?

Interesting as this question is, the manner in which Cicero philosophizes, makes it difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, in respect to his real subjective conviction. The Athenian schools of philosophy, as is well known, became, in several of their branches, quite inclined to skepticism. The Epicureans and Acataleptics, in particular, were of this character; and generally, the later Platonists were inclined to admit only *subjective* certainty, as the result of inquiry and argument, without undertaking to decide that any thing was *objectively* certain. This skeptical position of mind they honoured with the names of *modesty* and *diffidence;* and they held that any thing aside from this, savoured of dogmatism and arrogance, and was unworthy the name and office of a philosopher.

Cicero takes great pains to confine himself, as to the general tone of his discussions, within the boundaries which the later Platonists had prescribed to themselves; and which, indeed, Socrates himself seems to have not unfrequently commended by his example. Thus, near the commencement of his discussion (in § 1), Cicero, in reply to his Collocutor, who requests him to shew that death is not an evil, says: "I will unfold this matter, according to the best of my ability; yet not like the Pythian Apollo, so that what I may utter, will be certain and established; but like a man of small capacity, one of the multitude, seeking out by conjecture the things that are probable." This we might well put merely to the score of modesty, and regard the writer as designing simply not to raise great expectation in the reader, provided the passage were the only one of its kind. But this is not the case,

In § 4, after recounting various opinions respecting the soul, he says: "Which of all these opinions is the true one, let some god determine; which is the most probable, is a great question." So then *probability* was all he expected to arrive at, by his inquiries. Understood in one way, this might indeed be all that we need to ask for, on the ground of *satisfactory* assurance; but construed in another and philosophic way, it would seem to amount merely to a subjective conviction or balance of the mind, on the whole, in favour of the doctrine that the soul is immortal.

That Cicero alternated between the first and second of these states of mind, is altogether probable. In § 9, he makes his Collocutor request him to prove, that the soul survives the death of the body. Cicero replies, that Plato has already done this in such a way as admits of no improvement. The respondent then says (as before quoted), that 'he knows not how it is; yet such is the fact, that whenever he is reading Plato [the Phaedo], he gives his assent; but when he lays it aside, and begins to meditate on the immortality of the soul, the arguments seem to glide away from him.' Was not this Cicero's own case? And does he not make known to us a very common state of his own mind, in developing that of his Collocutor? I cannot doubt that such is the fact. In the midst of the perpetual hurry and confusion of business, in which Cicero was nearly all his life engaged, he could think but very little of Plato's Phaedo, or of any other arguments of the like nature. But when he was exiled from the forum and the Senate, and dared not mingle with the distinguished citizens of

the capital, in order to enjoy their society, then he turned inwards upon himself, and began seriously to consider what he was, and whither he was going. The result of this consideration he has set before us, in the delightful treatise which has given occasion to these remarks.

Once more, let us see how the fashion of the times wrought upon his mind, in regard to the expression of his convictions. In § 36, he gives us a long extract from the speech of Socrates to the judges, who had condemned him to death. In this speech Socrates says, that 'whether death be the end of our being, or not, it is deliverance from great evil, and altogether desirable.' After giving such a turn to his discourse as to show, that his predominant belief was in a continued existence, the Athenian philosopher subjoins: "But it is time for me to go hence, in order that I may die; for you, that you may live: yet which of these is best, the immortal gods know, but no man can well decide." "Nothing," says Cicero, "in his whole speech, is better than this." This same writer afterwards subjoins, however, a hint in what manner we are to understand declarations of this nature, by such men as Socrates and Cicero. "As to what he [Socrates] says," adds Cicero, "viz. that no one besides the gods knows which would be best, this same thing he himself does know; for he had already affirmed it. Nevertheless he abides by his own maxim even to the last, which was, to make no categorical assertions."

Such, I would hope, was the case with Cicero; in particular, during the latter part of his life. My meaning is, that I would hope his belief was more

firm and abiding, than his expressions at times would seem to indicate. The noble passage at the close of the present treatise, would seem to develope a state of mind like to that which he ascribes to Socrates; although, like this philosopher, he is careful to avoid all categorical assertions. The passage is in § 42, and runs thus: *We did not come into being without some purpose; we did not spring from chance; but there was some Power, who exercised an oversight respecting the human race. Nor would such a Power bring that into being, or continue to support it, which, when it had endured so many labours, should sink down in everlasting death. No;* THERE IS SOME HAVEN OF REST, SOME ASYLUM PREPARED FOR US.

It is delightful to think, that there were times, when the mind of Cicero could rise to such an apparent degree of assurance as this. That such was really the fact, would seem probable, from his occasional declarations in regard to the sufficiency and strength of the argument to prove the immateriality and immortality of the soul; for he united these indissolubly together. In § 25 he says: "Whether the soul is igneous, or aerial, matters nothing as to the object now in view. At present you must simply consider, that as you know the existence of a God to be certain, although you are ignorant of his dwelling-place and of his appearance; so the existence of your own soul ought to be considered as a matter of certainty, although you know nothing of its dwelling-place or its form." He then goes on to say, that "unless we are absolutely *leaden* in physics, we must acknowledge that there is in the soul nothing mixed, concrete, copulate, augmented,

or duplicate; and consequently, that the soul can neither be separated, divided, cut in pieces, nor torn asunder; and therefore it cannot perish."

It matters not, whether the argument will abide the test of philosophy at the present day. Plainly it will not; as there can be no proof *a priori*, that a simple substance may not be temporary, as well as a compound one; nor can we prove in the way of ratiocination simply, that the soul may not die as well as the body, although in entirely a different way. Enough that Cicero expresses himself without any doubt, in regard to the point in question. A man must be, in his estimation, absolutely a leaden-headed fellow (plumbeus), to believe that the soul is otherwise than immaterial and imperishable.

So in § 19; after producing the argument of Plato respecting the spontaneous motion of the soul, as establishing its eternity, he says, that 'although all the *plebeian* philosophers, (for so he may call all those who differ from Socrates and Plato), should join together, they could never produce any thing so elegant and so acute as this.' Hence he concludes, that 'as the mind is self-moved, it is never deserted by itself. Hence too, it follows that it is eternal.'

Once more; in § 24, after that most noble passage which argues, from the works of creation and providence, the existence of a Creator and Governor of all things, Cicero subjoins: "So the soul of man, although you do not see it, (and in like manner you do not see God), yet, as you acknowledge the being of a God, from the consideration of his works, so you should acknowledge the divine en-

ergy of the soul, from its memory, invention, celerity of motion, and every kind of virtue adorned with beauty."

After considering these and the like passages, in Cicero's works, we cannot doubt, that in the hour of cool reflection and sober argument, he had an overwhelming conviction of the reality of a future existence; although in his sportive or skeptical hours he might act, and probably did act, the part which he assigns to his Collocutor. That he expresses himself occasionally in a manner somewhat partaking of *σκέψις*, may, on the whole, be fairly put to the same account, as that to which he assigns the seemingly skeptical expressions of Socrates.

See now, as a confirmation of this, the manner in which he expresses himself, when, looking away from philosophical argument, his mind was filled with other views and other sympathies. In his *Cato Major* or *De Senectute*, where he endeavours to defend old age against the objections made to it, he labours, near the close of the treatise, to shew that the certain nearness of death is no valid objection. His reason is, that death is no evil; for the soul is immortal, and will survive the body, and be happy. When speaking of the various powers and capacities of the soul, he says, in the conclusion: "It is not possible that what contains such divine powers, should be mortal." After recapitulating, very briefly, a great part of the arguments used in the first book of the Tusculan Questions, in favour of the immortality of the soul, he thus exclaims in view of a future state: "O praeclarum diem, cum ad illud divinum animorum concilium

coetumque proficiscar, cumque ex hac turba et colluvione discedam! Proficiscar, enim, non ad eos solum viros, de quibus ante dixi; set etiam ad Catonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate praestantior."

He means, that he shall, after death, be with Cato Major, whose body he had burned, but whose soul was gone to the world of spirits. This Cato, whom Cicero so highly valued, lived to a very old age; retained the full vigour of his faculties, so as to study Greek at the age of eighty; and was a remarkable example of cheerfulness and happiness, in the decline of life. On this account, Cicero gives his treatise on old age the title of *Cato Major*.

Thus we see, that "God has not left himself without witness." Even among the heathen, he has enstamped his own image upon our nature. But while we cheerfully and gratefully recognize this truth, it is equally plain, on the other hand, that perverse as men are, and estranged from God, this image has been *distinctly* discerned by very few, who were not enlightened by revelation. Even those who have seen it most clearly, have not been able to free themselves from doubts and fears. It must be so. More light is needed, to afford an overwhelming conviction to minds darkened like ours. Simple, unperverted, unadulterated reason, might be well satisfied that the soul is immortal; but where is such reason to be found among the heathen? A revelation, therefore, was needed, in order to confirm and impress this great truth.

We rise, then, from the perusal of Cicero's *aureus libellus*, with gratitude to God, that he has so made human minds, as to emit, in every condition,

some sparks of the celestial fire of which they are composed. We thank him that the heathen were prompted to look upwards, and to long and sigh after immortality. But our souls should overflow with still higher gratitude, so often as we call to mind that the path of happiness is now made plain; that light from heaven is beaming with full radiance upon it; that LIFE AND IMMORTALITY ARE BROUGHT TO LIGHT IN THE GOSPEL.